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SUMMARY 
 
The early phases of the defense acquisition process require decisions that impact 
the capability of the US armed forces and the allocti n of billions of dollars of taxpayer 
resources.  Because acquisition programs often stretch for more than a decade, the 
operational, technological, financial, and political l ndscapes may be very different at 
system delivery than when the early acquisition decisions were made.  This deep 
uncertainty poses a wide variety of challenges to military planners and systems designer.  
The current revolution in military affairs and the rise of asymmetric warfare has 
magnified these problems by increasing the uncertainty around adversary capability and 
the complexity of the systems-of-systems being designed. 
The current defense acquisition process suffers from a lack of the ability to 
compare alternatives based on their robustness in a r gorous, quantitative fashion.  A 
survey of the literature for robustness evaluation in engineering and the current state-of-
the-art in defense acquisition identified the opportunity to develop a new method 
applicable to the defense acquisition process.   
Other disciplines were searched for methods that could be used or used with 
modification for robustness evaluation in the defense acquisition process.  Long-term 
policy analysis was identified as a promising field for methods based on its similar 
uncertainty, magnitude of risk, and time-horizon.  A cross-fertilization of two techniques 
from long-term policy analysis, massive scenario generation and regret analysis, was 
identified as having promise for addressing robustness early in the defense acquisition 
process.  Regret, in this context, is a measure of the degree to which a system falls short 
 xxiv 
of the optimum for a particular scenario.  In order to overcome the challenges associated 
with using these two techniques for early defense acquisition, a new methodology was 
developed that coupled regret analysis and massive cenario generation with surrogate 
modeling techniques in a parametric environment. 
The hypotheses presented in this work were tested using a modeling and 
simulation environment based on a strike mission in Operation Desert Storm.  The first 
experiment tested the feasibility of a Parametric Scenario Generator, used to rapidly 
develop and execute a large set of scenarios for concept evaluation in the FLAMES 
agent-based modeling and simulation environment.  The second experiment developed 
and tested a formal mathematical definition of Globa  Regret, which can be used to 
compare concepts in the early defense acquisition pr cess.  Additionally in the second 
experiment, the feasibility of approximating concept regret across the plausible scenario 
space with surrogate models was shown.  The work for the second experiment was 
conducted in the JMP statistical package.  The third experiment, also conducted in JMP, 
showed the used of a Filtered Monte Carlo Decision-Making technique for navigating the 
regret of concepts across the plausible scenario space.  Each of the experiments 
performed in the hypothesis testing phase supported the hypotheses of the dissertation. 
The methodology is demonstrated by using an example based on the US Air 
Force’s persistent, precision strike mission.  Eight major tasks, identified from the DoD 
documentation of the defense acquisition process, were completed to demonstrate the 
application of the Global Regret Analysis Methodology in a relevant defense acquisition 
process.  A DoE of five concepts, including concepts with distribution of tasks among 
platforms and swarming approaches, were evaluated using a Parametric Scenario 
 xxv 
Generator for a time-critical-target mission.  The results of this DoE were fitted with an 
Artificial Neural Network type surrogate model, whic  was then used to explore concept 
regret over the entire scenario space.  Based on the regret landscape and the Global 
Regret values, two concepts were identified as promising for future investigation. 
 Global Regret Analysis was qualitatively compared to five state-of-the-art 
robustness methods using a wide variety of criteria.  The Technique for Ordered 
Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution, a multi-attribute decision making 
technique, was used to compare the methods. Depending on the importance of the 
criteria, any of the methods could be found to be the “best”, however, for the majority of 
importance weightings, Global Regret Analysis was the strongest choice. 
 Global Regret Analysis shows promise for application n a number of areas of 
defense acquisition.  In the early, Pre-Milestone A Function Solutions Analysis and 
Analysis of Alternatives, Global Regret Analysis provides the opportunity to understand 
the robustness of alternatives across a wide variety of plausible futures.  Because these 
analyses are where the majority of the design is “locked in” and occur many years before 
the design’s fielding, it is imperative to understand how the effectiveness might change 
with differing operational conditions.  Additionally, once a system is selected or fielded, 
the landscape of effectiveness relative to operation l scenarios can be quickly understood 
because of the parametric nature of Global Regret Analysis.  Because of the mathematical 
formulation of Global Regret, the visualization of regions of the scenario space where a 
concept is “best” is intuitive.  This visualization also allows for the rapid identification of 
areas of poor effectiveness relative to the other alt natives.  As information about actual 
 xxvi 
operating conditions becomes available, corrective action can be taken based on this 
understanding of the effectiveness landscape. 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Shift in Warfare 
A major doctrine shift is underway in the United States Department of Defense (DoD).  
Historically, warfare has been conducted by massing forces to do battle with an enemy of 
comparable strength and intelligence [73].  These peer-on-peer battles were characterized 
by an enemy who was clearly identifiable and fought by a set of rules established by 
international treaty or convention.  In these types of peer-on-peer conflicts, a set of fairly 
simple relationships can be used to determine which side will prevail [71]. 
 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, the landscape of warfare has 
drastically changed.  Technologies perfected in the past century have greatly magnified 
the potential for non-state actors to wield influenc  on an international scale. 
Consequently, the US Military must adapt its mission t  fight not only the large battles of 
the peer-to-peer conflict era, but also battles against small groups, many of whom blend 
easily into the native population.  These conflicts can be labeled “small wars,” and their 
growing importance presents a major challenge for defense planners. 
 
The United States has engaged in small wars for nealy all of its existence.  From 
operations in Tripoli during the First Barbary War [252] to the Boxer Rebellion in China 
[185] and to the operations in Bosnia in the late 1990s [32], the US has consistently 
deployed forces to “hot-spots” around the world.  These small wars have typically 
garnered less attention than the major conflicts because of their expeditionary nature and 
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small drain on national resources.  In many cases th e operations have been entirely 
prosecuted by the United States Marine Corps, which under the expeditionary model was 
almost completely self sufficient for the duration of many small conflicts.  The 
expeditionary nature of these conflicts required Marines to integrate their fighting forces, 
land, sea, and air, and logistics support into a cohesive force that could win battles far 
from reinforcements or supply lines.   
 
The integrated approach used by the Marine Corps has historically enabled the 
expeditionary warfare model. [232]  As non-state actors become more important on the 
world stage, a concept closely coupled with fourth-generation warfare [245], the DoD has 
laid out a strategy that brings its functions closer to the Marine Corps model, currently 
the MAGTF.  This new strategy is commonly known as the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). Central to the new strategy are “joint operations,” where multiple 
services coordinate to achieve a goal [128].  The enabling technology approach for 
allowing soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, who exist in different command 
structures, to effectively prosecute joint missions is the network centric battlespace. 
 
The network-centric warfare environment offers the potential to greatly increase the 
effectiveness of the military System-of-Systems (SoS). By employing mixed units, the 
military gains the advantages of having each type of unit, but must effectively coordinate 
the units.  These coordinated units can potentially engage enemies from small, military 
operations other than war, for example stability and security operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, to large scale conflicts with emerging adversaries such as China and Russia. 
 
The benefits of network centric joint operations are not without cost, however, and the 
change in doctrine has forced a change in the way the DoD acquires systems.  While 
military systems previously served only the branch by which they were purchased, 
 3 
systems must now operate successfully in the integra d battlespace.  These systems are 
designed based on the capability they provide for joint operations, instead of a set of 
requirements.  Additionally, the technology required to integrate systems into the 
network-centric environment has greatly increased the cost of military systems.  This 
increased cost means that fewer weapons can be purchased, so their effectiveness must be 
assured.  According to Soban, the system effectiveness must be a product of the mission 
effectiveness over a wide variety of possible scenarios, and the cost that is required to 
achieve that effectiveness. [213] 
 4 
1.2 MDAP Failures 
 
The RMA has led to many changes to doctrine level policies in the DoD.  The acquisition 
process, which develops military systems while working closely with industrial suppliers, 
traditionally has taken many years to field new systems.  Especially in the case of Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), which may stretch for two decades or more, the 
RMA has greatly impacted whether programs face cut-backs or cancellations. 
 
Two MDAPs in the past 5 years have suffered high profile cancellations.  In both cases, 
the programs were cancelled during prototype testing, a d government investment in the 
programs were both several billions.  The Comanche helicopter and Crusader artillery 
system programs are discussed briefly in the following sections, and will serve as case 
studies for identifying new challenges in the defense acquisition process brought about by 
the RMA. 
1.2.1 Comanche 
“The RAH-66 Comanche… is the centerpiece of the Army’s odernization efforts for the 
next decade [1995-2005].” [149] 
 
In 1995, the Army’s reconnaissance fleet was composed of over 80% Vietnam-era OH-
58 Kiowa helicopters.  The Army’s attack fleet consisted of a significant number of AH-1 
Cobra helicopters, another Vietnam-era aircraft.  The age of these aircraft place 
significant limitations on the Army’s aviation operations, especially with respect to night 
operations, and high-altitude, high-temperature operations.  Additionally, the 




The role of the Comanche (Figure 1) was to be eyes and ears for advancing Army units in 
a fast paced battlefield.  Because of its emphasis on low Radar-Cross-Section (RCS), the 
Comanche would be able to penetrate enemy lines and coordinate attacks from other 
units.  It addition, the Comanche would be able to engage a substantial array of targets 
with its air-to-air missile, air-to-ground missiles and rockets, and 20mm turreted cannon. 
[105] According to a Congressional Budget Office report, the Comanche “could make the 
total combat fleet over 30 percent more capable in 2025 than [was in 1995].” [149] 
 
 
Figure 1: Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche 
 
The improvements in Army helicopter capability provided by Comanche did carry a high 
price tag.  In addition to the estimated 30 billion dollars (FY1996) to acquire the size 
Comanche fleet scheduled in 1995, the program would come at the cost of modernizing 
the Army’s utility helicopter fleet.  The utility helicopter fleet suffered many of the same 
age-related issues as the reconnaissance aircraft, and was badly in need of upgrades or 
replacement.  The Congress presented four alternatives to the existing Comanche 
program, in 1995, that would allow an interim update of the Army’s helicopter fleet, both 
utility and attack.  Three of the four alternatives involved the complete cancellation of the 
Comanche program, and the fourth involved another scale back. [149] 
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The Comanche program managed to survive the attacks in the mid-1990s and the first 
prototype flew in 2003.  However, in initial test flights some serious technical issues were 
identified that still needed to be overcome, including “software integration and testing of 
mission equipment, weight reduction, radar signatures, antenna performance, gun system 
performance, and aided target detection algorithm performance.” [105]  Despite the 
deficiencies, Sikorsky Aircraft and Boeing both invested heavily in infrastructure for 
Comanche production including a 20,000 square foot assembly facility in Philadelphia. 
[2] 
 
In 2004, the DoD officially cancelled the Comanche program.  Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfield’s vision for the new US forces brought large scale spending programs that 
were perceived to be relics of the cold war under renewed attack, and it was determined 
that the Comanche did not meet the needs of the future US Army.  There was additional 
concern that Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems would be available before 
Comanche’s service date that would be able to perform the same mission at a lower cost 
and risk to pilots lives. [105]   The budget allocated for the Comanche was shifted to 
upgrading existing helicopter systems, and the purchase of 800 new Blackhawk 




In 1991, Operation Desert Storm provided the first opportunity to test the effectiveness of 
many US systems in what was anticipated to be a peer-to-near peer war.  In the ground 
phase of the campaign, the US relied on a strategy that involved very rapid movement of 
armor.  The M1 Abrams Main Battle tank, powered by a 1500 horsepower Lycoming 
Textron gas turbine [85], moves at somewhere near 50kph in the dark. [56] Other highly 
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mobile units, such as the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MRLS), were able to keep up 
with the M1 and offer support in engaging the Iraqi rmored forces.  However, a major 
hindrance to the operation was the performance of the Paladin Artillery system. [106] 
 
Current US doctrine for the execution of armor battles relies heavily on indirect fire 
artillery for destruction of enemy units and the cration of walls-of-steel to shield friendly 
units that are outmatched.  The use of offensive, indirect artillery fire greatly reduced the 
risk to forward reconnaissance and direct-fire armor units, e.g., the M1 Abrams.   
 
Unfortunately in this scenario, the diesel powered M109 Paladin, with a maximum speed 
of 56kph on highway, [106] was unable to keep up with the advancing US armor line.  
The Paladin batteries were forced to leapfrog forward, reducing by 50% the number that 
could fire at any given point, and also slowing theadvance of the other armor systems.  
Based on the shortcomings of the Paladin system on the modern, fast-paced ground 
battlefield, the DoD began investigating a replacement system for the Paladin in 1992. 
[106]  
 
The Crusader Artillery (Figure 2) system was meant to address an entire wish-list from 
the Army artillery community.  It featured a completely automatic loading and firing 
mechanism, could deliver 8 rounds simultaneously on a target, separated the crew from 
the ammunition storage and breach compartment, included a heavily armored crew 
compartment with state-of-the-art navigation and communication equipment, and had an 
estimated top speed of 48 kph cross-country.  Initially conceived as a relatively 
lightweight 155mm system, once all the various compnents had been added to the 
chassis, the prototype weighed in at nearly 70 tons.  This weight was prohibitive due to 
the necessity to air deploy the vehicle. [106] To put this weight in perspective, the 




Figure 2: Crusader XM2001 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer [234] 
 
 
As a solution to the weight issue, United Defense redesigned the Crusader as a 2 vehicle 
system, with a 3 man crew in each vehicle.  The second vehicle was for re-supply, and 
featured the same crew protections as the main vehicle.  The vehicles could conduct the 
complete re-supply mission without the crews leaving the compartment. 
 
The majority of the Army artillery community believd that the Crusader was on track to 
be an effective program that would meet the needs of the Army at its planned 2008 roll 
out.  However, when the DoD came under the guidance of Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfield, a major doctrine shift occurred which put the Crusader in jeopardy.  Secretary 
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Rumsfield envisioned the transformation of the US military into an expeditionary force, 
focused more on maneuver warfare and rapid deployment.  As a part of this 
transformation, he sought to eliminate programs that were viewed as a legacy of the cold 
war, namely the F-22 Raptor, the RAH-66 Comanche and the Crusader Artillery System.   
 
In May of 2002, Secretary Rumsfield requested and analysis of alternatives for US Army 
artillery if the Crusader were to be cancelled.  He allocated 30 days for the study, but 
terminated the Crusader program on 8 May 2002, before the delivery of the report. [146] 
He cited the crusader’s incompatibility with his vision for the new US military. “This 
decision is not about any one weapon system, but really about a strategy of warfare in his 
reasoning for the cancellation of the program.” [146] The crusader had cost 11 billion 
dollars to that point. 
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1.3 Judging Military Systems 
According to Pinker, Smith, and Booher, it is difficult, except in hindsight, to judge to 
goodness of a military system. [183]  Even then, however, most military systems will 
have only been used across a limited slice of the space of possible conditions for which 
they could have been used.  How the system would have performed in an environment 
outside of that for which it was tested will never r ally be known. 
 
It is difficult to find a concise list of metrics that can be used to define a good military 
system.  However, the Navy SEALS and US Marines do publish a list of the human 
characteristics that make a good leader or member.  These characteristics are summarized 
in the table below. [67], [112], [231] 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Marines and Navy SEALS 
Judgment Justice Dependability 
Integrity Decisiveness Tact 
Initiative Enthusiasm Bearing 
Unselfishness Moral Courage Physical Courage 
Knowledge Loyalty Endurance 
Drive Discipline Responsibility 
Accountability Ambition Honor 
Integrity Flexibility Creativity 
Discipline Learning Winning 
 
 
In order to come up with a list of high-level characteristics that might describe “good” 
military systems, the list of human characteristics will be examined to see if any are 
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applicable to non-human systems.  Of the elements o the list, endurance, integrity, and 
flexibility are the few characteristics that can relat  fairly directly to non-human systems.  
In the human sense of the word, endurance is the ability to maintain performance over 
time under adverse conditions.  Integrity is the quality that describes an ability to perform 
as expected by the standards of the military servic.  Flexibility is the ability to change or 
adapt to overcome obstacles to performance. 
 
While these three characteristics do describe things that are considered for the evaluation 
of military systems, they are not usually put in these terms.  The integrity of a system 
would usually be described as the manufactured quality of the system.  The endurance of 
a system might be described in terms of its expected service life.  And finally, the 
flexibility of a system could be either flexibility or robustness.  Some additional 
characteristics that are desirable in military systems are listed below. 
 
• High Performance 
• Long Service Life 
• Long Time Between Failures 
• Low Training Required (Simple) 
• Low Acquisition Cost 
• Low Maintenance Cost 
• Low Disposal Cost 
• Robust 
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find many more traits of “good” military systems, because, 
depending on their particular role in the military, the direction of desirability could 
change.  For instance, an infantryman might claim that lightweight would be a good 
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characteristic for a military system, but a mortarmn might disagree because a heavier 
mortar is the more stable.  Stability might be a good thing for a mortarman, but a bad 
thing for a high-performance fighter pilot. 
1.3.1 Focus of the Dissertation 
Because of the recent shift in the threats that the US Military must deal with, and the 
possible emergent of more peer and near-peer adversaries, this dissertation effort with 
focus on understanding the robustness of military systems.  Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfield said in 2004 that “you have to go to war ith the Army you have, not the 
Army you want.” [167]  While the Secretary’s comment was met with great criticism 
[192], in many situations his statement is entirely correct.  Given that defense acquisition 
programs often stretch for at least a decade, and that the buildup for a conflict often only 
lasts a few months, it is impossible to custom tailor the military’s systems for each 
possible engagements.  However, by ensuring systems are robust to a wide variety of 
possible operating conditions, the need to re-tool the military for every conflict could be 
reduced. 
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1.4 Establishing a Baseline 
Before brainstorming ideas for improvements to a process for the evaluation of systems-
of-systems, it is important to understand the state-of-the-art in robust decision making.  
The author could locate little information about methods for robust decision making 
written prior to the 1980s.  However, during the 1970s and 1980s there was a revolution 
in manufacturing processes in Japan and the United S ates, respectively.  The Quality 
Revolution [259] brought into light the need to design systems that would maintain 
performance levels while being insensitive to variations in the manufacturing process.  
While military systems need to be robust to more than just variations in manufacturing 
processes, the concepts of the quality revolution can be brought to bear on more general 
concepts of robustness. 
 
In general, robustness deals with the insensitivity of an aspect of a design, whether cost, 
performance, reliability, etc, to variations beyond the control of the designer.  In 
structural design of a wing, for example, a “robust structural design is one that in 
insensitive to inaccuracies in maneuver loads… due to the use of linear aerodynamic 
theory.” [262]  Additionally, a secondary piece of information that is useful for 
understanding the robustness of a process or product is nderstanding where that process 
breaks down. [126] 
 
Toward the end of the 1980s a series of methodologies emerged for addressing 
robustness in design.  These methodologies can be broadly grouped into two areas: 
optimizer based methods and non-optimizer based methods.  Advances in computing 
power and the ability to perform simulations earlier in the design process greatly aided 
the creation of these methods. 
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1.4.1 Non-Optimizer-Based Robustness Methods 
1.4.1.1 Taguchi’s Parameter Design - 1993 
Genichi Taguchi developed parameter design as a method of mitigating the effects of 
noises on the variability of manufactured products.  Taguchi defines a noise as a variation 
in “primarily… three sources: environmental effects, deteriorative effects, and 
manufacturing imperfections.” [219]  According to Taguchi, parameter design can reduce 
the impact of all three primary noise sources.  Parameter design takes place in both 
product design and production process design.  Taguchi also enumerates three important 
factors for robustness: technology readiness, flexibility, and reproducibility. 
 
Two primary metrics are used by Taguchi for evaluating he robustness of a process.  The 
process capability index, Cp, is defined as shown in Equation 1.  The tolerance is the 
amount of variation in the product that is allowable to remain within specification limits.  
The standard deviation quantifies the variation in the product output.  Taguchi does not 
account for any shift in the mean of the product output in the process capability index. 
 
Equation 1: Process Capability Index 
σ*6
Tolerance
Cp =  
 
 
The second metric used by Taguchi for evaluating the robustness of a process is the 
signal-to-noise ratio.  The noise in this formulation is a catch-all factor that includes 
variations from all three primary sources mentioned above.  This signal-to-noise ratio is 
analogous to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of electronic devices, where the signal of 




Taguchi’s formulation for robustness has some limitations because of the linear nature of 
the assumptions, and the lumping of all noise factors into a single term.   Additionally, 
fairly concrete knowledge of the system being analyzed is necessary to complete the 
signal-to-noise calculations.  Taguchi states that “new products cannot be developed 
smoothly and efficiently if the technologies needed for new product development and 
production are not available.” [219]  This requirement places a significant limitation on 
the use of Taguchi’s methods in the pre-technology development phase of the defense 
acquisition process.  Additionally, according to Park, et al., because of the orthogonal 
array used in Taguchi’s formulation, the examination of a broad design space, which is 
often seen in conceptual and pre-conceptual design of military systems, is difficult. [178] 
1.4.1.2 Robust Concept Design - 1995 
Ford and Barkan’s Robust Concept Design (RCD) attemp s to address a shortfall of 
Taguchi’s Parameter Design by incorporating robustness considerations earlier in the 
design process.  The creators of RCD elaborate on Taguchi’s concept of robustness by 
noting that “consistency of performance of all products and production processes is 
importantly affected by variations in their manufacture, variations in the conditions of 
their use and variations in the environment in which they operate.” [90] This expansion 
provides an important addition to Taguchi’s concept because it brings robustness out of 
the manufacturing process environment discussed by Taguchi and into the environment 
of the product’s entire life cycle.  Considering the entire life cycle is especially important 
for military systems because of the long life-span and the high cost to operate the 
systems.  Brigadier General Guy Townsend underlined th  long life-span of military 
systems when he pointed out that the US Air Force has “three generations of pilots who 
have flown [the B-52] -- grandfather, father, and son -- in the same family. If it lasts until 
2040, five generations will have flown the same plane.” [88] 
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Ford and Barkan rely on the same mathematical definition for robustness as Taguchi 
defines for Process Capability Index (Equation 1). However, citing Fabrycky, as well as 
general acceptance by the engineering community, the developers of RCD identify the 
problem definition and concept design phases of the product life cycle as the area with 
greatest impact on the quality of the product (as well as that with the greatest design 
flexibility).  The RDS “window of opportunity” for increasing the robustness of a product 




















RCD "Window  of 
Opportunity"
 
Figure 3: RCD Window of Opportunity [90] 
 
The method for developing a robust system from the conceptual design phase using RCD 
consists of four stages: Definition of the Robust Problem, Derivation of Guiding 
Principals, New Concept Synthesis, and Concept Evaluation and Selection and Iterative 
Refinement. [90]  RCD brings many important attributes, such as defining robustness as a 
primary goal, singling out and circumventing limiting constraints, however, the 
methodology does not address competing metrics, or significantly “outside-the-box” 
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design.  Many steps in the process refer to designer’s experience, existing prototypes or 
products, and empirical correlations, which limit the method’s applicability when 
prototyping or obtaining empirical data is extremely xpensive (e.g. major defense 
acquisition) and when designers may have few experiences with the type of system being 
designed. 
1.4.1.3 Robust Flexible Design - 1999 
Kazmer and Roser developed a method for robust design with the goal of capturing both 
the negative effects of manufacturing variability and the potential positive effect of the 
manufacturing response. [131] Robust flexible design addresses two deficiencies in 
previous robust design methods: sensitivity to assumptions about variance in design 
parameters and lack of consideration of manufacturing esponse to flexibility.  The 
method addresses these two areas by examining “coresources of process variation… 
[and] incorporates an estimate of the manufacturing esponse to flexibly improve the 
product properties during production when faces with instances of significant variation or 
quality loss.” [131] 
 
Kazmer and Roser suggest the following equations for evaluating the robustness for a 
design with multiple criteria. 
 









































In Equation 2, Ri is the robustness of the ith performance parameter, phi is the normal 
cumulative density function, and n is the number of performance parameters.  This 
formulation allows robustness to be evaluated against several performance metrics, which 
may include both design and manufacturing parameters. 
 
The methodology for implementing the above formulation requires knowledge of several 
factors which likely will not be available for designers working in the Pre-Milestone A 
phases of the Defense Acquisition Process.  The method requires knowledge of product 
specification limits, design and manufacturing variables to a sufficient level to estimate 
variations in process outputs, estimates of variations in both design and process outputs 
and manufacturing properties. This becomes especially challenging because 
manufacturing design is typically not taken into consideration until much later in the 
Defense Acquisition Process. 
1.4.1.4 Methods at the Georgia Institute of Technol ogy - 1996 to 
present 
Robust Design Simulation (RDS) was developed at the ASDL at Georgia Tech to address 
uncertainty at numerous levels of the design hierarchy.  The goal in RDS is to quantify 
the uncertainty associated with a system and mitigate its effects.  RDS defines uncertainty 
as the error between a mathematical model and reality, with respect to the system model, 
its inputs, or the operating environment.  In the development of RDS effort was made to 
remove reliance on obsolete historical databases. 
 
The effect of uncertainty in engineering analyses is extremely important, however, 
according to Mavris, “even the most elegant decomposition, approximation, and 
optimization schemes cannot properly account for imprecise contributing analyses, 
uncertain operating conditions, and ambiguous design requirements.” [159]  Uncertainty 
 19 
leads to the second criterion that is evaluated along with the objective function’s expected 
value, the variability of the objective function. 
 
Central to RDS is the ability to model the vehicle sizing and synthesis and the 
environment in which it will operate.  The method first conducts ANOVA to determine 
the significant variables for the system level metrics.  After the variable screening, 
response surface equations are used to model the syst m and Monte Carlo Analysis is 
conducted.  The results of the Monte Carlo Analysis are viewed in the form of probability 
density functions (PDF) and cumulative density functions (CDF).  These PDFs and CDFs 
are used to establish a likelihood of meeting target values. [155] 
 
Two opportunities to improve RDS involve the inability to determine what regions of the 
scenario space contribute to poor system performance d providing a method for quickly 
comparing vastly different system concepts.  Understanding the relationships between 
regions of the scenario space and the relative merits of different concepts is important 
information for decision makers.  Because the capability- ased analysis sought in the 
current defense acquisition paradigm requires consideration of many different approaches 
to meeting capability goals, traditional sizing and synthesis approaches are typically 
inadequate for the comparison. Additionally, the Monte Carlo approach of RDS suffers 
from some shortcomings because of the tendency of the distributions to ignore corner 
cases because of the Central Limit Theorem.  This can become particularly problematic if 
the scenario space is characterized by an intelligent adversary trying to drive the scenario 
to technological or tactical limits. 
 
In addition to the work at the ASDL, the System Realization Laboratory in the School of 
Mechanical Engineering at Georgia Tech has been addressing the design of robust 
systems through the use of “Families of Systems.”  Families of systems are developed on 
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a common baseline model that has been designed such that the system may be 
continuously developed and improved to create several generations of systems that meet 
increasingly demanding constraints. [114] This approach is somewhat analogous to the 
spiral development approach favored by defense acquisitions prior to the RMA. 
 
The majority of the work within the systems realization laboratory has focused on the 
product-process design and creating families that are robust to evolving constraints 
within that process.  The techniques include the usof Design of Experiments and 
Response Surface Approaches, a form of surrogate models.  The work has not, however, 
focused on SoS or the impacts of changing environmental factors after the product’s 
manufacture. 
 
Much of the work of the families of systems approach is focused on improving the 
flexibility of the systems for later adaptation to changing constraints.  This approach is as 
opposed to choosing a system initially that’s effectiveness will be insensitive to changing 
constraints.  Both approaches have the ability to produce a “robust” solution, however, 
the families of systems approach requires some amount f redesign as the changes in 
constraints occur.  These two approaches, flexibility in the design process versus 
selecting an insensitive design initially, represent the main two approaches to selecting a 
design that maintains effectiveness over a wide variety of plausible futures.  However, 
the selection of the insensitive concept provides advantages after the system has been 
fielded. 
 
While the design of flexible systems is desirable in the design phases of the system, once 
the system has been fielded it has potential drawbacks for military systems.  One feature 
of the RMA is the shift toward expeditionary warfare, where supply chains are long or 
forces must self sustain.  In those cases, flexible systems that require additional 
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components have the potential to create logistics problems for the forward forces.  The 
flexible components must be stored, transported, maintained, and implemented, and all of 
those tasks require additional manpower and expense.  This approach is counter to the 
desire to increase the “tooth-to-tail” ratio of the armed forces.  Systems that are 
insensitive to changes in environmental and usage conditions, however, do not require 
this additional logistics footprint. 
 
1.4.2 Optimizer-Based Robustness Methods 
1.4.2.1 Wilde - 1992 
Wilde expands Taguchi’s Parameter Design method by introducing the idea of a “quality 
margin” that allows the designer to use a mathematical optimizer to drive robustness.  
Wilde’s method incorporates quality into the constraints of the optimization problem, 
allowing multiple quality and performance factors to be considered simultaneously. [255]  
Wilde uses the following definition of the quality margin. 
 



















In Equation 1, the superscript # corresponds to the upper margin, while the subscript # to 
the lower.  T is the target value for the design, Y is the averag  value, and y is the sample 
value.  The quality margin is the difference between the specification limit and the largest 
possible deviation from target, normalized.  Therefor , perfect quality, with zero standard 
deviation on the process and a mean on target, would be expressed as 50/50. [255]  
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Wilde’s model relies on the assumption that a mathematical constrained optimization 
problem can be created for the problem at hand.  For relatively simple products and 
processes this is likely the case, however, modeling systems-of-systems in this manner 
may not be possible.  Additionally, multiple design objectives must be treated as 
constraints rather than as objectives.  This creates problems when trying to address the 
affordability of a system, where capability and cost must be simultaneously evaluated 
with other, sometimes qualitative, objectives. 
1.4.2.2 Robust Optimal Design - 1994 
The Robust Optimal Design (ROD) was developed by Lewis and Parkinson to understand 
how variability in input parameters and design variables impacts a design.  This type of 
study is also known as sensitivity analysis.  Lewis and Parkinson expanded on the work 
of Emch and Parkinson [77] from worst-case tolerance analysis to statistical tolerance 
analysis.  The use of statistical analysis instead of worst-case analysis allows the engineer 
to understand the impact of the probability of the variation in the variance of the final 
product.  This is especially important when a large number of products will be 
manufactured. 
 
ROD is based on a standard-form, multi-objective optimization problem with a number 
of constraints.  Lewis and Parkinson determined that a linear tolerance model was 
inadequate for modeling problems where the skewness of product within design 
tolerances is significant.  To address the skewness issue, the method uses a second-order 
tolerance model to solve the optimization problem. [145] 
 
A limitation of the ROD method is that it relies onthe use of differentiable mathematical 
models.  Additionally, because of the assumption that parameters will be modeled with 
normal distributions about some mean, infeasible combinations of inputs can result, 
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especially near the “tails” of the normal distribution.  For example, if the designer was 
using an aircraft’s cargo weight as a parameter that m y have a distribution (payload 
weight will  vary in military operations), it is mathematically possible to have a negative 
payload weight from the edges of the normal distribu ion, even though that value is not 
physically realizable. 
 
1.4.3 Criteria for a Systems-of-Systems Robustness Evaluation 
Method 
The existence of several methods for handling robustnes  during system design implies 
that criteria need to be established to compare the methods.  The goal in the comparison 
is to determine if any existing method suffice for r bustness analysis in the early stages 
of military system-of-systems design.  The following table of metrics was constructed 






















The earliest phases of the design process are where the 
majority of the product quality is determined 
Applicability in 
Conceptual Design 
The earliest phases of the design process are where the 
majority of the product quality is determined 
Robustness Evaluation at 
Capability Level 
Capability based acquisition  
Applicable to Systems-
of-Systems 
The revolution in military affairs has shifted design and 
acquisitions to networks-of-systems  
Applicable to Multi-
Objective Problems 
Military acquisitions are inherently multi-disciplinary 
designs that must meet many different objectives 
Applicability to 
Revolutionary Concepts 
The emphasis on technology incorporation into military 
systems brings many designs outside the realm of historical 
or empirical design 
Robustness Evaluation 
Based on Full Life Cycle  
The long, expensive lifespan of military systems (e.g. the 
B-52) means that the majority of costs are not spent in the 
design and manufacture 
Mathematical Definition 
of Robustness 
Military acquisitions emphasize quantitative analysis 
wherever possible (Reference DoD 5000) 
Optimizable A robustness term that can be optimized allows Multi-
disciplinary optimization to include robustness in with 
performance and cost 
Automated Reduction in design and re-design time is critical if many 
scenarios are to be studied 
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1.4.4 Comparison of Existing Robustness Methods 
The following figure (Figure 4) displays the author’s assessment of each of the five 
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Figure 4: Robustness Methods 
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1.5 Need for a New Method 
The results of comparing the robustness methods to the evaluation metrics (Figure 4) 
show that no existing method is entirely suited for application to early phases of military 
systems-of-systems evaluation.  It is also apparent f om the evaluation that Robustness 
Evaluation at the Capability Level, Applicability to Revolutionary Concepts, and 
Applicability in Pre-Conceptual design are areas where challenges may exist for applying 
a robustness methodology. 
 
Based on the assessment of existing robustness methods, the author asserts that a new 
method may be able to better evaluate robustness for military systems-of-systems.  This 




The current RMA has placed an increased burden on the defense acquisition community.  
The community must now acquire capabilities through the SoS they design and purchase, 
and those capabilities must be robust to a wide variety of possible adversaries and 
operational conditions.  Additionally, the SoS must be able to operate effectively in the 
joint operations environment, placing additional constraints on the designers. 
 
Two major failures of defense acquisition programs, the US Army’s Comanche 
Helicopter program and the US Army’s Crusader Artillery program, cost taxpayers 
billions of dollars with little useful military gain.  The failure of these two programs 
underscores the need to effectively design systems that will be robust to changing 
battlefield conditions and adversary sets.  Robustness is only one of many characteristics 
that can be used to judge military systems, but was selected because of the importance it 
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plays across all of the service branches.  It is also important to note that the success of a 
military system can only be truly judged in hindsight and that, even then, the system will 
have been used in only a narrow set of the possible and plausible battlefield conditions. 
 
The current state-of-the-art methods of robust design fall into two groups: optimizer-
based approaches and non-optimizer-based approaches.  T  methods were compared on 
the basis of applicability in pre-conceptual and conceptual design, robustness evaluation 
at the capability level, applicability to SoS, revolutionary concepts and multi-objective 
problems, their use of a mathematical definition for robustness, and finally the ability to 
optimize and automate the method.  Based on the assssment of existing robustness 
methods, the author asserts that a new method may be ble to better evaluate robustness 
for military systems-of-systems. 
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2.1 Introduction to Terms 
Before beginning an effort to create a new methodolgy for making decisions based on 
robustness, it is important to have a common understanding of the meaning of terms that 
will appear throughout this dissertation.  Only broad, overarching concepts will be 
addressed in this section, more specific concepts will be defined when they first appear in 
the methodology.  The section will begin by defining the terms associated with the title of 
the dissertation: A Methodology for the Robustness-Ba ed Evaluation of Systems-of-
Systems Alternatives Using Regret Analysis. 
2.1.1 Preference of Definitions 
Because the focus of this work is on military acquisitions, the DoD definition of terms 
will be preferred, unless it is found insufficient or non-existent.  In these cases, the 
definition used by individual branches of the US military will be used.  If multiple 
definitions exist across branches, the most suitable wil  be chosen.  If definitions can not 
be found in the DoD or across the service branches, professional association or academic 
definitions will be used. 
2.1.2 Robustness 
The concept of robustness has been discussed at length arlier in this document, including 
mathematical definitions that exist in the scientific and engineering literature.  The DoD 
and service branches do not offer a natural language definition for robustness, but refer to 
it in many documents.  Robustness has many connotations in natural language, but the 
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particular one of interest for this dissertation states that robust means “capable of 
performing without failure under a wide range of conditions.” [4]  The need to perform 
under a wide range of conditions is relevant for the vast majority of military system.  
Robustness will be given a mathematical definition later in this dissertation, but the 
natural language definition of robustness will be th ability of a system to perform over 
a wide range of conditions.  
 
The basic idea of robustness is to be insensitive to changes in a condition around which 
there is uncertainty.  In comparing optimal designs versus robust designs, it is expected 
that optimal designs will do better than robust designs in the conditions for which they 
were optimized, but worse than the robust designs in conditions far from those for which 
they were optimized.  Figure 5 and Figure 6 show a general and specific example of how 
robust solutions can be compared to optimal solutions.  In Figure 5, the effectiveness 
measure is plotted on the vertical axis, while the sc nario variable with uncertainty is 
plotted on the horizontal axis.  The peaked, black line might represent an optimal 
solution, while the more flat, red line might represent a robust solution to the same 
problem.  The effectiveness of the red line is less than that of the black line for the 
peaked region, but over the rest of the range of the scenario variable the red line is more 
effective.  The choice between the red and black solution would then depend on the 
likelihood of different values for the scenario variable. 
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Figure 5: Allocation of Axes for Robustness 
  
In Figure 6, a notional agricultural example has been provided.  The expected yields for 
three crops, agave, olives, and rice, have been shown as a function of the rainfall they 
receive in the summer months.  As can be seen in the figure, agave, a succulent, does 
well when rainfall is below 6 inches, but poorly above that amount because of root rot.  
Olives do well for a range of 5 inches to 13 inches of rain, but not above or below those 
amounts because of their Mediterranean evolution.  Finally, rice does well in very wet 
climates because of its need for standing water.  If the amount of rainfall was known, or 
subject to very little variability, a farmer would be able to select a single crop to 
maximize his or her yield.  This would be an optimal pl nting for the farmer.  However, 
if the amount of rainfall was unknown or subject to great variability, planting a mixed 




obtained.  This would be a robust planting for the farmer.  Two robust mixtures are 























Agave Yield Olive Yield
Rice Yield Mixed (equal) Yield
Mixed (more olive/rice than agave) Yield 
 
Figure 6: Notional Performance of Crops 
2.1.3 Evaluation 
The DoD defines evaluation, “in intelligence usage, [as the] appraisal of an item of 
information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy.” [236] The 
terms, credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy, however, do not fully capture the 
nature of evaluation that is desired for system-of-systems design problems.  The 
individual services do not offer appropriate definitions of evaluation beyond specific 
applications of the term.  Therefore, the definition of evaluation used in this dissertation 
will stem from a more general source. 
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Webster’s definition, which is both more general and more applicable to the concept of 
this dissertation, is “to determine the significance, worth, or condition of usually by 
careful appraisal and study.” [4]  The determination of worth is the fundamental task of 
weighing different approaches and alternatives in the early phases of the DoD acquisition 
process.  The worth is a collection of all the benefits and costs associated with a system 
over its life cycle.  The particular definition and treatment of benefits and costs will 
typically be problem specific, but the general concept in the early phases of defense 
acquisition is to maximize a ratio of benefits to costs.  The definition of evaluation for 
this dissertation will be a modification on Webster’s definition. 
 
Evaluation is the determination of worth (usually the ratio of benefits to costs), 
through careful appraisal and study. 
2.1.4 System-of-Systems 
In the Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) documentation, the 
DoD defines a “set or arrangement of systems that are related or connected to provide a 
given capability” [203] as a system-of-systems.  As Biltgen [24] observes, however, a 
system-of-systems is in and of itself a system.  Systems-of-systems, therefore, must be a 
subset of systems in general, and depends on the perspective of the individual describing 
the system.  For example, to a Federal Aviation Administration planner, the national 
passenger aerospace infrastructure is a complex set of systems that gives the nation the 
capability to move people rapidly across the continent.  However, to a government 
transportation planner, the aerospace infrastructure is one system within the overall 
transportation network, which is composed of automobile transportation, rail 
transportation, shipping, aerospace, etc. 
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Because of this dependence on perspective, the author will carefully define the systems 
that compose the systems-of-systems discussed in this dissertation, as well as the 
systems-of-systems themselves.  Before discussing systems-of-systems further, a 
definition of system will be presented. 
2.1.4.1 System 
The DoD defines a system as “a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related 
group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming 
a unified whole.” [129]  This definition does not, however, address a key aspect of a 
system: systems are created for a purpose.  The International Council on Systems 
Engineering (INCOSE) provides the following definition in the Systems Engineering 
Handbook: [123] “A system is a combination of interacting elements organized to 
achieve one or more stated purposes.”  The INCOSE definition includes the fact that 
systems are created to do something, but does not contain the detail about possible 
relationships provided by the DoD.  For this dissertation, the DoD definition will be 
expanded to include the INCOSE reference to a system’  purpose. 
 
A system is a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly 
interacting or interdependent elements organized to achieve one or more stated 
purposes. 
 
This definition is consistent with the United States Air Force (USAF) Acquisition 
Community definition of a system. [172]  By carefully defining the meaning of a system 
for this dissertation, the applicability of the methods developed herein can be more 
effectively determined.  If a particular application in inconsistent with the definitions 
used, addition effort will be required to determine f the method is suitable. 
 34 
2.1.4.2 Defining System-of-Systems 
The DoD definition of a system-of-systems gives a good starting point for determining 
definition that should be used in this dissertation.  However, the Department of the Navy 
expands on the basic DoD definition by adding “the loss of any part of the system will 
degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole.” [64] This addition to the definition 
implies that not only do the systems interact when providing a capability, but they are 
also interdependent when providing that capability.  The INCOSE definition of a system-
of-systems also alludes to this interdependence by stating that the systems alone can not 
produce the same results. [123] 
 
Biltgen cites five characteristics compiled by Maier [24], [150] as critical distinctions for 
systems-of-systems: emergent behavior, evolutionary development, operational 
independence of the elements, managerial independence of the elements, geographic 
distribution.  Biltgen identifies the emergent behavior as the primary purpose of the 
system, which follows logically from the INCOSE definition.  The two characteristics 
relating to the independence of the systems within e system-of-systems, managerial 
independence and operational independence, indicate th t the systems are useful without 
the system-of-systems and are sometimes used indepently of the system-of-systems.   
 
Biltgen observes that the geographic distribution of the system implies that only 
information can be readily transferred between elemnts, not mass or energy.  However, 
the author would counter by suggesting that the USAF’s refueling fleet and strike fleet 
are independent systems, yet the refueling fleet transfers energy (in the form of mass) to 
the fighters during certain system-of-systems operations. 
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Evolutionary development of a system-of-systems hasbeen true for to this point.  
However, the newest systems-of-systems that are being developed for the US armed 
forces are being created from simultaneously developed systems.  The Army’s Future 
Combat System [14] is an example of a system-of-system  where nearly every system 
has been developed simultaneously. 
2.1.5 Regret 
The basic concept of regret for this dissertation is similar to the natural language usage, 
which relates to a sense of loss. [4]  However, to be able to use regret in a rigorous way it 
must be quantified, and therefore a loss must be relativ  to something.  Because regret is 
implicitly negative, it is desirable to eliminate the possibility of “negative regret,” which 
would be a double negative.  Therefore, the baseline to which regret will be measured is 
the best possible outcome in the particular scenario.  The definition of regret for this 
dissertation incorporates that concept. 
 
Regret is the difference between a system’s evaluation metric(s) and the best 
system’s evaluation metric(s) for a scenario. 
 
The origins of regret analysis and the justification f r its use in this dissertation will be 
discussed in the methodology section.  Additionally, a more formal mathematical 
definition will be presented in the methodology section. 
2.1.6 Analysis 
The DoD and service branches do not offer formal definitions for analysis.  According to 
Webster’s Dictionary, analysis comes from Greek roots that mean to “break-up.”  In 
mathematics, analysis is the “systematic study of real and complex-valued continuous 
functions.” [191] Webster also offers analysis as “n examination of a complex, its 
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elements, and their relations.” [4]  The mathematical definition and natural language 
definitions seem to offer two different views on analysis.  In mathematics, analysis is a 
very specific branch of mathematics (of which calculus is a part), whereas in the natural 
language analysis means to examine something by sectioning it in to sub-sections. 
 
For this dissertation, analysis will follow the natural language definition, but with one 
addition from the mathematical definition.  In studying problems for the defense 
acquisition process, it is important to be systematic.  A systematic approach provides 
several advantages in this context.  First, because of the transitional nature of the 
uniformed side of the DoD acquisitions community, a systematic approach with thorough 
documentation allows some continuity for the study, even as personnel change.  
Secondly, systematically studying acquisitions problems ensures that each problem 
receives consideration as rigorous as all others, or if not, the variation in rigor is justified.  
Finally, employing a systematic approach means that a custom, ad-hoc methodology does 
not have to be developed and tested for each problem; the success of the systematic 
method in previous applications builds credibility. 
 
Building on the Webster natural language definition, for this dissertation, analysis is the 
systematic examination of a complex by considering its elements and their relations. 
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2.2 Systems Acquisition in the DoD 
Use of robustness as a criterion for selecting military systems-of-systems requires 
understanding where in the defense acquisition process decisions relating to robustness 
are made.  The “window of opportunity” for system design indicates that addressing 
robustness as early as possible in the acquisition pr cess would be desirable.  This 
concept is further illustrated in Figure 7, but with the addition of a knowledge curve.  As 
Mavris shows in Figure 7, cost committed and design freedom are inversely proportional; 
therefore, by narrowing our system to a single concept, we have locked the majority of 
the design freedom and committed the majority of the cost. [158] 
 
 
Figure 7: “Cost-Knowledge-Freedom” Shift [158] 
 
Addressing robustness early in the acquisition process should aid in the shift of the 
“knowledge” curve to an earlier phase of the process, when there is more ability to 
change the design and less cost committed.  In order to identify areas in which robustness 




Figure 8: Complete Defense Acquisition Process [58] 
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2.3 Integrated Acquisition Process 
Figure 8 shows the Department of Defense’s Integratd Defense Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework.  The figure shows the interaction of 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the Defense 
Acquisition System, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process.  These three major areas correspond to the pink, yellow, and aqua rows in the 
figure, with major activities for each of the areas shown in the boxes within the rows.  
The events between major acquisition events are shown by color coding the boxes 
according to Table 3. 
 





Pre- Milestone A, 
Concept Refinement Phase 
Purple 
Pre-Milestone B, 
Technology Development Phase 
Green 
Pre-DRR 
System Integration Phase 
Pink 
Pre-Milestone C, 
System Demonstration Phase 
Blue 
Post Milestone C, 
Production and Deployment Phase 




As shown in Figure 8, the Integrated Defense Acquisition Technology and Logistics Life 
Cycle Management Framework involves many analyses, which occur at many levels of 
the government and industry contractors.  However, by looking at major components and 
processes first, the acquisitions process can be mor easily understood. 
 
Three interrelated tasks occur throughout the process: JCIDS, the Defense Acquisition 
System, and PPBE.  JCIDS can be thought of as essentially what the military or 
government needs.  The Defense Acquisition System is developing the system to fulfill 
the needs, and the PPBE is how to pay for that system.  The government and industry 
then work together, from left to right on Figure 8, to work through major milestones, or 
design reviews, before the system is actually delivered to the user.  There are six of these 
milestones or design reviews, which break the acquisition process into seven distinct 
phases. 
2.3.1 JCIDS 
JCIDS, which replaced the Requirements Generation System (RGS) in 2003, [58] defines 
the capabilities needed by the military or governmet and how systems designed to 
address capability gaps are to be evaluated, and is common to all branches of the US 
Military. [49] In a hierarchical systems decomposition [96], the capability level is the 
highest level objective, to which all other levels contribute.  The initial steps of the 
JCIDS process generally precede the initiation of the Defense Acquisition System or the 
PPBE.  The JCIDS continuously updates its information throughout the Integrated 
Defense Acquisition Technology and Logistics Life Cycle Management Process and 
exchanges information with the Defense Acquisition System and the PPBE.  The JCIDS, 
in the early phases of the management process, works t ward creating the Initial 
Capability Document (ICD), which guides most of theearly efforts. 
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There are four steps in the JCIDS methodology: Functio al Area Analysis (FAA), 
Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA), and Post 
Independent Analysis.  This analysis provides a picture of military needs for capabilities, 
due to gaps in current capabilities or emerging needs, and provides approaches to fill 
those capability needs.  An emphasis is placed on considering the capability in terms of 
the joint operating environment. [58] A detailed view of the JCIDS process that leads to 
the development of the ICD is shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: JCIDS Process [58] 
2.3.2 PPBE 
PPBE provides the funding for the development and acquisition of new military systems.  
Because this function involves the Do D, the White House, and the Congress, it is driven 
primarily by the government fiscal cycles.   While capability needs identified by the 
JCIDS drive the Defense Acquisition System, which in turn provides an estimate of the 
funds needed to design and procure the system, the PPBE group, by holding the purse 
strings, has final control over the project.  The Dfense Acquisition System attempts to 
provide cost information to the PPBE group by first using analogy and parametric 
studies, the transitioning to engineering estimates, followed by the actual procurement 
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costs.  As a result, the true Life Cycle Cost of the project emerges as a spiraling 
development of progressively higher fidelity analyses, which are finally replaced by the 
cost of the fully developed and purchased system. 
2.3.3 The Defense Acquisition System 
This section gives an overview of the Defense Acquisition System, as outlined in the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook [57], a publication of the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU).  The DAU is an organization within the DoD created in 1990 by the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act to better educate members of the Defense 
Acquisition Community.  It provides guidance to allbranches of the DoD with training 
courses in nearly all areas of the acquisition process. [59]  The DoD Acquisition process 
is outlined below in Figure 10.  In summary, the service User Needs and Technology 
Opportunities, as defined by the DoD in conjunction with industry technologists, feed 
into the initial three stages of the acquisition process.  These stages begin with a 
refinement of the concepts identified by the DoD and technologists, which is followed by 
a period of technology development.  Then the system goes through the actual RDT&E 
required to design, prototype and test the system.  The system is then produced according 
to the specification of the System Development and Demonstration phase and 
transitioned to the forces acquiring the system.  The final phase is the operation and 
support of the fielded system.  The detailed workings of each phase of the process are 





Figure 10: Defense Acquisition Process [57] 
 
2.3.3.1 User Needs and Technology Opportunities 
For more detailed information on the User Needs and Technology Opportunities section 
reference section 3.4 of DoD 5000.2.  This phase of the Defense Acquisition Process 
allows for the interaction between planners at the DoD, who are aware of military needs, 
and technologists and industry representatives, whoare aware of developing relevant 
technologies.  It roughly corresponds with the JCIDS process, but is primarily associated 
with the early phases of the JCIDS.  It is a parallel effort that must occur before any other 
phases, but is iterated upon based on the results of the milestone reviews.   
 
In the User Needs and Technology Opportunities phase, DoD planners are tasked with 
defining desired capabilities for directing the process of acquiring affordable system 
solutions.  The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), created by the DoD, provides the 
foundation for the initial system development investigations.  Technologist and industry 
representatives are tasked with identifying relevant technologies across a broad range of 
sources. While identifying possible technologies, they must ensure that the possibility for 
future competing contracts is not eliminated. [230] In short, the government is ensuring 
that technologists do not identify only their own technologies, therefore eliminating the 
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chance that they would have to compete for participation in the program.  Such action by 
the technologists could possibly reduce the performance or cost-effectiveness of the final 
system solution and is explicitly not allowed. 
 
The two key phrases in the DoD’s task are “defining capabilities” and “affordable” 
solutions.   Capability based design is a relatively new concept in the DoD that relates a 
system design directly to its addition of an ability for the military to successfully 
complete some action.  It emphasizes a top-down appro ch to design. [72]  Affordable is 
defined in the aerospace systems design field as a r tio of a system’s performance to the 
total life-cycle cost of acquiring, operating, maint i ing and disposing of the system. 
[154] 
 
2.3.3.2 Concept Refinement 
For more information on the Concept Refinement phase reference section 3.5 of DoD 
5000.2.  Concept refinement occurs directly after the approval of the ICD, which is 
mandatory for the program to continue.  Concept refinement is specifically the conduct of 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which is planned for in the ICD, and the development 
of the Technology Development Strategy (TDS).  The AoA functions as a systematic 
analysis of the possible alternatives for meeting the requirements of the ICD.  This AoA 
takes place before the initiation of any actual acquisition program, and specifically 
“refine[s] the selected concept documented in the ICD.” [230] The AoA is expected to 
focus on the risks, impact and expected maturation of critical technologies, and provide 
information for the TDS, a major item in Milestone A. 
 
In the AoA, the conceptual design space is reduced from a field of billions of possible 
system solutions [80], to a single, or in rare cases a very small group of, system 
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alternative(s).  This process occurs in a relatively short timeframe, usually less than a 
year, and must allow decision makers to determine that the concept selected will meet the 
needs of the military, be affordable, and be reasonbly close to some version of a “best” 
solution.  This process, unless conducted systematically, has the potential to leave out an 
acceptable level of analysis for many concepts, and can easily obscure the logic for 
filtering candidate system designs.  Therefore, much s rutiny must be given to the 
methodology to ensure soundness. 
 
The TDS, as the title suggests, provides a projected assessment of the ways in which 
technologies identified in the AoA, and relevant to the ICD, will mature.  Specifically, 
the DoD is concerned with the nature of an evolutionary approach to the system 
maturation or the possibility of a non-spiral development.  The TDS is expected to 
include estimates for the entire technology Research nd Development (R&D) effort, 
including costs, timelines, and testing plans. [57]  
 
Accurately predicting how technologies will mature is difficult, especially when they are 
in the early stages of development.  In many cases, to effectively judge the impact of a 
technology, much more information is needed than is available at the current 
development stage.  It is therefore important that e TDS accounts for the possibility of 
mature technologies providing a different impact than expected in the early conceptual 
design of the system-of-systems. 
2.3.3.3 Milestone A 
DoD 5000.2 outlines a set of requirements for initiation of the Technology Development 
phase that occurs after concept refinement (Figure 10), as well as an additional set of 
requirements for ship acquisitions.  These requirements are broken down into two 
categories: statutory requirements and regulatory requi ements.  Some requirements are 
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specific to Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) acquisition, and will not be 
discussed in this document. 
 
There are four statutory requirements for MDAP acquisition at Milestone A: the TDS, 
discussed in the previous section, a Consideration of Technology Issues, a Market 
Research report, and a CCA Compliance report.  The Consideration of Technology issues 
is discussed in DoD 5000.2, and also in 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2634.  
Information about the Market Research report is avail ble from 10 U.S.C. 3387 and 15 
U.S.C. 644(e)(2).  The CCA Compliance report is addressed in 40 U.S.C. Subtitle III 
Section 8088. [57] 
 
In addition to the statutory information, there are eight regulatory information 
requirements for MDAPS Milestone A.  Information about the specific requirements for 
all eight is available in DoD 5000.2. [230]  The regulatory information required includes 
the ICD, the AoA, a Component Cost Analysis, a Cost Analysis Requirements 
Description, a Systems Engineering Plan, a Test and Evaluation Master Plan, Exit 
Criteria, and an Acquisition Decision Memorandum. [57] 
2.3.3.4 Technology Development 
The technology development phase for all MDAPs other an ships is still considered to 
occur before the initiation of a new acquisition program.  The DoD has chosen to separate 
the technology development from the actual acquisition program in order to gain a more 
thorough understanding of the actual technology maturation.  The purpose of this 
technology development phase is to allow necessary technologies to develop, under the 
guidance of the TDS and ICD.  At the point where decision makers feel that the 
technologies have reached an acceptable level of military usefulness and have been 
proven in a relevant environment the Milestone B review is held.  In most cases, because 
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of the evolutionary nature of technology in most acquisition programs, the technology 
will not be fully developed at program initiation. [57] 
 
In order to support program initiation, the targeted system user is responsible for 
developing a Capability Development Document (CCD).  The CCD synthesizes 
information gained about the relevant technologies during the Technology Development 
phase and incorporates them into the context of the capabilities desired.  This document 
replaces the ICD during later program phases. [57] 
2.3.3.5 Milestone B 
Milestone B contains a breakdown of statutory and regulatory requirements similar to 
Milestone A.  It includes the statutory requirements of Milestone A, but adds the items 
shown in the first column of Table 4.  The regulatory requirements of Milestone B 
include those of Milestone A and add those requirements shown in the second column of 
Table 4.  These requirements outline the basic set of documents necessary to begin a 
MDAP.  They do not reflect those required for a MAIS, or a MDAP-ship.  The Milestone 













Table 4: Additional Requirement for Milestone B 
Statutory Requirements Regulatory Requirements 
Registration of Mission-Critical and 
Mission-Essential Information Systems 
Acquisition Strategy 
Benefit Analysis and Determination System Threat Asses ment 
Programmatic Environment Safety and 
Occupational Health Evaluation (PESHE) 
Technology Readiness Assessment 
Spectrum Certification Compliance Independent Technology Assessment 
Selected Acquisition Report 
Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence Support Plan 
(C4ISP) 
Live-Fire Waiver & Alternate LFT&E Plan Affordability Assessment 
Industrial Capabilities 
Operational Test Agency Report of 
Operational Test and Evaluation Results 
LRIP Quantities Program Protection Plan 
Independent Cost Estimate (CAIG) and 
Manpower Estimate 
 
Core Logistics Analysis/Source of Repair 
Analysis 
 
Competition Analysis  
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2.3.3.6 System Development and Demonstration 
DoD 5000.2 explicitly outlines “the purpose of the [System Development and 
Demonstration] SDD phase [as] development a system or an increment of capability; 
reduc[tion of] integration and manufacturing risk (technology risk reduction occurs 
during Technology Development); ensur[ance of] operational supportability with 
particular attention to reducing the logistics footprint; implement[ation of] human 
systems integration (HSI); design for producibility; ensur[ance of] affordability and the 
protection of critical program information (CPI) byimplementing appropriate techniques 
such as anti-tamper; and demonstrate[ion of] system integration, interoperability, safety, 
and utility.” [230] This phase is the non-technology related system design, and brings the 
system from a defined alternative to a producible system. 
 
2.3.3.7 Milestone C 
Milestone C is the final gateway before the system transitions into production and 
deployment.  The statutory and regulatory requirements for milestone C are shown in 
Table 5.  In each case, the documents must be updated to reflect the most current state of 











Table 5: Milestone C Requirements [57] 
Statutory Requirements Regulatory Requirements 
Consideration of Technology Issues Initial Capabilities Document  
CCA Compliance Capability Production Document 
Registration of mission-critical and 
mission-essential information systems 
Acquisition Strategy 
Benefit Analysis and Determination Analysis of Alternatives 
Programmatic Environment Safety and 
Occupational Health Evaluation (PESHE) 
Systems Engineering Plan 
Spectrum Certification Compliance System Threat Asses ment 
Selected Acquisition Report  Technology Readiness Aessment 
Industrial Capabilities Independent Technology Asses ment 
Independent Cost Estimate (CAIG) and 
Manpower Estimate (reviewed by 
OUSD(P&R)) 
Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Intelligence Support Plan 
(C4ISP) 
Core Logistics Analysis/Source of Repair  Affordability Assessment 
Competition Analysis Component Cost Analysis 
Technology Development Strategy Cost Analysis Requir ments Description 
Acquisition Program Baseline Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Cooperative Opportunities 
Operational Test Agency Report of 
Operational Test and Evaluation Results 
 Program Protection Plan 
 Systems Engineering Plan 
 Exit Criteria 




2.3.3.8 Final Phases 
Production and Deployment and Operations and Support make up the final two phases of 
the acquisition process.  The Production and Deployment phase assesses the operational 
effectiveness of the systems once obtained off the production line.  In addition, it focuses 
on the development of the necessary capabilities for the actual manufacture of the system. 
[62] Operations and Support provides engineering support through the life-cycle of the 
system. [57] In cases where deficiencies in the field performance of the system are 
identified, an analysis is conducted to determine whether the loss in effectiveness 
warrants an update of the design. 
 
The final phases of the defense acquisition system also require engineering analyses for 
the sustainment of the fielded system.  This sustainment can include maintenance 
procedure updates, small scale component re-design, trai ing, and end-of-service-life 




2.4 Analysis of Alternatives 
Based on the “window of opportunity” concept presented by Ford and Barkan, it is 
undesirable to address robustness when only a small amount of design freedom is 
available.  Also, as Mavris shows, selection of a design point locks down a great amount 
of design freedom.  Therefore, because in most cases the Analysis of Alternatives is the 
DoD process which selects the single design and locks down the design freedom, the 
evaluation of robustness should occur during or prior to the Analysis of Alternatives.  
The following sections will explore the current guidance available from the DoD for the 
conduct of the Analysis of Alternatives. 
 
AoAs are mandated by the DoD for all major acquisition programs, though the process 
for conducting an AoA is not explicitly directed by the DoD.  The DAU is the primary 
source for DoD guidance to all branches of the military with regard to the acquisition 
process, of which the AoA is a part.  The timing of the AoA in the overall defense 




Figure 11: Defense Acquisition Process [203] 
 
Each service maintains its own guidelines for the conduct of an AoA, within the 
framework set forth by the DAU.  These guidelines are more specific than those 
published by the DAU, but vary in scope among the services. 
2.4.1 Definition and Directive 
According to the DoD, an Analysis of Alternatives is defined as “the evaluation of the 
performance, operational effectiveness, operational suitability and estimated costs of 
alternative systems to meet a mission capability. The AoA assesses the advantages and 
disadvantages of alternatives being considered to sa isfy capabilities, including the 
sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables. The 
AoA is one of the key inputs to defining the system capabilities in the capability 
development document.” [203] The DoD specifies that the AoA is a mandatory 
procedure for MDAPS and MAIS Acquisition Programs. [230]  
 54 
 
The DoD, while not specifically outlining the process or steps involved in conducting an 
AoA, does provide guidance with respect to necessary components and goals of the AoA.  
The DoD specifies that the AoA shall assess multiple elements of project or program 
alternatives including “technical risk and maturity, and cost.” [230] 
 
The analysis shall be quantitative, and induce decision makers and staffs at all 
levels to engage in qualitative discussions of key assumptions and variables, develop 
better program understanding, and foster joint ownership of the program and program 
decisions. There shall be a clear linkage between th  analysis of alternatives, system 
requirements, and T&E MOEs [Test & Evaluation Measure  of Effectiveness] 
(Pub.L.104-106 (1996), Section 5123 and 44 U.S.C.3506). The analysis shall reveal 
insights into the program knowns and unknowns, and highlight relative advantages 
and disadvantages of the alternatives being considered. The activity conducting the 
analysis shall document its findings. [230] 
 
The quantitative AoA should allow personnel involved with a project to make transparent 
decisions regarding the selection of system alternaives.  By discussing and documenting 
key assumptions and variables, the thought process for discarding or further developing a 
particular option can be understood by later project r viewers.  Additionally, the AoA 
may help identify potential problem areas that could emerge as the program progresses. 
 
The analysis shall include sensitivity analyses to possible changes in key 
assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., selected performance capabilities). The 
analysis shall explicitly consider continued operating and support costs of the 
baseline. Where appropriate, the analysis shall address the interoperability and 
commonality of components or systems that are similar in function to other DoD 
Component programs or Allied programs (see 10 U.S.C.2457). For each alternative, 
the analysis of alternatives shall consider requirements for a new or modified 
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[Information Technology] IT, including a [National Security System] NSS, or 
support infrastructure. [230] 
 
The use of sensitivity analyses allows the evaluators t  assess how well the system will 
perform in off-design conditions.  The off-design performance is particularly important in 
the realm of military system design, as true operation l conditions are difficult, if not 
nearly impossible, to predict.  Battlefields evolve and new threats emerge that are often 
unanticipated by military planners.  Additionally, as warfare becomes more asymmetric, 
the adaptability of the enemy becomes a large factor in uncertainty around system 
operating conditions.  By varying the key assumptions f a system and observing the 
sensitivity, the off-design performance may be gauged, and the true affordability of the 
system understood.  In this definition, affordability is precisely the ratio of the system 
performance to the life cycle cost of the system. 
 
The analysis shall aid decision-makers in judging whether any of the proposed 
alternatives to an existing system offers sufficient military and/or economic benefit to 
justify the cost. For most systems, the analysis shall consider and baseline against the 
system(s) that the acquisition program will replace, if they exist. The analysis shall 
consider the benefits and detriments, if any, of accelerated and delayed introduction 
of military capabilities, including the effect on life-cycle costs. PA&E [Program 
Analysis and Execution] shall assess the analysis of alternatives in terms of its 
comprehensiveness, objectivity, and compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act... 
PA&E shall provide the assessment to the DoD Component head or Principal Staff 
Assistant (PSA), and to the MDA. The PM and MDA shall consider the analysis, the 
PA&E assessment, and ensuing documentation at Mileston  B (or C, if there is no 
Milestone B) for ACAT I and IA programs. [230] 
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The AoA, if deemed to be acceptable in terms of methodology soundness and objectivity, 
serves as the primary decision making tool in the early phases of the defense acquisition 
process.  Given the very large financial outlay of any MDAP, the decision makers 
attempt to focus objectively on the expected impact of the system, once obtained.  This 
impact could be an increase in the capability of the military as a result of the system, or a 
maintained level of capability for a reduced cost.  It is unlikely that military planners 
would accept a system from the AoA that reduced military effectiveness. 
 
Coordination shall ensure consideration of the fullrange of alternatives; the 
development of organizational and operational plans, with inputs from the 
Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, that are consistent with U.S. 
military strategy; and the consideration of joint-service issues, such as 
interoperability, security, and common use. USD(AT&L) [Undersecretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)] shall issue guidance for ACAT ID 
programs. USD(AT&L) or ASD(C3I) [Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, 
Control, Communications, and Intelligence] shall issue guidance for other programs. 
The Director, PA&E shall prepare the guidance in coordination with the offices listed 
above. [230] 
 
In order to avoid the tendency of services to automatically “go with what they know” 
instead of considering the full range of alternatives, special attention must be paid to 
properly populating the alternatives space for the program.  This should include not only 
system alternatives, but process alternatives with regard to the entire program life cycle 
including Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation [RDT&E], manufacturing and 
operation.  A great deal of complexity is added to the problem when assessing the full 
combinatorial range of alternatives, from a computational workload standpoint.  
Providing traceability through a design space of a million or billion possible alternatives 
also poses a challenge to the AoA team. 
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For the actual conduct of the AoA, it the DoD has left the decision making to the 
individual services or appropriate program managers.  According to the USAF Office of 
Aerospace Studies (OAS) DoD 5000.2-R assigns the responsibility for preparation of the 
AoA to the service responsible for the mission area for which the capability need is 
determined. [172] The OAS provides extensive documentation on the conduct of an AoA, 
and offers an educational program.  The United States Navy (USN) Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy has published some guidelines on the conduct of an AoA, 
but not nearly to the depth of the USAF literature.  There appears to be no available 
United States Army (USA) documentation on AoA’s available to the public. 
2.4.2 USAF AoA Process 
The USAF OAS at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, offers three forms of educational 
material about AoAs.  The first is the USAF Analysis Handbook, a 125 page document 
that outlines in detail the USAF standard process for conducting an AoA.  Additionally 
the OAS offers a web-based short course for the conduct of AoA’s and a live instruction 
in two possible formats: a course taught at Kirtland AFB, or an instructor sent to the unit 
involved in the conduct of the AoA.  At this time, it is not clear if government contractors 
can participate in the short course options, or if it s limited to military personnel and 
government employees. 
2.4.2.1 USAF AoA Format 
OAS provides basic guidance on how to conduct each phase of the AoA based on the 
outline shown below.  The guidance from OAS includes who is responsible for each 
section of the work, what should be done in each setion, but not necessarily appropriate 
tools for each section. 
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2. Acquisition Issues 




5. Constraints and Assumptions 
3. Alternatives 
1. Description of Alternatives 
2. Nonviable Alternatives 
3. Operations Concepts 
4. Determination of Effectiveness 
Measures 
1. Mission Tasks 
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
3. Measures of Performance 
4. Effectiveness Analysis 
a. Effectiveness Methodology 
b. Models, Simulations, and Data 
c. Effectiveness Sensitivity 
Analysis 
5. Cost Analysis 
1.Life Cycle Cost Methodology 
2.Models and Data 
3.Cost Risk Methodology 
6. Cost-Effectiveness Comparisons 
1.Cost-Effectiveness Methodology 
and Presentations 
2.Cost-Effectiveness Criteria for 
Screening Alternatives 
7. Organization and Management 
1.Study Team/Organization 




C. Lessons Learned 
D.  Other Appendices 
 
Throughout the AoA process, the OAS emphasizes the need for capability based analysis.  
Specifically, the goal is to determine how each alternative contributes to, or detracts 
from, the overall military mission accomplishment capability and the cost for that 
capability.  From this standpoint, OAS has adopted the DoD emphasis on capability 
based design and decision making. 
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In addition to emphasizing capability-based analysis, OAS highly encourages the use of 
quantitative methods wherever possible in order to promote traceability.  The traceability 
provides reviewing officers, as well as other personnel not present for the entire AoA 
process, a faster catch-up process, and allows deciion makers to more fully understand 
prior decisions and the impact of their decisions.  [173]  A more rigorous treatment of 
qualitative decisions would aid the AoA process, and llow the traceability to extend 
from the quantitative analyses to the qualitative and overall system evaluation as well. 
Figure 12 shows additional OAS suggested references for AoA’s and related acquisition 
concepts.   
 
 
Figure 12: USAF AoA References [173] 
 
2.4.3 USN AoA Guidelines 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy released guidelines for the conduct of 
Navy AoA’s because of the fact that “DoD 5000.2-R places the responsibility for 
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preparation of the AoA clearly on the organizational entity responsible for the mission 
area in which the requirement is determined to exist.”  [6] According to the documentation 
released by the Navy, the goal of an AoA is to determine if the best approach to meet the 
threat with respect to performance and resources expended. 
 
The key areas identified by the Navy for an AoA are: 
• Mission Need, Deficiencies and Opportunities 
• Threats 
• Operational Environments 
• Operational Concept 
• Alternatives 
• Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) 
• Life-Cycle Costs of each alternative 
• AoA (i.e., the actual analysis) [6] 
 
The first four bullets above correspond roughly to the “Acquisition Issues” section of the 
OAS approach to AoA.  The fifth and sixth bullets are approximately one to one with 
“Alternatives” and “Determination of Effectiveness Measures,” respectively, in the OAS 
document.  The seventh bullet roughly corresponds to the “Cost Analysis” section used in 
the USAF programs; however, the final “AoA” bullet appears to refer to sections that 
would be included throughout the OAS outline.  Thus the Navy’s direction for the 
conduct of an AoA includes similar information to the USAF process, but organized in a 
different fashion.  The Navy does not, however, direct that “Cost-Effectiveness” be used 
as the primary analysis for the comparison of concepts. 
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The Navy breaks the AoA into sections for each milestone review in the program 
breakdown.  The three milestone system follows a general program flow with more 
refinement on analyses as the program progresses.  It focuses the AoA as a tool for 
program evaluation by decision makers at each mileston  review. 
 
At MS [Milestone] I the analysis focuses on broad tradeoffs available between a 
large range of different concepts. The analysis normally presents a "Go/No Go" 
recommendation. It demonstrates why a new system is better than 
upgrading/modifying an existing system. Cost estimates may be only a rough order of 
magnitude but, nevertheless, an estimate is required. MS I AoA helps the MDA 
choose a preferred system concept and decide whether the cost and performance of 
the concept warrants initiating an acquisition program. MS I AoA can also illuminate 
the concept's cost and performance drivers and key trade-off opportunities; and 
provides the basis for the establishment of operation l performance threshold and 
objective values for use in the ORD, APB, and Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP). [6] 
 
The wording above indicates that the AoA in the Navy is focused on the selection of a 
new alternative, with the current system or an upgrade viewed as a baseline.  However, in 
many cases the upgrade of a current system is in fact the most cost-effective way to 
achieve a desired capability.  For the AoA to be truly capability driven, the AoA should 
consider upgrades as equal alternatives with new systems. 
 
At MS II the analysis would be more focused. Hardware lternatives present a 
narrower range of choices. The analysis is more detailed than at MS I and more 
defined cost data are available. Point estimates ar given with uncertainty ranges. 
Life cycle costs are normally presented.  
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At production approval (MS III) the AoA, if required, is normally an update of 
the MS II document. It highlights any trade-off or cost changes. However, since cost 
and performance issues have typically been resolved prior to MS III, an AoA is not 
often required to support this MS.  [6] 
 
In essence, the Navy’s guidance is recommending an AoA that increases in fidelity as the 
program progresses.  However, the focus of the analyses are still on selecting a point 
solution, which does not lend itself well to updating of information based on new 
knowledge gained in the design process. 
 
The Navy also specifies roles for the oversight of he AoA, the Analysis Director (who 
shall be independent of the program manager), the CNO/Sponsor, and the Program 
Manager.  The role of an AoA in relation to multi-disciplinary analysis is mentioned, 
though it is not fully explained. According to the documentation, the AoA should 
progress as follows: 
• Planning. 
• Determination of performance drivers. 
• Determination of cost drivers. 
• Resolution of cost/performance issues. 
• Preparing final briefing, and final report, if necessary [6] 
 




Figure 13: USN AoA Process Flowchart [6] 
 
2.4.4 AoA Guidance Discussion 
Both the USAF and USN have published fairly in-depth information with regards to the 
conduct of the AoA.  In the case of the USAF, the emphasis is on a quantitative process 
that results in a point solution for further development in the defense acquisition process.  
In the case of the USN, the cost-effectiveness is not emphasized, but the AoA is revisited 
in at each milestone of the acquisition process.  In the USN approach, the development of 
the AoA is very much like the spiral development of military systems, where the general 




There is some difficulty with the assignment of thepoint solution in both the USN and 
USAF AoA processes.  Updating the analysis as the program proceeds and information 
about technology maturation, policy issues relating to project funding, and future 
operating conditions can be very tedious once a design has been select.  Essentially, the 
entire analysis must be conducted again with a new set of assumptions that better reflect 
the true development of the technology, political, and operating conditions. 
2.4.5 Baseline AoA: KC-135 Recapitalization 
Current US doctrine for the conduct of war delays major ground operations until air 
superiority is established.  This approach has many benefits, but, perhaps most 
importantly, it delivers heavy damage to the enemy while exposing US personnel to 
minimum risk.  Key to the establishment of air superiority is the effectiveness of air-to-
air refueling systems, which greatly extend the range and endurance of air assets.  The 
extension of sorties is particularly important early in air-superiority operations when 
friendly airfields may be sparse or non-existent.  Aerial refueling tankers also allow 
strikes to originate from the continental US, and have the ability to keep surveillance 
aircraft aloft limited only by crew endurance. 
 
The US refueling mission is primarily carried out by the KC-135E aircraft.  These aircraft 
were originally commissioned in 1957 and, like the US Army’s helicopter fleet, are 
becoming increasingly costly to operate.  It was decided, therefore, that the KC-135 fleet 
should be recapitalized through upgrades or new acquisitions to allow cost-effective 
attainment of air power goals.  A recapitalization s specifically defined as “The rebuild 
and selected upgrade of currently fielded systems to ensure operational readiness and a 
zero time, zero mile system. The objectives include: (1) extend service life; (2) reduce 
operating and support costs; (3) improve reliability, maintainability, safety, and 
efficiency; (4) enhance capability; and (5) reduce footprint on the battlefield. [218] 
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The initial plan for KC-135 Recapitalization was presented to the Congress; however, it 
came under extreme scrutiny due to illegal contract negotiations and lack of an Analysis 
of Alternatives.  Senator John McCain, a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, requested an AoA as required for all defense acquisitions of this scale, and 
consistent with 5000.2-R. [187]  The AoA was to be conducted by a Federally Funded 
Research and Development Center (FFRDC) or other independent agency.  The RAND 
Corporation’s Project Air Force (PAF) was selected o conduct the AoA, with the 
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) checking soundness of methodology and 
objectiveness.  The purpose of the AoA was to ensure that the most cost effective 
alternative for recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet was selected. [135][134]  
 
The alternatives for the recapitalization study were p ovided to the RAND PAF by the 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Michael W. 
Wynne.  The set of alternatives is shown below in Table 7, and does provide a good 
variety of aircraft for consideration across a number of aircraft types.  In addition, fleets 












Table 7: KC-135 Recapitalization Alternatives 
Category Alternatives 
New, Commercial Derivative Tankers Airbus 321, 330,4 ,380 
Boeing 737,767,787,777,747 
Used Commercial Derivative Tankers Airbus 310, 330 
Boeing 757, 767, 747 
DC-10, MD-11 
New Military Derivative Tankers C-130J, A400M, C-17 
Newly Designed Tankers Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, Aeronautical Systems Center 
Newly Designed Tanker Transports Unnamed (5) 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Unnamed  
Stealthy Tankers Unnamed (2) 
Commercial Sources Unnamed 
 
The RAND PAF presented the following questions as the focus of the AoA, which will 
be discussed in the baseline discussion section 
 
KC-135 Recapitalization Research Questions: 
1. What is the most cost-effective alternative for recapitalizing the KC-135 
fleet? (Here, an “alternative” can be a fleet consisting of a single type of 
aircraft or a fleet consisting of more than one type.)  Again, in this AoA, 
the most “cost-effective” alternative means precisely the alternative 
whose effectiveness meets the aerial refueling requir ment at the lowest 
cost. 
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2. When should the recapitalization assets be acquired? 
 
In addition to the cost effectiveness and recapitalization timelines, the AoA considered 
two additional criteria for the recapitalization assets: operational concerns in terms of 
airfield use, and versatility in terms of cargo and passenger capacity.  Both of these areas 
were considered for each alternative in the AoA, but their impact on the selection of a 
concept was considered a “matter for senior decision maker judgment.” [135]  
 
With the research questions in place, the groundwork as complete for the comparison of 
the alternatives in the alternatives set.  The alternatives were compared using the 
approach of fixing the effectiveness of each type of fleet, and then comparing the 
complete life-cycle cost necessary to achieve that level of effectiveness with the aircraft. 
[187] A summary of the RAND PAF methodology for comparing the alternatives, 


















Figure 14: RAND PAF AoA Methodology [134] 
 
The set of alternatives was compared for a variety of future operating conditions, 
including, refueling requirement, operational characteristics of the refueling aircraft, 
technical performance of the tankers, the configuration of the tankers, differing cost 
projections, and the planning horizon for the analysis. [135]  While RAND PAF reports 
that there were a wide range of possible future operating conditions considered, in the 
publically available documentation there is no refer nce to how many cases were 
considered, what the ranges on the variables defining the operating conditions were, or 
how much the operating condition impacted the results of the study.  The only comment 
RAND PAF makes with regard to the sensitivity of the results of the AoA to future 
conditions is to say that “the results hold true regardless of the specific projection of the 
factors within the broad ranges examined.” [135]  
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The RAND PAF recommended that a fleet of medium to large commercial derivative 
tankers be acquired for the recapitalization of the KC-135, as they were the most cost-
effective alternative. [187]  The decision for timing of the recapitalization is not driven 
by the cost-effectiveness metrics considered for this study and therefore should be made 
based on other factors of interest to the DoD. [135]   
2.4.6 KC-135 Recapitalization  Discussion 
Because the metric of primary concern in the recapitalization of the aerial refueling 
tanker fleet is the effectiveness and cost of that fleet, the problem must be viewed as a 
system-of-systems.  The effectiveness of the fleet with include the size, operation and 
architecture of the fleet itself (the system-of-systems), the characteristics of the aircraft 
conducting the missions (the systems), and the chara teristics of the crew, fuel volume, 
etc within each aircraft (the sub-systems).  In theRAND study there were several 
allusions to considerations of costs at all system l vels, but the alternatives that were 
defined by the Under Secretary of Defense were only systems.  By limiting the 
conceptual design space in this fashion, the Under Sec etary removed two levels of the 
system-of-systems hierarchy, and consequently limited the possible effectiveness of the 
Analysis of Alternatives itself.  The interactions between the levels of a system-of-
systems often limit the capability of that system, and without considering the entire 
synthesized system-of-systems, those interactions are ignored. 
 
While identifying the most cost-effective alternative as defined above seems like, at first 
glance, a logical way to compare candidate alternatives, it does not address the system of 
systems approach necessary for truly evaluating the merits of a complex system.  By 
locking the requirements in place for the refueling fleet, the critical dimension of the 
impact of evolving requirements is ignored.  While changing requirements were 
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addressed in the form of alternate scenarios to check the robustness of the system to a 
number of different mission requirements, there is no evidence that the requirements 
were treated as independent variables so their impact on the system could be studied in 
detail.   
 
Because the refueling fleet is a system within a larger system of systems, a capability 
based approach should be adopted as it allows the AoA to incorporate changes at many 
system levels that could result in a more effective or least costly system.  Rather than rely 
on “cost-effectiveness” as defined above, the analysis should be conducted by analyzing 
the “affordability” of a system solution.  The precise definition of affordability is the ratio 
of the performance of a system to the cost of achieving that performance. 
 
It should again be reiterated that this baseline study was conducted on the 
UNCLASSIFIED version of the summary report, as well as unclassified presentations 
made available by the RAND PAF.  It is possible that in the SECRET version of the 
report, a different set of alternatives, scenarios, etc were explored.  In the absence of this 
information however, the assumption will be that the summaries available were 
representative of the entire effort.  
2.5 Summary 
The important terms relating to the title of the dissertation were defined and discussed 
with preference for DoD definitions wherever possible.  Robustness was defined as the 
ability of a system to perform over a wide range of c nditions.  Evaluation is the 
determination of worth (usually the ratio of benefits to costs), through careful appraisal 
and study.  A SoS is a set or arrangement of systems hat are related or connected to 
provide a given capability.  Regret is the differenc  between a system’s evaluation 
metric(s) and the best system’s evaluation metric(s) for a scenario.  And finally, analysis 
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is the systematic examination of a complex by considering its elements and their 
relations. 
 
A brief overview of the activities, phases, and tasks of the defense acquisition process 
was given.  The color coded rows of the Integrated D fense Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework correspond to the JCIDS process (high-
level military planners), the Defense Acquisition System (acquisition specialists and 
industry), and the PPBE (government financing).  The 6 phases of the process are coded 
by the color of the task boxes and are divided by milestones or decision markers. 
 
Based on the “widow of opportunity” concept from Robust Concept Design, the early 
phases of the defense acquisition process offer the most potential impact for improvement 
of the SoS products and processes.  A more detailed discussion of the AoA activity in the 
Pre-Milestone A Defense Acquisition System is presented.  Each service maintains its 
own procedures for the conduct of the AoA, though general guidance is passed from the 
Secretary of Defense and Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) via the Defense 
Acquisition University. 
 
The KC-135 Recapitalization AoA, performed by the RAND corporation, was examined 
as a baseline for the current state-of-the-art in AoAs.  In the RAND study there were 
several allusions to considerations of costs at all system levels, but the alternatives that 
were defined by the Under Secretary of Defense were only systems.  Additionally, while 
RAND PAF reports that there were a wide range of possible future operating conditions 
considered, in the publically available documentation there is no reference to how many 
cases were considered, what the ranges on the variables defining the operating conditions 
were, or how much the operating condition impacted the results of the study.  The lack of 
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a systematic study of the robustness of the candidates provides an area for improvement 






This chapter presents the research formulation for attempting to improve the ability of 
design engineers and decision makers to understand the robustness of alternatives early in 
the defense acquisition process.  The process of generating this research formulation was 
iterative, included many thought exercises, and involved an extensive search of literature 
in both the aerospace engineering realm and other fields.  Because the iterative nature of 
the formulation is difficult to convey in text, which flows linearly, the final state from 
each primary area will be presented.  The sections pre ented in this chapter include (1) 
the intent of the dissertation, (2) the perceived gaps in the state-of-the-art and the desired 
state, the challenges associated with those gaps, (3) a set of high level research questions 
related to the gaps, (4) a discussion of the genesis of the hypotheses for filling the gaps, 
and (5) additional research questions that were created at a lower level because of 
requirements of the proposed solutions. 
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3.1 Dissertation Intent 
The motivation chapters of this dissertation identified the robustness of military systems-
of-systems as the area of interest based on several logic experiments and case studies.  
The goal of this research is to improve the current state-of-the-art in early defense 
acquisition processes through increasing the engineer’s and decision maker’s ability 
to compare the robustness of competing alternatives. 
 
3.2 Assertions 
There are several assertions that form the logical backing for this research objective.  The 
path taken and the decisions made represent one of many possible approaches to looking 
at robustness and the defense acquisition process. 
3.2.1 Assertion 1 – Defense Acquisition 
Improvements to Defense Acquisition Process could improve MDAP performance 
 
The motivation behind this dissertation was the ineffectiveness of current military 
systems in the current operational scenario and the cancellation of several MDAPs 
because of anticipated shortcomings, performance, situational appropriateness, or 
affordability.  Anecdotal evidence from numerous peo l  involved in the Defense 
Acquisition Process indicates that improvements are ne ded.  It has also been observed 
that improvements in the development process for prducts in general usually result in 
improved products [215].  This logic is being extend d to military systems.  However, 
because it is not possible to test this assertion by designing two military systems for a 
control and test case, this assertion will be accepted without further attempt of proof.  The 
acceptance of this assertion leads to the next assertion about when the improvements 
should be focused. 
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3.2.1.1 Assertion 1.1  
Pre-Milestone A offers great opportunity for impact 
 
The defense acquisition process is long and cumbersome.  There are hundreds of possible 
tasks that could be improved upon.  However, because the cost of change is lowest in the 
earliest phases of a design and the potential impact of change is greatest [158], the early 
phases should be focused on for improvement first.  The Pre-Milestone A processes, 
specifically the JCIDS process and the AoA offer great potential for improvement, 
especially considering the impact the JCIDS process and AoA have on all other activities 
in the Defense Acquisition System.  The National Research Council, working under a 
request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, identified Pre-Milestone A 
as an area for improved systems engineering and noted that “about three-quarters of total 
system life cycle costs are influenced by decisions made before… Milestone A.” [11] 
 
There are two schools of thought surrounding improvements in the early acquisition 
process phases.  The first argues that decision freedom should be preserved for as long as 
possible to allow uncertainty to clear.  The second argues that a decision should be made 
early on, but based on as much information as possible.  Because these are two 
fundamentally different approaches to addressing the problem, but both are used in 
defense acquisition, the method will not be specifically tailored to either.  Rather, every 
effort will be made to allow decision makers to use either philosophy while working with 




3.2.2 Assertion 2 – Robustness 
Using robustness as a criterion for selecting among alternatives will improve SoS 
performance 
 
Military systems are used across a wide range of scenarios, many of which may have 
never been considered when the system was first designed.  The B-1 bomber was 
designed solely as a nuclear strike aircraft, but has become a conventional bomber with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the development of the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition. [139], [241]  The system received a new lase on life because it was robust to 
the change in the tactical environment in which theUS operates.  The unarmored 
HUMVEE has been upgraded with armored sides in order to increase its effectiveness in 
operating under conditions in Iraq that were unanticipated during its design.  However, 
these upgrades are greatly increasing the engine wear on the vehicles and increasing their 
cost to operate.  These are just two examples of current military systems that are 
operating in scenarios outside those included in their initial design, with varying degrees 
of success. 
 
By definition, optimal systems will perform better than robust systems in the conditions 
for which they were designed.  However, as noted by Borer, military operations are 
almost never at “on-design conditions,” [28] the selection of a system that is robust will 
improve overall performance.   
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3.3 Gaps: Current State-of-the-Art and Desired State 
The following gaps have been identified based on the case studies, evaluation of current 
robustness methods, and dissection of the defense acquisition process. 
3.3.1 Gap 1 
As was observed in the baseline study of the KC-135 recapitalization, the robustness of 
candidate alternatives is currently studied through a limited number of off-design 
simulations.  This does allow a limited understanding of the robustness of a particular 
candidate, but not the robustness relative to the or candidates.  Therefore the first gap 
is the lack of a quantifiable metric for the robustness of a system. 
3.3.2 Gap 2 
An additional problem with the current approach to assessing robustness of candidate 
alternatives is the limited nature of the off-design explorations that can be accomplished.  
This very limited nature is in stark contrast to the limitless number of ways that 
operational scenarios and enemy technologies can evolve.  The second gap follows as the 
inability to account for a massive possible scenario space in assessing robustness. 
3.3.3 Gap 3 
The third gap in the current state-of-the-art and the desired state is the difficulty in 
updating the Pre-Milestone A activities as additional information becomes available 
about future operating conditions and technology maturation .  The extended 
timeframe of MDAP development, decades in many cases, m ans that the knowledge of 
the operating conditions, while fuzzy at first, will become clearer as the program 
progresses.  This is analogous to a cloud of uncertainty “shrinking” to a smaller cloud or 
a point as the program develops.  Understanding the impact of the scenario maturation 
currently required a nearly complete rework of the Pr -Milestone A activities. 
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3.4 Research Questions 
The following research questions were developed based on the gaps outlined in the 
preceding section and the research objective expressed in the dissertation intent section.  
The development of the research questions was an iterative process that included a 
thorough literature search of the aerospace engineering literature, the defense acquisition 
literature, and literature from other disciplines.  The two research questions presented 
here provide the overall questions the research is attempting to answer; however, many 
other questions were considered in the process of addressing these. 
3.4.1 Research Question 1 
 Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs stretch for more than a decade, so how 
can we evaluate the robustness of candidate system-of-systems solutions while 
considering the uncertainty associated with: 
 Technology maturation? 
 Possible warfare doctrine? 
 Possible enemy set? 
 How can we define robustness to include these uncertainties? 
 
MDAPs naturally fall into an undesirable region of high uncertainty, because numerous 
assumptions must be made early in the defense acquisition process, and high risk, 
because a large amount of taxpayer dollars required to develop this class of SoS.  The 
successful development of a complex SoS to a very high performance level with a long 
period of program development is inherently difficult.  The development program is 
impacted by uncertainty with respect to many aspects of he SoS. 
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3.4.1.1 Cost and Performance Uncertainty 
Uncertainty associated with the SoS cost and performance primarily relates to the 
accuracy of modeling and simulation techniques avail ble for use at the early phases of 
conceptual SoS design and to the accuracy of assumptions that were made in the 
modeling and simulation variables.  Typically, the models used in early SoS design 
contain a fair amount of uncertainty because of the speed at which they must be capable 
of evaluating SoS concepts.  Additionally, there arssumptions about the performance 
of immature technologies that will be used in the final SoS.  Often, the only information 
about these technologies is available from the research rs developing the particular 
technology, who are quick to sing praises but often h sitant to share the costs or problems 
with a new customer.  Many revolutionary projects for the military rely heavily on 
emerging technologies to step ahead of current and potential adversaries.  When so much 
money is involved in the development of a SoS, the SoS designer must be able to account 
for the possibility of a different maturation result for critical technologies. 
3.4.1.2 Operational Environment Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about the operating environment for the SoS appears because the possibility 
of differences in the assumed operational doctrine of friendly commanders and forces, 
and the possibility of differences in the set of enemies for which the SoS was designed.  
Every new war brings a new set of challenges, many unanticipated by planners.  In the 
20th century, warfare evolved from trench based to large army maneuvers to more 
asymmetric methods. [210] In recent years, the paceof the shift in enemy tactics, and as a 
result the pace of US doctrine change, has greatly increased.  Military planners of 
previous centuries saw evolutions in tactics that took many years to take hold.  However, 
in regard to the current conflict, “[Former Marine Commandant] Hagee describe[s] Iraqi 
insurgents as clever fighters who change their battlefield tactics every seven to 10 days, 
making it difficult to stay ahead of them.” [163] These rapid evolutions of enemy tactics 
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mean that a point condition of the environment could have gone through 700-1000 
evolutions during the duration of a 20 year MDAP.  These rapid changes in operating 
conditions drive the need to greatly increase the robustness of military SoS. 
3.4.1.3 Definition of Robustness 
The current definitions of robustness outlined earli r in this dissertation do not easily 
allow the consideration of performance for many systems over a large number of 
operational scenarios.  A mathematical definition that allows the assignment of a 
robustness metric to each candidate design and is a function of the design’s performance 
and cost, as well as the relative likelihood of thescenarios under which it will be 
evaluated is desired.  Additionally, a relatively simple definition is desired, both for 
clarity and for computational load while evaluating over large numbers of scenarios. 
3.4.2 Research Question 2 
 How can we promote the ability to update the robustne s analysis as higher-
fidelity information about the system-of-systems’ operating conditions becomes 
available? 
 
Information in early stages of systems design relies on assumptions, especially when 
dealing with immature technologies that are common in MDAPs.  However, as 
technology and the SoS design mature, assumptions are replaced by more concrete 
information from modeling and simulation, bench tests, and finally full SoS field tests.  
As this information becomes available, however, it is rare to find the systems engineering 
tasks of Pre-Milestone A repeated.  This is because of the cost and engineering time 
associated with improving upon the earlier analyses.  However, important information 
about the SoS performance, especially in the context of a wide number of scenarios, can 
be gained by revisiting the early tasks. 
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The most apparent benefit would be increased understanding of the bounds of SoS 
performance across the possible operational scenarios.  This information would allow 
better planning for future gaps in capability.  Additionally, the updated early systems 
engineering studies would allow tweaking of design requirements where tasks remain 
unfinished.  For example, if a radar technology matured to a lower-than-expected level, 
missile seeker requirements could be made more stringent to compensate for the loss of 
radar performance.  Both of these benefits would not be realized without a cost-effective 
way to update the systems engineering analyses of the Pre-Milestone A period. 
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3.5 Hypothesis Genesis – Creating a New Method 
3.5.1 Functions Required 
The methodology of this section is proposed to fulfill a research objective: to incorporate 
robustness into the decision making process and encourage adaptability of the Pre-
Milestone A period.  There are eight generic tasks that must be completed in this phase 
[58].   
 
1. Establish the need 
2. Define the problem 
3. Establish measures of performance (MoPs) and measurs of effectiveness (MoEs) 
4. Generate architectures 
5. Generate alternatives 
6. Analyze alternatives 
7. Compare results 
8. Make a decision 
 
These tasks vary slightly from those that appear in some systems engineering literature, 
but the basic purpose of the tasks is the same.  In ma y cases, systems engineering 
assumes that the first phase shown below is conducte  by someone outside the 
organization doing the systems engineering.  However, for defense acquisition the JCIDS 
process involves establishing the needs of the military.  The generation of architectures 
and the generation of alternatives are separated becaus  of the processes in the Pre-
Milestone A phase of defense acquisition.  Systems architectures are usually established 
before and guide the generation of alternatives.  There is usually a down-selection among 
architectures before systems alternatives are created. 
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3.5.2 Scope 
The methodology of this dissertation is not intended to address all of the activities in the 
Pre-Milestone A phase of defense acquisition.  Such a task would be beyond the scope of 
a doctoral dissertation, and would require much coordination with the government 
agencies responsible for the defense acquisition activities.  Rather, the methodology in 
this dissertation will only address those generic aeas where the research objectives, 
questions, and hypotheses relate to the activities. 
3.5.3 Activities Focus 
The research objective for this dissertation most closely aligns with the analysis of 
alternatives and the comparison of results from the generic tasks list.  There is additional 
impact in the establishment of MoPs and MoEs, in that new measures must be included. 
 
• Task 3: Establishing MOPs and MOEs 
• Task 6: Analyze Alternatives 
• Task 7: Compare Results 
3.5.4 Cross-Fertilization from Long-Term Policy Ana lysis 
Because no existing systems engineering method for assessing robustness performs well 
enough for application to the early tasks of defense acquisition, other fields were 
searched for methods.  The hope was that a method existing in another field, with support 
of experts and literature in that field, could be applied without modification, or with slight 
modification, to the defense acquisition process.  There were several criteria identified by 
the author as an initial screening for finding appropriate fields for methods investigation: 
similar time-frame, existence of a large amount of uncertainty, and high-stakes/risk.  
After searching literature from a variety of disciplines, long-term policy analysis was 
identified as a promising field. 
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3.5.4.1 Time-Frame 
Long-term policy analysis typically deals with a time horizon of somewhere between 10 
and 50 years. [141]  Military acquisition processes typically take between 5 and 20 years, 
though this fact has been lamented by military planners. [11]  The similarity in these 
time-frames creates an environment where the following two filter criteria are more likely 
to be met. 
3.5.4.2 Uncertainty 
Lempert defines deep uncertainty as the condition when “when we do not know, and/or 
key parties to the decision do not agree on, the system model, prior probabilities, and/or 
“cost” function.” [142]  This is opposed to a system where the probabilities are well 
behaved, the system model exists and is readily understood, and the cost function is well 
defined.  The more well-behaved case is close to Taleb’s concept of “mild uncertainty” or 
“Gaussian uncertainty.” [220]  The concept of mild uncertainty is very applicable in near-
term problems and corresponds to the majority of the methods that exist in systems 
engineering for evaluating robustness. 
 
Military acquisition exists in the realm of deep uncertainty.  The system model for 
military operations is poorly understood and rife with human-factors.  Especially as the 
concept of network-centric warfare has come to dominate battlefield operations, simple 
statistical relationships, such as those established by Dupuy, [71] no longer are 
applicable.  Additionally, the “cost function” for current military systems changes 
depending on the decision maker.  Often there are unspoken constraints that drive designs 
and are never formally communicated to the designers. 
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3.5.4.3 Risk 
The level of risk associated with long-term policy analysis is the same, or perhaps 
greater, than that of defense acquisition.  James Dewar notes that the following are all 
examples of successful long-term policy [35]. 
 
• The US Constitution 
• Panama Canal 
• Transcontinental railroad in the US 
• Marshall Plan 
• Bismark’s unification of Germany 
• George Kennan’s policy of “containment” of the USSR 
• US Social Security plan 
• FCC helping the US phone system connect to computers 
 
All of the policies above, if unsuccessful, carried great potential consequences, ranging 
from a failed early United States to billions in economic losses to overseas competitors 
who could have adapted technologies before us. 
 
While the consequences of failure are not as great for MDAPs as for these major policy 
decision outlined above, they are enormous.  The loss of billions of dollars of taxpayer 
funds can derail political establishments and cause major corporations to fail.  Because 
these two areas are in the same realm of risk, at le st relative to most small risk 
calculations done in systems engineering, long-term policy analysis is an acceptable fit 
for identifying methods for cross-fertilization. 
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3.5.5 Analyzing Alternatives 
The three primary areas where a contribution is being made will be discussed out of 
order.  This is because the contribution for the establishment of MOE’s and MOP’s is a 
creation of this dissertation’s author based on the contributions from long-term policy 
analysis to the other two primary areas.  These two cross-fertilized ideas and their 
potential contribution to defense acquisitions are discussed in the following sections. 
 
The first area of cross-fertilization, Massive Scenario Generation, allows the designer and 
decision maker to consider the utility of an alternative across a much wider set of 
possible future scenarios than was previously availble.  The second area of 
advancement, parametric methods, allows the designer to rapidly update analyses as 
information about the future becomes available. 
3.5.5.1 Massive Scenario Generation 
Massive Scenario Generation is an approach to exploring possible futures with the aid of 
computer models.  The technique was developed at the RAND corporation for use in 
long-term policy analysis and for strategic planning.  The development of this technique 
was dependent on the development of powerful computing capabilities that have recently 
become prevalent in the research environment. 
 
Massive Scenario Generation was constructed to help humans consider the implications 
of policy decisions across a “very large landscape of plausible futures.” [141] The ability 
of the policy decision to be implemented in a computer simulation that can realistically 
capture the dynamics of the problem is crucial to the validity of the Massive Scenario 
Generation results.  In Lempert’s formulation, Massive Scenario Generation is used to 
create “scenario ensembles,” which are discrete cass intended to represent the landscape 
of plausible futures.  Exploratory modeling software and a computerized scenario 
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generator are used to construct the large set of scenarios that make up the scenario 
ensemble. 
3.5.5.2 Defining a Scenario 
A key part of defining a parametric scenario for Massive Scenario Generation is 
understanding how to categorize elements that belong t  the scenario and identifying 
interactions among the elements that impact the altrna ive being evaluated.  In 
Lempert’s work on regret analysis coupled with Massive Scenario Generation, the RAND 
team used an extensive literature review to identify potential input variables and metrics, 
and then relied on the experts on the team to categorize and prioritize them. [141]  For 
military alternatives analysis, the basic initial breakdown is suggested to be friendly 
systems (including the alternative being analyzed), targets, and the general environment.  
The general environment will include threats that are not targets, and the physical 
characteristics of the world.  A sample breakdown is shown in Figure 15. 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, targets will be considered part of the environment.  
By considering the targets as a part of the environment, the scenario can be broken down 
into two groups: things over which the friendly side will have control and those things 
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Figure 15: Scenario Breakdown 
 
3.5.5.2.1 Environment 
The principle concern for evaluating SoS concepts in a particular possible future is what 
makes up the possible future.  The particular realization of events leads to an 
environment in which the SoS will function.  The environment in which the SoS acts, 
combined with the actual matured state of the SoS itself, combine to form the future 
scenario. 
 
The environment is defined in this dissertation as all of the factors which affect the SoS, 
but are not a part of it.  This is based on the definition from Webster, which states that an 
environment is “the circumstances, objects, or conditions by which one is surrounded.” 
[4] The environment is made up of three subsets: the p ysical environment, the target 
environment, and the threat environment.  However, relevance of each element of the 
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environment subset, physical, threat, or target, will depend on the required level of 
fidelity for the problem at hand. 
3.5.5.2.2 Target Environment 
The SoS’s target is “a geographic area, complex, or installation planned for capture or 
destruction by military forces.”  The intelligence ommunity definition is “a country, 
area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed.” 
For targeting purposes, this definition must be expanded to include the contents of the 
area, complex, or installation (e. g., people, equipment, and, resources). Furthermore, 
capture or destruction must be expanded to include “ isruption, degradation, 
neutralization, and exploitation, commensurate with objectives and guidance.” [236] 
  
A target must qualify as a military objective before it can become a legitimate object of 
military attack. In this context, military objectives include those objects that, by their 
nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effectiv contribution to military action, or 
whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military 
advantage. The key factor is whether the object conributes to the enemy’s war fighting 
or war sustaining capability. Consequently, an identifiable military benefit or advantage 
should derive from the degradation, neutralization, destruction, capture, or disruption of 
the object. Not only does this concept preclude violati ns of the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC), but it also supports the principles of war by employing economy of force 
against valid military objectives. 
 
The target environment describes all aspects of the SoS’s target that are relevant to the 
function or performance of the SoS.  This definition s intended to include characteristics 
that may not intuitively be a part of the target itself, but nonetheless have an impact on 
the performance of the SoS.  An example of this might include proximity of the site to a 
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major religious site, which would limit the SoS’s ability to apply energy to the target in 
many conflicts. 
3.5.5.2.3 Threat Environment 
The threat environment describes all elements of the adversary’s assets that can 
potentially impact the SoS in an adverse way.  These are outside the set of elements 
included in the target environment and can include 3rd party threats.  The threat 
environment is considered to be entirely “man-made” and therefore, while some natural 
occurrences would be threatening to a SoS, forces of nature are not considered part of the 
threat environment. 
3.5.5.2.4 Physical Environment 
The physical environment will be defined as all elements of the environment that are not 
included in the target environment or the threat enviro ment, but can affect the SoS or its 
performance with respect to the MOEs for the scenario. 
3.5.5.3 Parametric Methods 
Parametric methods, as opposed to deterministic methods, typically do not return a 
“single answer.”  Rather, a parametric method will focus on establishing a set of 
relationships that will return an answer for a range of input parameters.  Input parameters 
correspond to the independent variables of a deterministic function (or method), but are 
allowed to take a range of values. [24] 
 
Parametric methods have become important in the design of highly integrated systems, 
such as aircraft, because of the uncertain nature of many system aspects in early design 
phases.  For example, historical data may be used in aircraft conceptual design to assign 
an anticipated weight to the aircraft’s engines, upon which the structure design is 
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dependant.  If upon conducting a detailed design the engines are determined to be heavier 
than anticipated, the aircraft’s structural weight will have to be increased, which either 
will require more thrust (an engine re-design) or will reduced performance.  By using a 
parametric approach, however, designers can rapidly update the entire design by simply 
“dialing in” the new engine weight. 
 
Baker’s Unified Tradeoff Environment (UTE) [19] provides an environment in which 
parametric methods can be visualized through partial differential equations.  Baker’s 
formulation was initially implemented using a rotorcraft example, but has been extended 
to autogyros by Ahn [10], and to SoS by Biltgen and Ender [23], [25].  By viewing the 
partial differential equations in the UTE, not only can the designer “dial in” a new design 
and rapidly see the results, the impacts of the various parameters can be visualized 
simultaneously. 
 
Parametric methods have an added benefit in the curr nt paradigm of electronic design 
reviews.  [156] Analyses presented to decision makers are rife with assumptions that have 
been made in order to enable the use of models, simplified relationships, and even many 
empirical tests.  If a decision maker disagrees with an assumption, the entire study can be 
discredited in his or her eyes.  However, if a parametric study is presented instead of 
static results, the assumption can be changed and the entire study instantaneously updated 
to reflect the new parameter. 
 
The utility of parametric methods for improving the ability of designers to update studies 
has been demonstrated in aircraft design and in systems-of-systems design reviews.  
However, these methods have not penetrated the defense acquisition system to a large 
degree, where static milestones still dominate the process.  The potential of these 
parametric methods to replace the static milestones is immense, and would result in a 
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dynamic product that could be updated rapidly as information about the maturation of 
technology, the shift in enemy set, or the conditions under which the alternatives would 
operate becomes more concrete. 
3.5.6 Compare Results 
The third area of advancement, regret analysis, is also cross-fertilization from long-term 
policy analysis and provides a way to compare the alternatives that are being considered 
across the many possible futures. 
3.5.6.1 Regret Analysis 
Regret analysis is a way of measuring the merit of a particular system solution for a set of 
operating conditions.  Kayne defines regret analysis as “the difference between some 
choice and the best choice for a particular realization of the uncertainties.” [130]  Regret 
is a fairly intuitive concept for engineering that translates well to the generally accepted 
definition of regret.  Webster’s dictionary specifially refers to a feeling associated with a 
loss or error. [4] If a regret analysis were conducted for a current situation, the regret 
would correspond to the difference between the system on hand and a system optimized 
for the current situation.  If the analysis is conducted at the beginning of a particular 
program, its purpose is to look at the way a candidate solution performs with respect to 
other possible solutions for a certain future operating condition. 
 
The way the difference between the candidate system and the system optimized for the 
particular set of future operating conditions is quantified depends on the problem at hand.  
In most system-of-systems problems, many metrics of interest exist for deciding among 
candidates, including various measures of performance and cost.  It is important, 
therefore, that the method of measuring the difference between solutions includes all of 
the measures of merit and weights them appropriately. 
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A common form of regret analysis is the minimax approach.  In essence, minimax strives 
to find an optimum that is defined by the solution that displays the smallest maximum 
regret over the future conditions considered. [251] By minimizing the maximum regret, 
the designer is taking a very pessimistic approach and assuming that the worst possible 
conditions for system performance will occur in the lif  of the system.  The minimax 
algorithm is also independent of the likelihood of any future condition.  Because system 
designers usually have some understanding of the most likely future operating conditions, 
they have more information that should be included in the assessment of concept 
alternatives. 
 
If information about the likelihood of the various future operating conditions was 
included in the regret analysis, a more complete understanding of the merits of particular 
system alternatives.  Especially in situations were certain operational conditions are 
“must haves” and others are “wants,” including additional information future operational 
conditions is desirable.  Using techniques such as MCS coupled with regret analysis to 
explore the system behavior in a variety of future conditions has the potential to provide 
more robust solutions by fully exploring regions of likely and less-likely operating 
conditions, and factoring that likelihood into the d cision.  An additional suggestion for 
improving the way regret analysis is conducted is presented by Aseeri [15], who suggests 
normalizing the regret for each candidate scenario.  This allows a consistent comparison 
among systems which may exhibit performance at different magnitudes for different 
scenarios. 
3.5.6.2 Regret Analysis Shortcomings 
Regret analysis provides a way to compare alternatives that have some sort of overall 
evaluation criterion associated with them.  However, in the current implementations of 
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regret analysis, the regret associated with an altern ive exists only at the discrete points 
where a scenario has been evaluated.  These clusters of individual data points can give 
the decision maker some sense of the value of each possible alternative, but the discrete 
nature creates shortcomings in decision making. 
 
Because some futures are generally considered more likely than others, a minimax 
approach is deficient for decision making because it cannot incorporate the likelihood of 
the different futures.  A possible solution to this would be to assign a weight to the actual 
value of regret based on the perceived likelihood of the scenario.  Unfortunately, this 
solution only partially addresses the problem.  During most decision-making processes, 
there will be differing opinions on the likelihood of different scenarios, leading to a log 
jam whenever the regret calculations must be updated to reflect differing opinions. 
 
The minimax approach, even when weighted with the likelihood of the scenario, has the 
possibility of returning a solution as “best” that is in fact outperformed over the vast 
majority of the design space.  This is illustrated in the comparison of three hypothetical 
platforms in Figure 16.  “Option A” represents one robust design candidate, “Option B” 
represents another robust design candidate, and “Option C” represents an optimum design 
candidate focused on performing well in a narrow band in the left half of the scenario 
space.  Using the mini-max approach, “Option B” would be selected as the “best” 
alternative.  However, it is clear that for the majority of the scenario space, “Option A” is 
a superior alternative, and only is moderately outperformed by “Option B” in a small 
region of the space.  Most decision makers would consider “Option A” superior, but the 
current regret analysis construct does not allow for this alternative to get fair 
consideration.  If the regret analysis method could be modified to allow rapid 
consideration of the performance of alternatives in all areas of the scenario space, regret 































Figure 16: Performance of 3 Platforms 
 
A final shortcoming of regret analysis is that, because of the static nature of the regret 
analysis approach, it does not naturally fit with the concept of the interactive design 
review.  In an interactive design review the norm is to understand the effects of changing 
assumptions in real time, which is not possible when a large number of complex analyses 
must be run. 
3.5.6.3 Overcoming Regret Analysis Shortcomings 
A more effective approach might be to apply the concept of surrogate models, discussed 
in detail below, to the scenario space.  If a surrogate of the scenario space can be 
successfully constructed, then because surrogates are merely closed form equations, the 
regret can be integrated over the entire scenario space, creating a global regret.  Global 
regret is discussed in more depth in following sections. 
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3.5.7 Tactical Research Question 
Can surrogate models be used to address the shortcomings of regret analysis for use in 
early defense acquisition? 
3.5.8 Surrogate Modeling 
Surrogate models serve as a way to rapidly assess th  results of a particular code, in a 
particular region of the design space, for conceptual design purposes.  In any given area 
of the design space, the variability of results canbe attributed primarily to a handful of 
variables.  While the other variables are necessary for the magnitude of the response, in 
nearly every case the vast majority of variables can be defaulted within the ranges being 
considered, significantly reducing the number of computational runs required for design 
space assessment.  This concept, the Pareto Principle, allows designers in early stages of 
design to concentrate on the design variables that truly matter in the selected concept 
space. 
 
The identification of significant variables greatly reduces the number of cases that must 
be considered for a design, but it is often insufficient to allow the real time analysis of 
trade games and the consideration of multi-attribute decision criteria on the fly.  In this 
case, a surrogate model can be generated based to represent the analysis code in the 
region of the conceptual design space of interest.  These surrogate models reflect the fact 
that for limited ranges of input variables, analysis codes typically display behavior that 
can be represented with a polynomial regression equation, an artificial neural network, or 
a Gaussian Process regression.  
  
Surrogate models are created by careful observation of the analysis code behavior using a 
Design of Experiments (DOE).  DOEs are purposeful manipulation of the significant 
variables, identified for the particular ranges of interest, with the goal of identifying the 
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effects of each variable and the cross terms between th  variables.  One of the most 
straightforward forms of a surrogate model can be generated based on a least-squares 
regression of the data from the DOE, as outlined in the Response Surface Methodology 
(RSM) [136], but more complex approaches including artificial neural networks have 
been applied to various problems.   
 
Surrogate models are simply equations that represent th  behavior of a higher-fidelity 
code or tool with a high degree of accuracy.  As continuous equations, they provide the 
ability to perform more complex mathematical manipulations than pure data from the 
analysis code would.  As equations, they are also platform independent and they cannot 
“crash” if incorrect inputs are given: the equation tself will always yield a result.  The 
result cannot, however, be relied upon if the input variables are beyond the ranges for 
which the surrogate was created.  Surrogate models have been used to replace a wide 
range of analysis codes, and can be used for both linear and nonlinear spaces depending 
on the complexity of the model created.  Three commn types of surrogates are discussed 
in the following sections: response surfaces, artificial neural networks, and kriging 
regressions. 
3.5.8.1 Response Surfaces 
“Response Surface Methodology (RSM) comprises a group of statistical techniques for 
empirical model building and model exploitation. Bycareful design and analysis of 
experiments, it seeks to relate a response, or output variable to the levels of a number of 
predictors, or input variables, that affect it.” [33] 
 
Response surfaces were introduced in the 1950s by Box and Wilson [34].  The idea 
behind a response surface is the use of a simple mathe tical relationship, such as a 
polynomial equation (such as Equation 4), to represent a much more complex process.  
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The coefficients of the polynomial or other equation are often determined through a 
regression of a set of known data for the complex process.  The simple relationship can 
then be used to find an optimum solution, ideally at a much lower cost than searching the 
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Equation 4 
 
In the 1990s response surface methods began to penetrat  into the field of aerospace 
design for technology assessment through the work of Mavris and Kirby. [159], [136]  
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD), and the Robust Design Simulation  
(RDS) method both rely on response surfaces to allow statistical design of products and 
processes. [160] 
 
Response surfaces have some problems when applied to highly complex systems.  
Because of the typical assumption that the response follows a polynomial equation, 
discrete responses, nonlinearities, etc can not be captured in the method.  This may lead 
to a sub-optimal solution, since the optimizer uses the (perhaps erroneous) 
approximation.  Additionally, because a least-squares regression is used for estimation of 
the polynomial coefficients, a non-normal distributon, i.e. fat tails, can lead to a poor 
model fit. [168] 
3.5.8.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
An artificial neural network is a type of surrogate model that functions based on the 
principles of neuron interaction in the brain. [8] Artificial neural networks provide an 
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advantage over response surface equations because they have the ability to capture non-
linearities and will work with discrete inputs or outputs. [246] 
 
The basic unit of the artificial neural network is the perceptron, which applies a transfer 
function to a set of weighted and biased inputs.  Most artificial neural networks used in 
surrogate model applications are composed of three layers of perceptrons: an input layer, 
a hidden layer, and an output layer.  The perceptrons are linked so that the input layer 
outputs to the hidden layer and the hidden layer outputs to the output layer. [127] The 
artificial neural network is fit to the data via a stochastic process known as training.  
Because this training requires a stochastic optimizer, the training must be repeated in 
most cases to ensure that the “best” possible fit is obtained. [200] The logistics sigmoid 





















































In Equation 5, aj is the intercept term for the jth hidden node, bij is the coefficient for the 
i th design variable, Xi is the value of the ith design variable, N is the number of input 
variables, ek is the intercept term for the kth response, fjk is the coefficient for the jth 




Disadvantages associated with artificial neural networks arise from the computational 
requirement for training them and from the lack of easily understandable form to the final 
equation.  Because the computational time associated with the training optimized 
increases with the number of cases, for very large problems training artificial neural 
networks can be slow.  This problem is compounded by the stochastic nature of the 
optimization, which means that several attempts must be used for each number of hidden 
nodes attempted in the training process.  Also, as the number of hidden nodes increases, 
the potential for “over fitting” the data increases.  Finally, because the artificial neural 
network relies on the logistics equation, it is often difficult to gain understanding into the 
physical phenomena behind the system behavior.  While polynomial regressions often 
allow simple linear and quadratic relationships to be identified, the complexity of the 
logistics equation typically prevents such insight. 
 
3.5.8.3 Kriging Regressions 
Another form of surrogate model that has gained significant attention in the past few 
years is a form of a Gaussian Process called kriging. According to Shao, “a kriging model 
is a generalized linear regression model that takes th  weighted linear combination of a 
set of collected data as its prediction model.” [206] The regression is constructed in such 
a way as to ensure that the prediction of observed values will always precisely match 
those values.  One of the appealing aspects of kriging s the model’s ability to account for 
a non-linear or multimodal response space. [248], [260]  The assumption of a Gaussian 
Process means that for every predicted point, there is an associated error estimate that is 
created as a by-product of the model training. [248] 
 
Kriging does not address all issues encountered in the creation of surrogate models.  
Because of the matrices involved in the creation of the surrogate, kriging methods are not 
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suitable when there are more than 15-20 independent variables or more than 300-500 data 
points being used to create the model. [132]  In these cases the regression becomes too 
computationally intensive and cumbersome for use as a surrogate. 
3.5.8.4 Radial Basis Functions 
Radial basis functions are used to build approximations of functions by following the 
form shown in Equation 6.  The radial functions, a function whose value depends on the 
distance from the center [177], are summed with different centers and weights to 
approximate the value of the true function.  The weights for radial basis functions can be 
estimated using a least-squares approach or an optimizer in a fashion similar to training a 
neural network. 
 










Radial basis functions provide an advantage over response surface equations for non-
linear and non-monotonic spaces. [248]  The disadvantages for radial basis function are 
similar to those of the artificial neural network, in that the equation produced does not 
provide easy insight into the underlying mechanics of the process and that it is more 
complicated to produce than the response surface equation. 
3.5.9 Establishing MOPs and MOEs 
Sound decision making is dependent on the existence of riteria to measure the relative 
utility of different aspects of alternatives. [181]  According to Sproles, an MOE is a 
metric that quantifies how well a proposed solution meets a particular need of a problem 
stakeholder.  Sproles goes on to draw the distinctio  between an MOP and an MOP, 
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which is from the point of view of the engineer of other internal developer. [214]  The 
DoD differentiates the levels at which MoEs and MoPs exist, with MoEs existing at a 
higher level.  According to the Joint Test and Evaluation Handbook [63] an MOE is “a 
quantifiable value that expresses the effectiveness of the system, system of systems, or 
process under test.”  The same document describes an MOP as “a quantifiable value that 
expresses performance or capability of a system, system of systems, or process under a 
specified set of conditions at the human-machine task level.” 
 
Pinker suggests that acquisition metrics can be grouped into six fairly broad categories: 
cost, acquisition performance, schedule, commercial practices, weapon system 
performance, and technology innovation. [183]  Pinker goes on to outline a large number 
of metrics that could be used to judge acquisition programs, and while he does not claim 
that the list is exhaustive, robustness is conspicuously absent.  The absence of this metric, 
which few would argue is unimportant, could be because of the lack of methods for 
applying robustness early in the defense acquisition system and the lack of an appropriate 
mathematical definition for judging the robustness of competing alternatives. 
3.5.9.1 Global Regret 
Measures of effectiveness currently in use for the evaluation of alternatives do not 
attempt to quantify the robustness of candidates.  At most, they observe the change in a 
variety of MOEs and MOPs for a handful of off-design scenarios. 
 
A new measure of effectiveness is proposed.  Global Regret should be a function of the 
local regrets, regret in conventional regret analysis, across the entire scenario space of 
interest and of the probability of a certain scenario.  The mathematical formulation of 
Global Regret will be left for the hypothesis testing section of the dissertation.  The goal, 
however, will be to establish a new MOE that will aow the quantification of the 
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robustness of candidate alternatives relative to the other alternatives in the pool of 
consideration. 
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3.6 Methodology Summary – Global Regret Analysis 
The following steps provide a high level summary of the steps necessary to complete 
Global Regret Analysis, which will allow the quantification of the relative robustness of 
candidate acquisition alternatives.  Figure 17 summarizes the high-level tasks of Global 
Regret Analysis. 
 
1. Establish Global Regret as a primary metric 
2. Create parametric scenario 
3. Analyze alternatives across a wide range of possible futures 
4. Create surrogates of the local regret across the possible futures 
5. Establish likelihood for ranges of possible futures 
6. Evaluate Global Regret 
 




Alternatives for a 









Task 3: Establishing 
MoPs and MoEs
Task 6: Analyze 
Alternatives
Task 7: Compare 
Results
  
Figure 17: Modification to Regret Analysis 
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3.6.1 Methodology Information Flow and Tasks 
Establish Global 
Regret as a Primary 
Measure
Create the Parametric 
Scenario Generator
Analyze Alternatives 
for a Large Set of 
Scenarios





















Figure 18: Global Regret Methodology 
 
Figure 18 shows the flow of information among the tasks of Global Regret Analysis.  The 
two blue boxes in the figure show inputs from other tasks in the Pre-Milestone A defense 
acquisition process, but are not part of Global Regret Analysis.  The white boxes in the 
figure are the 6 activities of the Global Regret Analysis Methodology.  The individual 
pieces of information that flow are coded by numbers and explained below and the tasks 
for each step are shown in Table 8.   
 
1. Information about the scenario space of interest 
2. Information about the expected development of adversary's technology 
3. Software tool that can evaluate a concept in a particular scenario 
4. Set of variables that can be used to describe a particul  scenario 
5. Set of alternatives to be considered 
6. Scenario/alternatives DoE 
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7. Results of scenario evaluation for each DoE case 
8. Surrogate model defined local regret landscape 
9. Likelihood function for scenario space  
10. Global Regret value for each alternative 
11. Understanding of regret landscape 
12. Parametric environment 
 
Table 8: Global Regret Analysis Tasks 
Phase Tasks 
Establish Global Regret as a Primary 
Metric 
− Ensure robustness is a focus of the 
engineering efforts 
Create the Parametric Scenario Generator 
− Breakdown scenario to sufficient level 
for modeling approach (agent based, 
discrete event, system dynamics, etc) 
− Identify interactions significant to 
metrics of interest 
− Identify variables necessary to model 
interactions 
− Model interactions based on physics, 
empirical data appropriate for ranges of 
scenario variables 
• Should focus on batch mode execution 





Analyze Alternatives for a Large Set of 
Scenarios 
− Build a scenario/alternatives DoE 
− Execute the scenario/alternatives DoE 
using the Parametric Scenario Generator 
Software 
− Record metrics for each case in the DoE 
 
Build Scenario Space Regret Surrogates 
− Build and evaluate fitness function based 
on tracked metrics 
− Fit surrogate models for local regret and 
other metrics  
 
Establish Probability Weightings for 
Plausible Futures 
− Establish likelihood distributions for 
each scenario variable 
− Establish likelihoods for each future 
scenario 
 
Evaluate Global Regret 
− Evaluate the Global Regret Function for 
each alternative 
• Can us integration form if 
computationally possible 
• Can use numerical approximation of 
integral 
• Can use Monte Carlo techniques 





Information about the scenario space of interest is key for developing the Parametric 
Scenario Generator.  The Parametric Scenario Generator is a Modeling and Simulation 
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(M&S) environment that has been created in a parametric fashion so that variables 
critical to the metrics of interest can be rapidly manipulated to create scenarios.  The 
Parametric Scenario Generator also executes the M&Sfor the settings of the scenario 
variables.  In order to create this environment, however, information about the 
interactions within a scenario and the expected course of adversary’s technological and 
tactical development must be available.  This information comes from military planners, 
intelligence personnel, warfighters, and engineers who must provide input to ensure the 
parametric scenario provides a realistic representatio  of plausible scenarios. 
 
The Creation of the Parametric Scenario Generator step results in an M&S environment 
that can rapidly evaluate a particular scenario, and  set of variables that describe 
plausible scenarios.  Two additional pieces are necessary for creating a scenario space, 
however: the alternatives to be analyzed and the scenario Design of Experiments (DoE).  
The set of alternatives for evaluation using Global Regret Analysis are created in the 
Alternatives Definition task of the Pre-Milestone A activities.  These alternatives must be 
created using good systems engineering practices, such as those of the RDS 
methodology.  The use of solid systems engineering techniques ensures that the 
alternatives are representative of regions of the design space where promising solutions 
exist.    The scenario DoE is created by the engineers running the M&S codes and fitting 
the surrogate models (the following step of the methodology) and must be designed in a 
manner appropriate for the dynamic nature of the scenario space.   
 
The analysis of the alternatives in the Parametric Scenario Generator results in a DoE that 
is coupled with metrics of interest for each case.  This information is then used to fit 
surrogate models describing the responses for the entire scenario space for each 
alternative.  These surrogates are then coupled with likelihood functions for the different 
regions of the scenario space for the evaluation of Gl bal Regret. 
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The establishment of likelihood for different regions of the scenario space allows the 
local regret of concepts at different scenarios to be weighted.  By weighting the regions 
of the design space, large regret in unlikely regions will not have as big an impact as 
large regret in a likely region.  However, the likehoods must be established based on 
sound intelligence information and engineering understanding about the progression of 
technology.  In general, the lower bound for scenario variables is suggested to be set at 
the lowest value in the current state-of-the-art, while the upper bound should be some 
improvement on the cutting edge of the current state-of-the-art.  Once these likelihoods 
are established, the likelihood functions are outputs to the final Global Regret Evaluation. 
 
The analysis of Global Regret establishes a single value that can be used for the 
comparison of the robustness of individual concepts.  However, because of its parametric 
nature, the landscape of the local regrets can also be rapidly understood by manipulating 




While the methodology outlined above is the result of significant logical effort, the main 
assertions remain relatively unreinforced.  In an effort to solidify the arguments for using 
Global Regret Analysis, a number of hypotheses have been developed around the key 
new developments of the method.  These hypotheses will be tested in the following 
chapter in an effort to understand whether or not the method does in fact address the 
intended issues. 
3.7.1 Hypothesis 1 – Parametric Evaluation of Alter natives 
Recasting the current Analysis of Alternatives process as a parametric 
evaluation of alternatives that can be updated throughout the Defense 
Acquisition Process will increase the robustness of systems-of-systems solutions 
to a changing future operational environment  
 
Parametric approaches to systems engineering problems have shown to be effective in 
increasing robustness by allowing the delay of design decisions until more knowledge 
about the problem is available.  Lack of computational resources limited the usefulness of 
true system-of-systems parametric studies, but recent advances in aerospace systems 
design have greatly increased the practicality of parametric studies. 
 
A fundamental assumption of the usefulness of parametric studies for increasing the 
robustness of systems-of-systems is that knowledge of the near future is better than that 
of the far future, as discussed by Lempert [140].  Therefore, by delaying decisions about 
military systems until the fielding date is closer, our knowledge of the conditions will be 
more accurate.  With more accurate information, the system-of-systems can be designed 
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to better complete its task.  By continuously updating the assumptions wherever 
uncertainty exists, the magnitude of the uncertainty in he final product can be reduced. 
 
Implicit in the parametric approach to system-of-systems design is that the system 
concept must be allowed to change to a certain degree, in this case as information about 
the future becomes available.  In order to allow a ch nging design, design decisions must 
be made in as late a stage as possible, using parametric studies for as long a period of 
time as possible.  These synthesized, system-of-systems parametric studies seem overly 
cumbersome at first glance, especially to anyone who has conducted a complex system 
design. But recent developments in surrogate modeling now allow a designer to greatly 
increase the responsiveness of the network-of-systems model to near-instantaneous 
evaluation.  While the creation of these surrogate models does take an up-front 
investment, both computationally and in man-hours, it affords the designer a great deal of 
freedom in the assessment of the design space. 
3.7.1.1 Hypothesis 1a – Expanded FMCS 
A hierarchical, surrogate-model based environment can be coupled with a 
filtered, Monte Carlo decision-making technique to evaluate alternatives in the 
parametric methodology 
 
Filtered Monte Carlo decision-making has been developed over the past few years and 
emerged as an approach to top-down design over a lage design space.  [78], [24]  
However, the method has not been demonstrated over a la ge scenario space.  This 
particular method was selected for the evaluation of alternatives because it represents the 
state-of-the-art in top-down design space exploratin, and allows the consideration of 
many output and input variables.  The natural expandability of the filtered Monte Carlo 
 112 
approach could potentially allow a design space to be expanded to include a scenario 
space, or a scenario space expanded to include a design space. 
3.7.2 Hypothesis 2 – Global Regret Analysis 
Robustness can be defined as a function of the regret associated with a 
particular future scenario by using Global Regret Analysis 
 
In the evaluation of competing design alternatives, it is important to understand the 
relative robustness of the candidates.  Because a suit ble method for the early defense 
acquisition process was not found in the aerospace engineering, methods in other fields 
similar to defense acquisition were examined.  Regret analysis, from long-term policy 
analysis, was identified as a possible method for quantifying the relative robustness of 
candidate alternatives.   
 
Regret analysis does have some shortcomings that limit its applicability it its current 
form, however.  The formulation does not return a single measure of the relative 
robustness, rather a large set of relative regrets.  These discrete values can give a general 
picture of the robustness of concepts, but the design r and decision maker may have 
difficulties distinguishing among concepts that have different areas of strong and weak 
performance. 
3.7.2.1 Hypothesis 2a – Surrogate Modeling of the S cenario Space 
Surrogate models can overcome the shortcomings of regret analysis for use in 
the parametric methodology to enable Global Regret Analysis 
 
Surrogate models have been used successfully in the past to create a continuous space 
from a discrete set of data points.  Because of their ability to simply represent a complex, 
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but bounded space, they can greatly increase the speed and range over which an analyst 
may explore a process.  This simplification should aid in the ability of a continuous space 
of regret to be evaluated for a single, general robustness metric. 
3.7.3 Hypothesis 3 – Parametric Scenario Generation  M&S 
The use of a parametric scenario generator will allow the consideration of 
uncertainty across a wide variety of possible futures in the parametric 
methodology 
 
One of the key requirements for the current formulation of regret analysis is the ability to 
quickly evaluate a large number of possible future scenarios, so that each of the 
alternatives may be evaluated in them.  A similar requirement exists for the creation of a 
surrogate model, in that an environment must be constructed in which a Design of 
Experiments may be executed.  While traditional DoE methods have focused on the 
parameters under the control of the experimenter, bcause this method focuses on 
developing a surrogate of the scenario space, the traditional environment must be 
refocused.  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter presented the assertions, gaps, research questions, hypothesis genesis, and 
hypotheses for the dissertation effort. 
 
Assertion 1 is that Improvements to Defense Acquisition Process could improve MDAP 
performance and, following, assertion 1.1 is that Pre-Milestone A offers great opportunity 
for impact.  Assertion 2 is that using robustness a a criterion for selecting among 
alternatives will improve SoS performance. 
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The first gap is the lack of a quantifiable metric for the robustness of a system.  The 
second gap follows as the inability to account for a massive possible scenario space in 
assessing robustness.  The third gap in the current state-of-the-art and the desired state is 
the difficulty in updating the Pre-Milestone A activi ies as additional information 
becomes available about future operating conditions and technology maturation. 
 
The research questions for the dissertation were deived from the gaps identified in the 
current defense acquisition evaluation of the robustness of SoS alternatives.  They were 
an attempt to capture the essence of the gap in a manner that could be answered 
qualitatively or quantitatively through the hypotheses.  The research questions for the 
dissertation follow: 
 
• Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs stretch for more than a decade, so how 
can we evaluate the robustness of candidate system-of-systems solutions while 
considering the uncertainty associated with: 
o Technology maturation? 
o Possible warfare doctrine? 
o Possible enemy set? 
• How can we define robustness to include these uncertainties? 
• How can we promote the ability to update the robustne s analysis as higher-
fidelity information about the system-of-systems’ operating conditions becomes 
available? 
• Can surrogate models be used to address the shortcomings of regret analysis for 
use in early defense acquisition? 
 
The hypotheses were created by the infusion of techniques from long-term policy 
analysis and advanced aerospace design.  These techniques were Computer-Assisted 
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Massive Scenario Generation, Regret Analysis, and Parametric Methods.  The hypotheses 
were combined into a methodology presented in the chapter, but are summarized here. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Parametric Evaluation of Alternatives: Recasting the current Analysis of 
Alternatives process as a parametric evaluation of alternatives that can be updated 
throughout the Defense Acquisition Process will increase the robustness of systems-of-
systems solutions to a changing future operational e vironment. 
 
Hypothesis 1a – Expanded FMCS: A hierarchical, surrogate-model based environment 
can be coupled with a filtered, Monte Carlo decision-making technique to evaluate 
alternatives in the parametric methodology. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Global Regret Analysis: Robustness can be defined as a function of the 
regret associated with a particular future scenario by using Global Regret Analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 2a – Surrogate Modeling of the Scenario Space: Surrogate models can 
overcome the shortcomings of regret analysis for use in the parametric methodology to 
enable Global Regret Analysis 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Parametric Scenario Generation M&S: The use of a parametric scenario 
generator will allow the consideration of uncertainy across a wide variety of possible 






Before pursuing a demonstration of a methodology for robustness assessment early in the 
defense acquisition process, a series of tests will be performed to indicate the soundness 
of the hypotheses outlined above.  The logic associated with the generation of these 
hypotheses and an in-depth discussion of their elements will be presented in this section.  
The hypotheses will be tested with a framework based on the Operation Desert Storm. 
4.2 Hypothesis Testing Approach 
There are four key elements in the methodology that need to be tested before an example 
problem of the complete methodology is conducted.  Because of the expensive and time 
consuming nature of defense acquisitions, these elements will be tested in the 
“laboratory” environment of computer-based simulation.  Computer-based simulation 
offers the opportunity to explore complex relationship  at a significantly reduced cost.  
Unfortunately, validation of computer simulation without real-world data is extremely 
difficult. 
 
Figure 19 outlines the flow of information among the research experiments and the 
hypotheses.  A bottom-up approach was chosen because the higher-level hypotheses are 
dependent on the success of the lower-level hypotheses.  The bottom-up approach allows 
the identification of any “show-stoppers” before significant effort is wasted validating 




















Figure 19: Experimentation Approach 
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4.3 Experiment 1 – Computer Aided Scenario Generation 
 
Hypothesis: The use of a computer-assisted scenario generator will allow the 
consideration of uncertainty across a wide variety of possible futures in the parametric 
methodology 
 
To demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis, a parametric scenario generator will be 
created in the FLAMES modeling and simulation environment.  This scenario generator 
will then be used to generate a large number of possible engagement scenarios that reflect 
the physical environment, the threat environment, ad the target environment.  The 
scenario generator will be demonstrated by showing a large random generation 
experiment, a design-of-experiments, and the creation of a particular scenario of interest. 
4.3.1 Selection of a Campaign Framework 
Before attempting to create a parametric scenario,  set of relevant “ground-rules” need to 
be established to bound the possible behavior and ensur  that the parametric scenario is 
of use for military analysis.  While it might be possible to create a completely 
generalizable scenario, warfare from the stone-age and the realm of science-fantasy do 
not particularly lend insight into current defense acquisitions.  To test the hypotheses of 
this dissertation the author chose to limit the parametric scenario to a region around a 
historical conflict in which strike aircraft played a role.  The top row of Figure 20 shows 
the nine historical US conflicts that were considere , based on the criteria in the first 
column of the figure.  Each conflict was given a qualitative score based on literature 































































Data Availability 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 1 1
Technological Similarity 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4
Presence of Air Campaign 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4
Variety of Missions 4 4 4 1 1 2 4 2 4
Historical Proximity 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4  
Figure 20: Conflict Selection 
4.3.1.1 Data Availability 
Data availability was considered the most important spect of selecting a campaign 
framework for a number of reasons.  The primary reason is the necessity of comparing 
the results of the modeling and simulation to “real-world” events.  Without the ability to 
make this type of comparison, the experimenter is forced to rely on mathematical proof, 
or expert corroboration for support.  However neithr of these provides an attractive way 
of validation for this dissertation.  A secondary consideration is the desire to keep the 
dissertation unclassified.  While a large amount of data exists for any conflict, especially 
in the second half of the 20th century, much of it remains classified.  Publicly available 
information on military operations remains limited to generalities and statistics, so 
finding a conflict with as much unclassified information as possible will decrease the 
likelihood of uncovering sensitive issues. 
4.3.1.2 Technological Similarity 
Technological similarity is desirable to ease the modeling and simulation workload and to 
increase the relevance of the results to modern acquisition programs.  Current modeling 
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and simulation efforts, for the most part, are focused on current systems of interest.  To 
increase the likelihood of being able to leverage other modeling and simulation work, 
choosing a campaign framework that is technologically similar is important.  
Additionally, once the results of the modeling and simulation are analyzed, they will be 
more likely to be relevant to existing projects if they are based on models of similar 
technological maturation. 
4.3.1.3 Presence of the Air Campaign 
The degree of the presence of an air campaign is important because of the focus of this 
dissertation on aerospace and defense applications.  The work of the hypothesis testing 
has more likelihood of extending to the persistent strike application if it was based on an 
air campaign from the beginning. 
4.3.1.4 Variety of Missions 
The variety of missions present in the historical context provides a way to compare many 
different possible scenarios to historical data.  While detailed data about a particular 
campaign is critical, if that data does not contain  variety of missions the scenario 
generation can only be validated against a limited number of points.  By choosing a 
campaign with a large variety of mission types, theability to compare the generated 
scenarios to historical data increases. 
4.3.1.5 Historical Proximity 
Historical proximity plays a role in the selection f a campaign framework for a variety 
of non-quantifiable reasons.  Members of the armed forces community have better 
memory of events that have taken place more recently.  Additionally, the closer a conflict 
is to present day, the more likely that defense planners will take it into consideration 
when planning from the future.  In essence, choosing a campaign framework with close 
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historical proximity increases the likelihood that the work will be applied to current 
problems.    
4.3.2 Campaign Framework - Operation Desert Storm 
Based on the scores in Figure 20, Operation Desert storm was chosen as the campaign 
framework for the creation of the parametric scenario.  This choice was relatively 
insensitive to the weightings of the various criteria for comparison.  However, if more 
data on the current Global War on Terror were availble, it would be the campaign 
framework of choice. 
4.3.2.1 Historical Setting 
Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Iraq boasted the fourth largest army in the world with 
nearly a million men. [119] Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, causing immediate 
international condemnation of the act. According to the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), “On 9 August 1990 the UN Security Council voted 15-0 to declare Iraq’s 
annexation of Kuwait null and void.” [38]  This UN resolution left Iraq essentially out in 
the cold, occupying Kuwait and waiting to see what the response would come from the 
West. 
 
After a massive air and sea-lift of military equipment to Saudi Arabia from September of 
1990 through January of 1991, Operation Desert Shield, which had been to protect Saudi 
Arabia from a potential Iraqi invasion, became Operation Desert Storm, to liberate 
Kuwait. 
 
The coalition consisted of more than thirty nations from around the world, and more than 
800,000 troops were deployed at peak strength, with more than 540,000 of those coming 
from the US at peak strength. [115]  Such a large deployment might seem to be overkill 
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in these days of more limited conflicts, but at that time Operation Desert Storm was 
expected to be a large, peer-on-peer conventional war.  Saddam Hussein actually 
expected to prevail in a war of attrition, as was evid nced by his stubborn refusal to 
withdraw from Kuwait. [148]   
 
Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991 with a massive effort on the part of 
the coalition to gain air superiority over Iraq. [101]  The initial air-only war lasted until 
February 24, 1991, when full scale ground operations began.  After an extremely short 
period of ground fighting, the Iraqi army was driven out of Kuwait, and a cease-fire was 
negotiated on March 1, 1991.  The conflict represented one of the shortest in history, but 
on a tonnage of ordinance dropped per month, the Iraq war rivaled both World War II 
and Vietnam. [102] 
4.3.2.2 Desert Storm Target Environment 
The initial phases of Desert Storm consisted of twoprimary missions: Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) and the destruction of know  fixed and mobile Scud missile 
launchers. [Lowry]  Throughout the conflict, a wide variety of targets were struck, 
including fixed and mobile, hardened and soft, disper ed and concentrated. 
4.3.2.3 Desert Storm Threat Environment 
Three initial attacks on the first night of Operation Desert Storm “created a twenty-mile 
wide blackened radar corridor for [coalition aircraft] to enter Iraq.” [148]  This twenty-
mile corridor grew in width over the course of the air campaign, and after the first few 
days of the campaign, the Iraqi air defense threat was limited to both visually and radar-
guided Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), shoulder-launched infrared Surface-to-Air Missiles 
(SAM), and occasional engagements from radar-guided mid to high-altitude SAMs. [148] 
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Low altitude missions were particularly vulnerable to the radar-guided AAA and infrared 
SAM threat.  In fact, according to the Government Accounting Office, after the first few 
days of the conflict operations under 10,000 feet wre heavily limited during the bombing 
campaign. 
4.3.2.4 Desert Storm Physical Environment 
Iraq is a desert country, mountainous in only the north, which is roughly twice the size of 
Idaho. The summer months in Iraq are typically cloud ess [45], which in those months 
allows for mostly unhindered operation of bombing aircr ft.  However, there is a threat 
posed by sandstorms and dust storms, which can cause serious issues with aircraft engine 
performance. [55] 
 
The mountains of Iraq are nearly 12,000 feet in some areas; however, these regions were 
not heavily targeted during Operation Desert Storm.   The rest of the country, especially 
the areas in which the majority of Operation Desert Storm’s air campaign was 
concentrated, is primarily flat, offering little interms of hindrances for aircraft or radar. 
 
While Iraq’s summers are nearly cloudless, Operation Desert Storm took place in the 
winter months, which is Iraq’s rainy season.  Precipitation itself rarely impacts military 
operations, but cloud cover can impact the ability to deliver munitions and assess the 
impact of those munitions.  During the winter months, cloud ceilings below 25,000 feet 
occur 25-35 percent of the time in the areas where the majority of the air campaign was 
conducted.  However, the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) characterizes the mean 
cloud cover as “scattered over most of Iraq,” during the rainy season. [92] 
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4.3.3 Creating a Parametric Environment 
The parametric environment for massive scenario generation was created by trying to 
balance a reasonable scope of work for a dissertation while ensuring that sufficient detail 
was captured to verify the hypotheses.  There are a very large number of possible aspects 
of a scenario that could be considered for scenario generation.  However, because the 
goal of this effort is to demonstrate the hypotheses, a subset of aspects was chosen based 
on existing models in the FLAMES environment that could be used with some 
modification.  The general categories that were considered were threat characteristics, 
target characteristics, environmental characteristics, enemy tactics, and friendly tactics.  
One or several representative aspects were chosen from each area to show how they 
could be incorporated into a parametric scenario generator.  A heavier focus was given to 
threat characteristics and enemy tactics, as these w r considered to be the areas under 
which the most uncertainty would lie. 
4.3.3.1 Selection of a Modeling and Simulation Fram ework 
Table 9 shows four categories of simulation types that were considered for the creation of 
the models for hypothesis testing.  Because of the need to model physics of flight for 
many of the elements of the simulation, a discrete ev nt simulation was eliminated from 
consideration.  Differential equations were considere  inappropriate because, while they 
work well for systems, the SoS interactions are typically highly nonlinear and complex, 
which would likely drive the computational expense b yond the level afforded for the 
dissertation.  These eliminations left discrete-time and real-time models.  Because there 
was no need to have human-in-the-loop or hardware-in-the-loop, and the discrete-time 




Table 9: Formalisms of Simulation Types [188] 
Formalism Characteristics Applications Issues 
Discrete 
Event 
Based on a state machine – 
time is advanced based on 




oriented systems  
Complex systems may 
contain discrete elements 
that can use this formalism 
Differential 
Equations 
The state of the system 
varies continuously as a 





expensive. Doesn’t scale 




Simulation time is 
advanced in fixed and even 
increments.  At each 
increment, the state of the 
system is evaluated 
Systems that 
depend on time 
Can be slow if there are 
long periods of little 
simulated activity 
Real Time Simulation time is 
periodically synchronized 




Time synchronizing can be 
complicated 
 
The FLAMES software package from Ternion Corporation was selected as the discrete-
time modeling environment for this project.  Another package SEAS, was also 
considered, but FLAMES was chosen because of modeling xperience by the author from 
several research projects.  The FLAMES package provided several example models with 
flight physics, sensor physics, communications, anddata recording incorporated.  These 
models were used as the baseline for developing the models used for hypothesis 
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verification.  Additionally, the FLAMES environment has the capability to handle terrain, 
weather, atmospheric properties, and sensor masking, which were considered important 
in the selection of a modeling environment.  Descriptions of the various components of 
the model follow. 
4.3.3.2 Target Components 
The target model consists of a single model.  It has the ability to be fixed or mobile, 
allowing for moving targets of various speeds to be simulated. 
4.3.3.3 Target Physics 
One key aspect of a known target is its ability to withstand an attack, also known as its 
hardness.  A hardened target requires more energy, o  a concentration of energy in a very 
small area, to destroy than a soft target. 
 
The DoD and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) define a hardened target as 
one that is designed to withstand the effects of conventional weapons.  They specifically 
cite the use of rock and concrete as a usual means of protection.  [129]  Many different 
types of targets existed in Operation Desert Storm, f om relatively soft targets such as 
aircraft hangars and power plants, to extremely hard bunkers.  According to a German 
designer of one of Saddam Hussein’s bunkers under his royal palace is “very, very 
difficult to crack unless you hit it directly with a small atomic bomb.” [16] 
 
Because of the wide variety of targets engaged during Operation Desert Storm, a generic, 
fixed target will be used throughout the simulation.  This target would be representative 
of a fixed facility, such as a power-plant, command-bunker, or bridge.  These types of 
targets are interesting to military planners and were targeted throughout Operation Desert 
Storm. 
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4.3.3.4 Threat Components 
The threat for the parametric scenario was broken down into three primary models: a 
radar model, a tracker model, and a SAM model.  After the first days of operation, SAM 
suppression was relatively effective and reduced th threat to aircraft flying at medium 
and high altitudes.  However, visually and radar guided AAA remained a relatively 
important threat and caused the coalition mission planners to limit operations within 
reach of these systems.  [26] Because of the limitations on operations below 10,000 feet 
in Operation Desert Storm, small arms fire and AAA, both radar-guided and unguided, 
were not considered for this parametric scenario. 
4.3.3.5 Threat Component Physics 
The following sections give an overview of the modeling approaches used in the 
FLAMES simulation environment for the various components of the threat for the 
parametric scenario. 
4.3.3.5.1 Radar Modeling 
The SAM radar modeled for the hypothesis testing parametric scenario is based on the 










The wavelength, lambda, of the antenna is based on the operating frequency of the radar.  
Alpha is the radar cross section of the target, and R is the range of the target from the 
radar.  The gain of the antenna, Gt , is based on the antenna model described below, and 
only considers the main-lobe gain. The power transmitted, Pt, is user specified.  The gain 
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term appears in Equation 7 twice under the assumption that the transmit and receive 
antennae are one and the same. [222] 
 
For a successful detection, the returned power must be greater than the minimum 
detectable signal.  The minimum detectable signal is defined as the product of the noise at 
the receiver and the signal-to-noise ratio threshold, which is user specified. The noise at 
the receiver is calculated based on a product of the noise factor (Nf, user input), the 
ambient temperature (Ts), transmitted bandwidth (B), and Bozeman’s constant (k) 
(Equation 8). [222] 
 
fsr N B Tk   N =  
Equation 8 
 
4.3.3.5.2 Tracker Modeling 
The tracker model provides the track data necessary from the radar for the SAM targeting 
and launch.  The user can specify the maximum number of tracks, the transmit frequency, 
and the purge frequency.  The tracker is essentially a data repository that purges un-
updated tracks at the purge frequency and broadcasts its information to the other models 
at the transmit frequency. [222] 
4.3.3.5.3 SAM Modeling 
The SAM model for the parametric scenario is a three d gree-of-freedom (3DOF) model 
that models the translational degrees of freedom.  The missile guidance is governed by an 
expected collision point: the missile flies to where the guidance system “thinks” the 
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target will be located.  The missile model is composed of a guidance model and a motion 
model. 
 
The missile guidance model controls the flight path of the missile.  The missile burns all 
propellant at maximum thrust in the first phase of flight, and then coasts for the 
remaining flight time.  The missile guidance system calculates the path of the target, and 
the missiles current path to identify an intercept.  If no intercept is determined, the missile 
is turned to the correct path for an intercept.  If the difference in the missile heading and 
the target is more than eight degrees, the guidance syst m routes the missile on a shortest 
path to intercept through a maximum G turn.  The missile is commanded to explode at 
the calculated nearest point to the target.  [222]  
 
The missile motion model is derived based on Newton’s Second Law, that force is equal 
to the time rate change of momentum [12]].  Missile forces are divided into axial and 
normal groups (forces are resolved), and the new position is calculated based on the 
forces.  The axial forces include drag, thrust, andweight, while the normal force is the 
missile lift.  Missile drag is calculated based on the dynamic pressure, reference area, and 
drag coefficient. [222]  The use of a simple 3DOF model is consistent with many 
aerospace modeling and simulation efforts where the details of the missile flight are not 
the primary concern of the study. [140], [263], [117]  The formulation is also consistent 
with Moore’s derivation of weapon performance, which ncludes information about the 
“range, time of flight, maneuverability, and miss di tance.” [164]  
4.3.3.6 Physical Environment Components 
The physical environment consists of all elements that are not part of the friendly SoS, 
Target, or Threat sets.  This leaves a large portion of the world available for modeling, 
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but it is important to bound the parameters by identifyi g which impact the elements of 
interest in other sets in a way that might in turn impact other interactions. 
 
In the Desert Storm Parametric Scenario, two potentially important elements were 
identified for modeling in the physical environment: terrain, and weather.  Proximity to 
civilians and weather were both eliminated from consideration, however.  The weather 
patterns in Iraq are largely cloudless [92], and all of the systems under consideration are 
“all-weather.” 
4.3.3.7 Physical Environment Physics 
The physical environment of in the FLAMES simulation impacts many system models.  
The properties of the atmosphere, both density and wi , impact missile, aircraft, and 
bomb flight dynamics.  Terrain affects lines-of-sight and minimum altitude.  Weather can 
impact line-of-sight in certain ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum (visual, for 
example) and can limit the aircraft that can be used for a particular mission. 
4.3.3.7.1 Terrain Impact 
The impact of terrain is primarily manifested in the detection ability of the SAM radar 
systems modeled in FLAMES.  The radar calculation includes line-of-sight, so that the 
radar detection can not “see” through mountains.  A sample detection plot based on a 
single radar in a mountainous area is shown in Figure 21.  The lighter colors correspond 
to higher elevations.  The covered area is represent d by the light green region, and is 
calculated for a red aircraft flying at 300 meters Above Ground Level (AGL) using the 
FLAMES sensor coverage tool.  The red aircraft is shown in the lower right-hand corner 
of Figure 21.  The radial magenta lines from the blue SAM site show where radar 





Figure 21: Terrain Impact on Radar Performance 
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4.3.3.7.2 Terrain Generation 
This terrain generation algorithm creates a terrain b sed on a fractal approach that repeats 
the basic segment of code over decreasing intervals to generate a “natural” landscape. 
[69]  In two dimensions the progression of the algorithm through 3 iterations would 
follow the progression in Figure 22.  In the top, left-hand area the starting and ending 
points of a line are specified, in this case at an elevation of 1.  In the first iteration of the 
code, the midpoint of that line is displaced by a random amount elevation (either up or 
down).  This step corresponds to the top, right-hand rea of Figure 22.  In the second 
iteration (bottom, left-hand area) the midpoints of each of the line segments created in the 
first iteration are displaced by a random elevation, but of a reduced magnitude from the 
first iteration.  The final area of the figure shows another iteration of the code.  If this 
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Figure 22: 2-D Progression 
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Figure 23: 2-D Ridge 
 
The 3-D terrain generator uses a similar algorithm, extended to rectangles instead of 
lines.  In the start of the code, the four corner el vations are specified.  Then in the first 
iteration, the centroid of that rectangle is displaced by a random elevation, creating four 
rectangles.  Then in the second iteration, the centroids of each of the four new rectangles 
are displaced by random elevations.  This process is repeated until the desired 
smoothness of terrain is obtained.  It is important o note that the computational time for 
each additional iteration grows exponentially, so uing the minimum number of iterations 





Figure 24: 3-D Terrain 
 
There are three inputs under the control of the user for the terrain generation code.  The 
first is referred to as the “mountainousness” factor.  This number allows the specification 
of the initial range by which an elevation may be displaced.  However, if the area is to be 
re-scaled in a post-processor, this parameter does n t impact the results.  The second 
parameter that may be specified is the “jaggedness” of the terrain.  This factor allows the 
user to specify how rapidly the change in elevation decays with each iteration.  A lower 
“jaggedness” factor results in a smoother terrain.  Finally, the user can specify the 
number of iterations through which the code will execute.  This increases the fineness of 




The detailed modeling of weather was considered beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
and would have vastly increased the computational time required for the execution of the 
scenario generator.  However, the implementation of a cloud density algorithm is very 
similar to the generation of a random terrain, where a eas of high elevation would 
correspond to areas of limited visibility, and areas of low elevation would correspond to 
un-hindered visibility.  The demonstration of this algorithm was considered unnecessary 
to the validation of the hypothesis under consideration in Experiment 1. 
4.3.4 Scenario Generation 
4.3.4.1 Model Center Environment 
Traditionally, engineering software has been dominated by command line execution, text 
based input files, and very limited graphical user interfaces.  While usually 
computationally efficient, these types of legacy software interactions are not conducive to 
the visual decision making environments that are becoming prevalent in conceptual 
engineering design. [156]  FLAMES can be run from either a command line using an 
input file for scenario variables, or from the FLAMES graphical user interaction 
environment, FORGE. [223]  In this case, the desire to remain as visual as possible for 
decision maker interaction must be balanced with the need for rapid execution when 
exploring massive number of possible future scenarios. 
 
Phoenix Integration’s Model Center software provides a good approach to balancing the 
two competing needs.  Model Center allowed the inclusion of both the FLAMES 
scenario, and the MATLAB terrain generator in a single, visual environment.  The 
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environment allows either a single execution of the sc nario, or the execution of many 
scenario runs through the Model Center DOE Tool. [180] 
 
The implementation of the parametric scenario generator is shown in Figure 25.  The 
center window contains the status of the two main programs that make up the parametric 
scenario generator: MATLAB and FLAMES.  There are several additional batch files 
associated with the parametric scenario generator that handle path issues, deleting 
database files that are no longer needed, and moving inputs files to the proper directories.  
Because these files are not affected by input variables, and do not yield any outputs, they 
are included in the FLAMES icon and have no status ssociated with them. 
 
The left side of Figure 25 shows the interactive section of Model Center that allows the 
manipulation of scenario variables and the observation of the results in the scenario 
outputs.  The top four entries are the four scenario outputs that are being tracked.  Below 
those are the 29 scenario parameters that may be changed, as well as non-scenario 
variables that are discussed in the next experiment.  This area allows any input variable to 
be highlighted and changed, at which point the values in the output will grey out.  Once 
all desired changes have been made, the program icons are activated and the outputs 




Figure 25: Parametric Scenario Generator 
 
4.3.4.2 Parametric Scenario Generator Function 
The parametric scenario generator executes three codes that generate terrain, evaluate the 
scenario, and parse scenario data.  These codes are automated in Model Center so that 
they perform as a single, stand alone code that returns the values of interest based on 
input variables. 
4.3.4.2.1 Terrain Maker 
The function of the terrain maker is described earli r in this chapter.  The terrain maker 
generates an output text file that is read into the FLAMES scenario. 
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4.3.4.2.2 FIRE 
FIRE is the FLAMES executable that actually performs the time-step simulation of the 
FLAMES scenario.  Fire reads in the generic parametric scenario, a variable list 
generated by Model Center, and the results of the terrain generator.  The scenario is then 
executed 25 times to account for the stochastic nature of many of the variables in the 
simulation.  A variety of key events are tracked an written to an SQL database.  These 
database files include events such as unit kills, munitions firing, unit status, etc. 
4.3.4.2.3 FLARE 
The database files that are created by FIRE are parsed using SQL script in the FLARE 
application.  FLARE is a command line program that allows manipulation of the data 
tables and can write results of the manipulations t a text file.  In this particular case, blue 
and red unit deaths are tracked, as well as the number of SAMs fired, and the number of 
simulation runs (constant at 25).  Tracking the simulation runs allows for the easier 
identification of possible crashed simulation cases.  Once the desired data is parsed from 
the simulation datasets, a batch file erases the data files and transfers the parsed outputs 
back to Model Center. 
4.3.4.3 Ranges of Variables 
The table below (Table 10) shows the variables that were considered in the parametric 
scenario generator.  These variables are associated with the terrain generator, the generic 
air defense system, the ground radar module, the tracking radar module, and the SAM 
missile module.  The first column shows the variable name, the second gives a brief 
description of the variable and how it relates to the physics-based models described 
earlier in this chapter, the third column shows the upper bound used for this experiment, 
and the final column shows the lower bound used for this experiment. 
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The gray portion of the table shows variables that were not used in the creation of the 
scenario design-of-experiments.  These variables were eliminated to reduce the 
dimensionality of the experiment and clarify the results.  The logic used to select which 
variables were considered will be discussed in the following experiment, as it directly 
relates to the metrics used in that experiment. 
 







Maximum distance by which a 
SAM can be avoided 
120 km 0 km 
SAM_PK 




Thrust of SAM burn – drives speed 
and range in a single parameter 
500 lb 5000 lb 
SAM_Max G 
Maximum gravitational loading for 
SAM turns 
6 30 
GR_Trans Power Ground radar transmission power 40 dBW 60 dBW 
GR_Scan Period 
Time between a repeat of the 
ground radar scan 
6 sec 30 sec 
GR_ SNR 





Maximum range at which the 
ground radar can acquire a target 
100,000 m 600,000 m 
SAM_Burn Time 
Time for which the SAM burns at 
full thrust for launch 
  
SAM_Flight Time 









SAM_Max Range Maximum range for SAM   
SAM_Min Range Minimum SAM range   
SAM_Max Speed 
Maximum speed allowable for 
SAM 
  
SAM_Ref Area SAM drag reference area   
TR_Transmit Freq Tracking radar transmit frequency   
TR_Purge Freq Tracking radar purge frequency   
GR_Noise Figure Ground radar noise figure   
Number of SAMs 












It is important to not that in most cases, the upper and lower bounds are not fixed values 
and can be determined based on the size of possible future space that the user wants to 
explore.  The use of physics-based models is important if the bounds of the variables are 
not defined.  An accurate physics-based model should perform for any realistic value of 
the inputs (unless computational considerations take over), while historical regressions 
and empirical relationships are only valid in the ranges for which they were created.  In 
this case, because the models are physics based, most variables do not require limits. 
4.3.5 Experiment Results 
The visualization of a parametric scenario is extremely difficult because of the number of 
degrees-of-freedom that are in the scenario.  Humans have difficulty visualizing any 
number of dimensions greater than three, so in the following sections, examples will be 
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given in both three dimensions for easier visualization, and in many dimensions that 
reflect the true capability of the parametric scenario.   
 
The most effective way to present many dimensions of a scenario simultaneously is a 
multivariate scatterplot. In the scatterplot, each s enario is represented by a point in each 
box.  If a particular point is selected, its vector of attributes is then the values that read on 
each axis of the scatterplot.  In the scatterplot, it is important to realize that each box is a 
plot of the ordinate versus the abscissa, not the abscissa as a function of the ordinate.  
Each is independent variables, or if they are dependent, only two dimensions of the 
problem are being shown in the particular box. 
4.3.5.1 User Specified Scenario 
The first area of interest for the parametric scenario generation tool is the ability to 
investigate rapidly a specific scenario of interest, without a large investment of 
programming time.  This type of scenario is useful for decision making exercises where 
the decision makers want to play “what-if” games about the scenario assumptions.  By 
using the parametric scenario, the decision maker should be able to specify the possible 
future of interest and then have rapid feedback to the impact of that scenario on the 
metrics for the decision making exercise. 
 
In three dimensions, this type of scenario might look something like Figure 26.  The 
many possible dimensions of the scenario generator have been resolved to three meta-
criteria for demonstration.  These generic descripto s of the scenario are SAM Capability, 
Radar Capability, and Target Defense.  If a decision maker were interested in a relatively 
low-threat environment, but where any missiles present were highly capable, the green 
circle would provide insight into that type of scenario.  The purple square, on the other 
hand, would provide insight into a scenario where the adversary stationed a large number 
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of low-capability assets near a target.  The other wo user-specified scenarios represent 
different combinations of the three enemy scenario parameters. 
  
 
Figure 26: 3-dimensional Scenario Investigation - User Specified 
 
The actual parametric scenario generation tool is much more flexible than the generalized 
three-dimensional example because of the increased number of parameters that can be 
manipulated.  Table 11 shows the parameter settings a d results for a number of different 
user specified runs, using the parametric scenario generation tool.  The blue system being 
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evaluated is a B-1B bomber flying at 10,000 feet and 600 knots.  In each case the process 
of changing scenario variables and evaluating the results took approximately 20 seconds. 
 























































































































1 0 0.9 5000 30 60 6 5 3000 5 
2 60 0.9 5000 30 60 6 5 3000 5 
3 0 0.7 800 20 50 6 5 300 15 









































































































1 360 900 100000 500 3500 .3143 25 0  
2 360 900 100000 500 3500 .3143 23 4  
3 360 600 10000 500 1000 .3143 19 5  
4 360 600 10000 500 1000 .3143 0 24  
 
The first run in Table 11 shows a scenario where the blue bomber is forced to fly directly 
over a SAM site in its ingress to target.  This scenario might occur when the enemy has 
established a heavily defended zone around the targt, or when intelligence is lacking for 
the mission planning effort.  Both the SAM and the radar system considered for this 
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scenario are at the upper-end of the capabilities found in the literature search.  The radar 
coverage for this scenario, against a target similar to  large bomber aircraft, is shown in 
Figure 27.  This coverage was calculated by the FLAMES sensor coverage tool.  This 
scenario would be the equivalent of a decision maker sking for a worst-case scenario, 
and not surprisingly, in each of the 25 iterations, the blue bomber is shot down before it 




Figure 27: Case 1 and 2 Radar Coverage 
 
The second run in Table 11 is another attack against  very capable enemy, but in this 
case, the user has specified that the mission planners will be able to keep the blue bomber 
at least 60 km from the enemy SAM site.  This would correspond to a situation where the 
intelligence community was able to establish before th  mission the likely location of 
enemy defenses, but some of those defenses were unavoidable.  In this scenario, the blue 
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bomber was shot down 92% of the time, but 16% of the time the mission was successful.  
The difference in these two missions shows that against very capable enemy defenses, 
mission planning alone is insufficient to create a high probability of success, unless the 
blue bomber could be kept more than 60 km from the def nses. 
 
The third run in Table 11 shows a scenario where the blue bomber is again forced to fly 
directly over the enemy air defenses, but with two key differences from the first run.  In 
the third run, the enemy SAM capability is reduced to that more representative of a 
moderately capable air defense system, the enemy radar system is reduced to a less 
powerful variety, and the electromagnetic noise perceived by the radar system is greatly 
increased.  The reduction in radar coverage can be seen by comparing the calculated 
radar coverage against a target similar to a B-52 in Figure 28 to that in Figure 27.  In this 
scenario, the blue bomber survived the mission 24% of the time, and the target was 
destroyed 20% of the time. 
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Figure 28: Case 3 and 4 Radar Coverage 
 
The final run in Table 11 shows the same enemy capabilities and noise environment as 
the third run, but the blue bomber is able to avoid the enemy SAM site by 60 km.  In this 
case, the blue bomber is not shot down in any of the simulation runs, and the target is 
destroyed 96% of the time.  This situation shows a much greater increase in the impact of 
mission planning on both mission accomplishment and ircraft survival.  The difference 
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in the impact of the mission planning suggests that t ere is a cross-coupling effect on the 
metrics between the distance by which defenses may be avoided and the capability of the 
air defenses. 
 
User specified scenarios are not in-and-of-themselve  good ways to judge SoS 
alternatives, especially if only a few scenarios are considered.  But, they can provide 
valuable insight if there is a particular interest in a very limited region of the scenario 
hyperspace.   
4.3.5.2 Random Scenarios 
Having established that the parametric scenario generator can be used to rapidly evaluate 
scenarios of interest to decision makers in a nearly real-time fashion, it is important to see 
how the generator can be used to sample a large spac  of possible futures.   
 
The non-dimensional quantities shown in Figure 26 are shown again in Figure 29, but 
this time are assigned random distributions.  For clarity, only 30 points are shown in the 
space, based on two different types of distributions.  The type of distribution assigned to 
the parameters in the scenario generator depends on the knowledge the designer has 
about the likelihood of the possible futures associated with the parameter.  For example, 
if the designer has no idea what types of systems the adversary will have, a uniform 
distribution might be assigned to both SAM and Radar C pabilities, bounded by the 
range of current state-of-the-art systems and those under development.  However, for 
Target Defense, the designer might assign a triangul r distribution, centered on a 
moderately defended target.  This would reflect a perception that the adversary would 
spread defenses somewhat evenly across possible targ ts.  Figure 29 shows uniform 
distributions for SAM and Radar Capability, and a tri ngular distribution centered at 0.5 




Figure 29: 3-dimensional Scenario Investigation – Random Scenarios 
 
For the demonstration of the ability of the scenario generator to create a large number of 
possible future scenarios, eight of the scenario parameters were allowed to vary with 
uniform distributions over the ranges shown in Table 10.  These ranges were 
representative of values found in the literature search on current systems possessed the 
US and her adversaries.  The systems considered were both under development and 
current state-of-the-art.  All information was obtained from publicly available, 
unclassified documents, so the values may vary fromthose of actual systems. 
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Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the range of sensor coverage considered in the random 
scenario generation experiment.  The sensor coverage was calculated based on a large 
bomber-type aircraft flying at 3,000 meters AGL using the FLAMES sensor coverage 
tool. [224]  The radar-guided SAM systems employed by Iraq during Operation Desert 
storm fall into the range between the two areas of coverage shown in the figures. 
 
 




Figure 31: Min Radar Coverage 
 
The parametric scenario generator was used to create 15,000 random cases.  All scenario 
variables that are not included in the white section of Table 10 were defaulted to 
representative values.  The execution of the 15,000 cases, which represented 375,000 
actual scenario executions, took approximately 50 hours of processor time on a desktop 
computer.  The metrics tracked in the scenarios were number of blue bombers shot down, 
number of red targets destroyed, and number of enemy SAMs fired.  Figure 32 shows the 




Figure 32: Multivariate Visualization of Random Scenarios 
 
The first three rows and columns of the multivariate scatterplot (Figure 32) show the 
scenario metrics being tracked, while the remaining eight rows and columns show the 
scenario parameters that were allowed to vary.  A single case will appear in each box of 
the multivariate scatterplot, and can be traced through by selecting that point in the 
visualization software.  The presence of data points over the total ranges of all the 
scenario parameters indicates a good sampling of the entire design space.  A scarcity of 
points in a particular region would indicate that a non-uniform distribution was used to 
populate the scenario hyperspace for that variable.  Scarcity of points in regions of the 
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dependent variables (scenario metrics) indicates areas beyond the bounds of the 
simulation, essentially situations that will be very unlikely to occur given the ranges on 
the scenario parameters. 
 
To gain insight into the scenario results, four regions of one scenario parameter have 
been color coded.  Green points represent simulations where the blue aircraft was able to 
maintain approximately 70 km distance from red defenses.  Blue points represent a stay-
away range of 45-70 km, purple points 20-45 km, and fi ally pink points are less than 20 
km.  This color coding does not reveal any dependencies with the scenario parameters in 
the lower right-section of the scatterplot because no correlations were used among 
variables.  The presence of all 4 colors evenly across the spectrum indicates the uniform 
distributions.  However, interesting trends can be o served in the responses when the 
different regions of the design hyperspace are color-coded. 
 
Box 1,4 of the multivariate scatterplot (Figure 32) shows the number of blue aircraft 
killed versus the SAM stay-away range, and is magnified in Figure 33.  At this 
magnification, horizontal lines are present in the scatterplot that reflect the integer values 
that the loss of blue bombers takes.  A trend can be observed in the region of the plot 
corresponding to a route closer to the air defenses.  The lack of points in this region 
indicates that without mission planning to keep the aircraft away from the defenses, there 
is a much higher likelihood of losing the blue bomber, regardless of the capability of the 
SAM site.  This relatively intuitive conclusion shows that the scenario generator is 
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Figure 33: Multivariate Magnification 1 
 
Box 1,5 of the multivariate scatterplot (Figure 32) shows how multiple elements of the 
scenario can be combined through color coding for additional insight, and is magnified in 
Figure 34.  The change in the presence of colors frm the region of high blue losses and 
low SAM probability of kill to the region of low blue losses and high SAM probability of 
kill indicates that there is a coupling between the SAM probability of kill and the range 
by which the blue bomber is avoiding the air defense system.  In the top-left (high blue 
losses and low SAM probability of kill), only the pink and purple bands of range are 
observed.  This indicates that in this region, blue aircraft that were avoiding the defense 
site were having a higher rate of survival.  This ob ervation is consistent with the shift in 
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color down the blue killed axis, showing that low rates of loss occur at further distances.  
However, as the missile probability of kill increass, the number of points in the region of 
low blue loss decreases.  This indicates that with more capable missiles, the adversary is 
able to overcome some of the tactical advantage achieved by staying farther from the 
defense sites.  The presence of the green points in the region of high SAM probability of 
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Figure 34: Multivariate Magnification 2 
 
These two examples have demonstrated some of the advant ges the multivariate 
scatterplot has for viewing many possible scenario outcomes, especially when combines 
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with color coding of regions of interest within the scenario parameters.  The initial 
computational investment for creating the data points can be computationally intensive, 
however, once generated they can be manipulated quickly in the decision making setting.  
Different views of the data can be created instantaneously, and the color coding and 
marking scheme can be updated to show different perspectives on the scenarios.  The 
ability to rapidly manipulate an entire scenario hyperspace of data makes the multivariate 
scatterplot coupled with the randomized parametric scenario generator ideal for 
conceptual design decision making. 
 
4.3.5.3 Scenario Design-of-Experiments 
Just as the parametric scenario generator allowed th  creation of a large set of random 
scenarios, a scenario design-of-experiments can be executed.  The design-of-experiments 
allows a large amount of information to be obtained from the modeling and simulation 
environment with a minimal amount of computational effort. [See Appendix A] 
 
Figure 35 shows a three dimensional representation of the design of experiments used for 
the parametric scenario generation.  The particular design used for this experiment was a 
combination design that used a face-centered central composite design, shown by the 
blue asterisks in Figure 35, and a latin-hypercube space-filling design, the purple 
diamonds in the figure.  The latin-hypercube was select d to have an equal number of 
points to the number in the face-centered central composite.  The face-centered central 
composite design provides insight into the behavior of the metrics near the edges of the 
scenario space, while the latin-hypercube points give reater insight into the behavior in 
the middle of the design space. 
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As can be seen from the distribution of the points  the three-dimensional plot (Figure 
35) the design of experiments provides data points in nearly the entire scenario space.  
These experiments provide the possibility to rapidly understand regions of the design 
space where the system under consideration performs well or performs poorly.  Once the 
general performance of the system across the space is understood, greater fidelity can be 
used to explore regions of interest. 
 
Figure 35: 3-dimensional Scenario Investigation – Design of Experiments 
 
Figure 36 shows the complete design of experiments for the eight variables manipulated 
in the random scenario generation experiment.  In the figure the points have been color 
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coded by the bands of distance that the aircraft maintains from the air defense site.  The 
reason for the appearance of only green points in the bottom right portion of the 
scatterplot matrix is that at each point there are actually five experiments overlaid.  If any 
particular band were selected, that color would come to the front of the independent 





Figure 36: Multivariate Visualization of Scenario DOE 
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As was observed with the randomly generated points, trends in the location of points and 
the changes of colors can be used to understand the be avior of the system in the 
scenario. 
 
Figure 37 shows the design of experiments, but with only one degree of the SAM 
distance shown (where the aircraft flies directly over the SAM site).  The color coding 
corresponds to four bands of SAM probability of kill.  Purple, blue, green, and red points 
correspond to increasing probability of kill from 30% to 90%.   
 
Figure 37: Simplified Multivariate Visualization of  Scenario DOE 
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4.3.6 Experiment Summary 
The three components of this experiment explored the use of a parametric scenario 
generator to evaluate specific regions of interest in the possible futures space, a massive 
number of randomly created scenarios that span the possible futures space, and finally a 
design-of-experiments that spans the possible futures space.  These scenarios were all 
used to show trends in the performance of a system can be understood across the futures, 
even when the uncertainty about the likelihood of the futures was not.  In many cases, 
these trends allowed decisions (such as using mission planning to avoid defenses). 
 
The hypothesis being tested for this experiment is considered true.  It has been shown that 
a wide variety of possible future scenarios can be evaluated rapidly with the parametric 
scenario generator. 
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4.4 Experiment 2 – Evaluating Regret 
 
Hypothesis: Robustness can be defined as a function of the regret associated with a 
particular future scenario. 
Sub-hypothesis:  Surrogate models can allow the regret for candidate alternatives to 
be rapidly assessed across the entire future scenario space. 
 
Having shown the possibility to rapidly create a wide range of possible futures using the 
parametric scenario generator, the next experiment will explore how the robustness of a 
particular system or system-of-systems can be evaluated across those futures.  Four 
systems that were employed for various missions during Operation Desert Storm will be 
compared. 
4.4.1 Mathematical Definition 
The Global Regret, RG, of a system is the integral, over the possible futures space, of the 
local regret, Rl, at each possible future multiplied by the likelihood of that future, Pl. 
(Equation 9)  In the equation, the x’s are the dimensions of the parametric scenario that 














∫ ∫= K  
Equation 9 
 
The Local Regret, Rl, is the difference in the maximum fitness displayed by a system for 
a possible future minus the fitness of the system under consideration for that same 
possible future.  The Local Regret is normalized by the maximum fitness displayed by a 
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system for the possible future. (Equation 10)  The fitness, F, is a function of the vector of 
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Equation 11 
 
The probability of a possible future is the product of he likelihood of each element of the 













This definition of regret is based on the previous definition of regret discussed earlier in 
this dissertation.  The historical definition corresponds to the Local Regret.  The 
development of a Global Regret term grew out of the desire to be able to understand the 
performance of the system under consideration over the entire possible future space, not 
just at discrete points.  The use of a single, integrated metric for regret allows the use of 
many decision making methods that would be limited by the existence of many discrete 
regret data points. 
 164 
4.4.2 Candidates for Comparison 
Three strike aircraft from the USAF’s 1991 inventory were selected for comparison in the 
parametric scenario generator.  These aircraft repres nt a sampling from the large variety 
of aircraft that were used in the air campaign in Operation Desert Storm.  The B-1B 
bomber is included in this list; however, it was not used during the conflict because of its 
status as a solely nuclear platform at that point.  The desire to show changes in regret as 
advanced technologies enter a scenario led to the inclusion of this platform, along with 
the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM). 
 
The aircraft considered were among four used in the heavy bombing campaign. [97]  
However, because of their similarity in size and capabilities to the F-111, the F-15E was 
not considered in this experiment.  The other aircrft, the F-117 Nighthawk, was only 
used in a small fraction of the missions and relied h avily on its stealthy characteristics to 
avoid being engaged by Iraqi air defenses. [97]  Because the B-1B represents a “stealthy” 
platform, and too much information regarding stealth can result in classification of 
research materials, the F-117 was not evaluated in this experiment.  A brief discussion of 
each aircraft follows. 
4.4.2.1 B-1B 
The B-1B Lancer (Figure 38) is a multi-mission, supersonic heavy bomber that is the 
“backbone on America’s long-range bomber force.” [241]  The B-1 program was one of 
the most controversial defense acquisitions of the second half of the 20th century, but the 
bomber has become a valuable part of the USAF inventory. [139] During Operation 
Desert Storm, the B-1B was not used as part of combat operations against Iraq, because 
at that point it was only armed with nuclear weapons; the B-1B conventional armament 
program did not begin until 1994.  [27]  During the w apons conversion program, the B-
1B was initially intended for the delivery of Mk-82 non-precision 500 lb gravity bombs, 
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but since has been upgraded to carry a wide variety of weapons including the Joint 
Standoff Weapon (JSOW) and the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). [83]  
The Lancer was first used in combat in Operation Desert Fox in 1998, delivering 
conventional munitions. [27]   
 
According to Jane’s, the B-1B has a radar cross section of approximately 1% of the B-52. 
[221] While this value does not give any information about the directionality of the RCS, 
or the range of frequencies for which it is applicable, the value does give a good starting 
point for the comparison of the B-52, B-1B and F-111’s susceptibility.  The use of this 
value is not meant to generate any real values about the survivability of the B-1B against 
various radar threats, but rather give insight intogeneral trends between aircraft designed 






Figure 38: B-1B Lancer [241] 
 
The parametric aircraft parameter settings used to describe the B-1B are shown in Figure 
39.  Theses parameters were compiled from publicly available information from the US 




Figure 39: B-1B Parameters 
4.4.2.2 B-52 
During Operation Desert Storm, forty percent of thew apons dropped by the coalition 
were delivered using the B-52 (Figure 40). The B-52 was used against a wide variety of 
targets and is currently able to deploy the most diverse set of weapons of any platform in 
the USAF inventory. [240]  The aircraft is capable of carrying more than 50,000 pounds 
of ordinance and flying in a range from low-level to around 50,000 feet.  [169] 
 
The B-52 has been in the USAF inventory since 1954, and the current generation, the B-
52H has been in service since 1961.  The B-52 airframe has been continually upgraded 
throughout its service life, however, and currently has modern avionics systems, global-
positioning system, and all-weather capability. [99]  The B-52 has a crew of six and a 
unit cost of $53.4 Million (FY1998).  Cost data on a average sortie was unavailable for 
the B-52 during Operation Desert Storm [97], but will be assumed based on a multiple of 
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the cost of an F-111 mission.  Because both aircraft a e of roughly the same vintage, the 
B-52 cost will be assumed to be $100,000 for an average mission.  This number 
incorporates the increased number of crew, and the eight engines of the B-52 (as opposed 
to 2 on the F-111). 
 
 
Figure 40: B-52 Stratofortress [240] 
 
Public USAF information and information from GlobalSecurity.org was used to describe 




Figure 41: B-52 Parameters 
4.4.2.3 F-111 
Originally intended as a dual-use platform for the US Air Force and the US Navy, the 
General Dynamics F-111 (Figure 42) was designed in the 1960’s and entered service in 
1967.  Only the air force variant was built, but the aircraft was designed as a combination 
fighter-bomber (air force) and air superiority fighter (navy).  With a range of nearly 3,000 
miles, the F-111 Aardvark filled a long-range, all-weather strike role for the USAF until 
the last variant was retired in 1998.  [170] 
 
The F-111 has a unit cost of $75 Million (FY1998) and is operated by a crew of two.  The 
aircraft saw service in Vietnam, Libya, and Iraq, [120] and was “one of the most effective 
Allied aircraft in Operation Desert Storm, flying more than 2,400 sorties against Iraqi 
strategic sites, vehicle formations, and hardened bunkers.” [170] The F-111 was initially 
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a controversial purchase, but “achieved one of the saf st operational records of any 
aircraft in USAF history.” [81] 
 
The parameters used to describe the F-111 in the FLAMES simulation are shown in 
Figure 43.  These parameters were from publicly avail ble sources including the USAF 
Museum [170], GlobalSecurity.org [104], and the Federation of American Scientists. [81]  
According to the General Accounting Office, an averge F-111F sortie in Operation 
Desert Storm cost $24,900 and this number will be used for cost calculations. [97] 
 
 




Figure 43: F-111F Parameters 
4.4.2.4 TLAM 
The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), shown in Figure 44 and also known as the 
Tomahawk Cruise Missile, is a long-range munition capable of attacking targets 1500 
miles from its launch point.  The TLAM was initially deployed in 1984 [235], but 
became famous for its role in Operation Desert Storm as the first shot that was fired in 
the war. [17]  Over the course of the conflict, 288 missiles were launched against a 
variety of Iraqi targets. [46]   
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Figure 44: Tomahawk Land Attack Missile [107] 
The TLAM’s small size and low-altitude flight make it difficult for the adversary to 
detect the missile in flight. [190]  The TLAM also incorporates intelligence about the 
threat environment and is piloted over an evasive route to its target.  [235] The unit cost 
of the TLAM has varied widely over its deployment since 1984, but according to the 
General Accounting Office, a TLAM sortie in Operation Desert Storm cost $2.855 
Million. [97] 
 
Because of its similarity in flight to a very small ircraft, the TLAM was modeled using 
the FLAMES aircraft physics model.  Figure 45 shows the parameters that were used to 
model the TLAM.  These figures were taken from publicly available sources including 
US Navy FactFile [235], Raytheon Documentation [190], and GlobalSecurity.org. [107] 
The flight model completes with the deployment of a bomb munition.  The deployment 
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does not destroy the vehicle model, however, so its exi tence is ignored after the 
deployment and the deployment itself is counted as the destruction of the vehicle. 
 
After constructing the model, it was decided not to include the physics of the TLAM in 
the regret consideration, but rather to incorporate it probabilistically.  According to the 
Chief of Naval Operations “about 85% of the 288 missiles fired during the war hit their 
targets.” [46]  Because of the dissimilarity between the TLAM and the other aircraft 
being considered, in size, tactics, and employment, the model used for the TLAM for 
regret will not follow the pattern of the other aircraft.  Instead, the mission success rate of 
85% will be used for all of the scenarios in the global regret analysis. 
 
 
Figure 45: TLAM Parameters 
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4.4.3 Modeling Candidates 
4.4.3.1 Aircraft Physics 
The aircraft in the simulation are modeled using a 3DOF translational model.  In the 
parametric scenario generator, the aircraft is assumed to fly a direct path to its target.  
Because the particular location of the target is not prescribed, different types of flight 
path are accounted for by moving the location of the target’s defenses relative to the 
flight path.  This is equivalent to moving the flight path, but eliminates the need to 
program a complex flight path for the aircraft. 
 
Biltgen provides a good description of the function of the FLAMES aircraft model used 
in this effort. [24]  The Flames Example Models Documentation [222] also provides 
additional information.  Atmospheric density and dynamic pressure are calculated at each 
time step for the aircraft.  These calculated values are used to calculate the drag on the 
aircraft, the maximum turn acceleration available to the aircraft (based on lift), the 
maximum turn rate and minimum turn radius.  The maxi um roll rate of the aircraft is an 
input.  Within these constraints the aircraft operat s based on the movement commands 
entered into the individual aircraft code. 
 
Because of the mission formulation selected for this experiment, the aircraft flies a 
straight, level, constant-speed path to the target, th n performs a maximum g turn and 
returns to the starting point of the simulation.  The physics of the flight before this ingress 
and egress are not calculated; they are assumed to not play a role in the scenario level 
metrics of interest for the regret analysis. 
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4.4.3.2 Aircraft Flight Conditions 
Two primary variables were considered for adjustment to aircraft tactics to ensure that, 
when comparing the performance of systems, the ‘best’ p rformance for that particular 
system could be used.   
 
Aircraft speed was varied from 300 knots to the aircr ft’s maximum speed.  This range 
allows the “best” speed for avoiding enemy SAMS to be used.  However, the top end of 
the speed range impacts the accuracy of the bombing simulation.  Aircraft flying faster 
are more likely to miss their targets that those flying at lower speeds.  As a result of these 
two competing attributes, a wide range was considered so that the best trade between 
survivability and mission success can be made. 
 
Altitude aircraft altitude was allowed to vary from 10,000 feet AGL, to 50,000 feet AGL.  
This range represents a wide variety of possible altitudes that reflect mission altitudes 
used in Operation Desert Storm.  According to the General Accounting Office, because 
of the severe threat posed by radar guided AAA and IR SAMS, after day three almost no 
low-level missions took place. [97] 
 
4.4.3.3 Quantifying Survivability 
Electronic warfare (EW) and stealth technologies both play a large roll in the 
survivability of strike aircraft in hostile airspace.  Stealth technologies reduce the RCS of 
a vehicle, making the vehicle appear “smaller” to radar detection systems.  Electronic 
warfare helps mask the presence of strike aircraft by emitting electromagnetic energy in 
the frequency range of the hostile radar systems.  However, the specifics of both stealth 
technology and electronic warfare for US systems fall solidly in the classified realm.  
[175] As a result of the desire to keep this dissertation in the publicly releasable realm, 
 176 
specifics of RCS and EW will not be included in any simulations for this work.  
However, a general susceptibility term will be established to mimic the effects of some 
stealth technologies.  The following sections discus  the general effects of stealth and 
EW, as well as how they might be incorporated into a classified study using the 
methodology outlined in this dissertation. 
4.4.3.3.1 Radar Cross Section 
Radar systems emit electromagnetic energy and then “listen” for the echo of that 
radiation off of objects downrange from the transmitter.  The amount of radiation that is 
returned depends on a variety of factors including the propagation effects of the 
atmosphere, the downrange distance of the object, the material the object is made from, 
and the size of the object, to name a few.  The amount f radiation returned to the 
receiver antenna is proportional to how easy it is for the radar to “hear” the object.  
 
Increasing the difficulty for enemy radars to detect an aircraft is one approach to reducing 
the likelihood that an aircraft will be neutralized before it can complete its mission.  
Survivability is defined as the probability of being detected, times the probability of 
being shot at if detected, times the probability of being hit if shot at, times the probability 




killedhitengagedectSurvive PPPPP det=  
 
There are a fairly large number of approaches to reducing the RCS of an aircraft, but the 
fall into three broad categories: reducing the physical size and shape of the aircraft, 
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coating the aircraft with a radar absorbing paint, a d changing the materials from which 




Figure 46: Typical RCS Diagram (Wikipedia) 
 
The simulation used in this dissertation for hypothesis testing is capable of incorporating 
data about the RCS signatures of aircraft of interest, including the directionality and 
bandwidth range for the signatures.  These signature models interact with the function of 
the radar models in the FLAMES simulation.  However, the ability to generate the 
anticipated signature of an aircraft is not inherent in FLAMES.  Because of this limiting 
factor, and the desire to keep this dissertation unclassified, a generic survivability term is 
used in place of the RCS of each vehicle of interes.  This term was based on publicly 
available information and is meant to show only that incorporation of survivability 
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information is possible with the methodology presented in this dissertation and the 
direction of the impact on the capability. 
 
Table 12: Survivability Factor 






4.4.3.3.2 Electronic Warfare 
During a military strike mission, the aircraft delivering the ordinance is rarely the only 
aircraft involved in the mission execution.  In addition to the strike platform there are 
often airborne control aircraft, refueling assets, and electronic warfare aircraft.  These 
electronic warfare assets are important to increasing the probability that a mission will be 
successful by increasing the survivability of the strike platform.  The DoD defines EW as 
“military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the 
electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three 
divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, a d electronic warfare support.”  [129]   
 
Electronic attack is defined by the same source as the “division of electronic warfare 
involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons 
to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or 
destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.” 
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According to the DoD, electronic protection is the “division of electronic warfare 
involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of 
friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy 
friendly combat capability.” [129]   
 
Electronic warfare support is the “division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked 
by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, 
and locate or localize sources of intentional and uintentional radiated electromagnetic 
energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct 
of future operations.” [129]   
 
A common form of electronic warfare that impacts the survivability of aircraft is radar 
jamming.  The DoD identifies two primary types of jamming under the broad umbrella of 
electromagnetic jamming: barrage jamming and spot jamming.  Jamming is the use of 
electromagnetic energy to reduce the effectiveness of enemy electromagnetic capabilities.   
The difference between barrage jamming and spot jamming is that spot jamming is 
targeted at a specific frequency while barrage jamming encompasses a wide section of 
frequencies in which electromagnetic systems operate. [129]   
 
If jamming technologies were to be incorporated into a modeling and simulation 
environment, the primary impact would be on the effectiveness of radar sensors for the 
adversary.  This could be captured by modeling the p ysics of the electromagnetic 
interference or by a modification to the system leve  performance of the adversary radar.  
This could take the form of a generic reduction in se sor range, or a reduced likelihood of 
acquisition when under the effect of a jamming system.  Jamming technology and tactics 
are closely guarded to reduce the effectiveness of the adversary’s countermeasures, as are 
the changes in capability that they allow.  In order to eliminate the possibility of 
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inadvertently exposing sensitive material about the performance of systems in a jammed 
environment, electronic warfare of any type will not be considered in the modeling 
portions of this dissertation. 
4.4.3.4 Modeling Munitions 
According to the General Accounting Office, and contrary to popular belief, during 
Operation Desert Storm, “95 percent of the total bom s delivered against strategic targets 
were unguided; 5 percent were guided.” The reasons f r the use of so many unguided 
munitions included the high cost of guided bombs, the all-weather capability of unguided 
bombs, and the large size of many of the strategic targets. [97] Because of the large 
number of unguided munitions delivered, the modeling a d simulation environment will 
focus on modeling only unguided munitions, specifically freefall bombs. 
 
At the time of Operation Desert Storm, the B-1B was not configured to deliver 
conventional ordinance. [241] 
4.4.3.5 Measures of Performance 
Three measures of performance were tracked from the FLAMES parametric scenario 
generator for the three aircraft in the simulation.  These measures were the number of 
blue aircraft shot down, the number of red targets de troyed, and the number of SAMs 
fired.  The measures were tracked over 25 repetitions f the same scenario settings in 
order to account for the probabilistic nature of some of the variables in the simulation.  
While 25 cases would normally not be considered a large enough sample to gain a high-
confidence in the outcomes, the need to limit computational expenditure, coupled with 
the conceptual nature of the problem, led to the sel ction of this number of cases. 
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The measures of performance tracked in the scenario allow the quantification of the 
mission success rate (how many red targets were killed), the friendly loss rate (how many 
blue aircraft were shot down), and a rough measure of cost to the enemy through the 
number of SAMs fired.  The cost to the US forces is dependent on whether the blue 
bomber was shot down or survived.  The cost model us d for these scenarios is discussed 
in the following section. 
4.4.3.6 Costs 
Before discussing the costs used in this experiment, it is important to note that these costs 
are not meant to make actual military decisions, but rather show the ability of regret 
analysis to incorporate cost information.  Assumptions have been made where data was 
unavailable that may lead to results that differ from reality.  In each case that such an 
assumption has been made, every effort has been made to clarify the reasoning behind the 
assumption. 
 
The cost of a typical mission in Operation Desert Storm for each of the aircraft listed 
above was taken from General Accounting Office documents.  Those costs, coupled with 
the unit replacement cost for each aircraft, are list d in Table 13.  Figures for the average 
mission cost of the B-1B and B-52 were not available for Operation Desert Storm (the B-
1B did not actually serve because of its nuclear armament in 1991).  The operation cost 
for the B-52 was estimated based on the cost of the F-111.  Based on the logic that was 
used to estimate the B-52 mission cost, the same appro ch was used to estimate the B-1B 







Table 13: Aircraft Costs 
Aircraft Mission 
Cost 
Cost of Crew Unit Cost 
(FY98) 
Total Cost of Loss 
 missionC  ( )MC crewcrew 6$#=
 
unitC  crewunitmission CCC ++  
B-1B $50,000 $24,000,000 $283,100,000 $307,150,000 
B-52 $100,000 $36,000,000 $53,400,000 $89,500,000 
F-111 $24,900 $12,000,000 $75,000,000 $87,024,900 
TLAM $2,855,000 N/A N/A N/A 
 
The value of human life is something that is nearly impossible to quantify, and doing so 
opens a Pandora’s Box of questions about ethics and morality.  However, only labeling 
the loss of the aircraft as a financial burden is an incomplete assessment, especially when 
the aircraft being compared have different numbers in their crews.  While either is 
terrible, the loss of a B-52, with its crew of six, will have a greater impact than the loss of 
the F-111, with its crew of two.  In 1999, Conetta and Knight reported that “The Air 
Force estimates that it costs $6 million to train a pilot to full operational competence” 
[51] This figure, coupled with the unit cost of the aircraft in the mission, can give a sense 
of the cost to the US in the case of an aircraft being shot down.   
4.4.4 Local Fitness Function 
The fitness function used for the assessment of regret is shown in Equation 14.  The 
aircraft fitness is the ratio of the probability of mission success to the expected cost of the 
mission.  The Greek letters alpha, beta, gamma, and epsilon are weighting factors that can 
be used by decision makers to adjust assumptions (such as the cost for B-1B and B-52 
missions) that they find objectionable and instantaneously see the effect on the analysis 
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results.  The factor on the crew cost, beta, can allow the incorporation of a higher value 
on human life than the training cost of $6 Million that was included in the initial 
experiment.  Each cost in the fitness function is normalized by a baseline, shown in Table 
14.  These baseline values help condition the problem to reduce the likelihood of 









































Table 14: Baseline Cost Values 





The local regret for each aircraft alternative is calculated based on the difference between 
the aircraft’s fitness and the maximum fitness exhibited for that particular scenario.  The 
aircraft that performs the “best” based on the fitness function therefore has a local regret 
value of zero.  This formulation allows the regret function to be in a standard form for 
optimization or other computer manipulation. [243] 
 
This form of local fitness function is often referrd to in literature as an Overall 
Evaluation Criterion (OEC), which combines a number of metrics of interest into a single 
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overall score for the particular concept.  The challenge in using an OEC lies in the 
assignment of the weights for the various metrics.  While analysts and engineers may 
establish weights, it is the decision makers who must have the final say in the importance 
of the various metrics.  Therefore, the OEC creation must be an iterative process that 
involves the decision makers’ input.  This input can be solicited ahead of time, or, 
sometimes more effectively, solicited in an interactive electronic design review.  This 
type of review allows instantaneous incorporation of decision maker feedback by 
leveraging the power of parametrics in early conceptual design. 
4.4.5 Surrogate Model Creation 
Because of the elaborate nature of the interactions in the FLAMES agent-based 
environment, the most likely candidate for a good surrogate model fit is the Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN).  However, for completeness, two other forms of surrogate 
models will be considered, the polynomial response surface, and a krigining model.  
Because Global Regret is formulated as a series of integrals, the simplicity of the 
functional form will have great impact on the ability of the integrals to be calculated in 
closed form.  While the Response Surface Methodology (RSM), ANNs, and kriging 
models are all functions that can be integrated, the complexity of the ANN and kriging 
functions can be limiting if more than a very few dimensions are considered. 
4.4.5.1 RSM 
The first attempts at fitting the measures of performance from the parametric scenario 
generator were based on the RSM.  This method was cho en because it provides the 
simplest form of surrogate model, and is not very computationally intensive to create.  
The model created used a Response Surface Equation (RSE) form as shown in Equation 
15 and is fit using a least-squares regression.  In Equation 15, R is the response, the betas 
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Equation 15 
 
Because of the discrete nature of the input for aircr ft type, a separate surrogate had to be 
created for each aircraft.  The results of the fitting are shown in Figure 47, Figure 48, and 
Figure 49.  Because the TLAM’s effectiveness is calcul ted based on an equation, no 
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Figure 49: B-52 Units Lost RSE Fit 
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In the figures above, the number of blue bombers lost as predicted by the RSE is plotted 
on the horizontal axis, and the actual number lost according to the data is plotted on the 
vertical axis.  The first measure of goodness of fit typically checked for surrogate model 
creation is the coefficient of determination, RSq, which indicates what portion of the 
response, on a scale of 0 to 1, is explained by the factors under consideration. If the RSq, 
were equal to 1, all points would lie along a 45 degre  angle from (0, 0) to (25, 25).  
Because the RSq value for the responses is relatively low for engineering design 
standards, the RSE is considered a poor choice for describing the responses for these 
ranges in the parametric scenario generator.  Biltgen typically found RSq values around 
0.8-0.95 in his exploration of a three day strike sc nario. [24] 
4.4.5.2 ANN 
Artificial Neural Network surrogates were built using the Neural Network tool in JMP 
7.0 and also using BRAINN 2.0, a MATLAB ANN program created at the Aerospace 
Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at the Georgia Institute of Technology.   
 
The JMP surrogates were trained using a random-holdback crossvalidation, with 25% of 
the data held back to check against overfitting.  Because ANNs are capable of accounting 
for discrete variables, only one ANN was required for each of the responses of interest.  
The best fit obtained with the JMP neural network fitting tool was an RSq of 
approximately 89%, found with 13 hidden nodes Figure 50.  The performance limitations 
of the JMP tool allowed only a range of 3-14 hidden nodes to be explored during the 






















































Figure 50: Fit History for Blue Bombers Lost 
 
Figure 51 shows the fit results obtained using the BRAINN software to build the 
surrogate model of the number of blue bombers lost. Because of the automated nature of 
the BRAINN software, a wide range of numbers of hidden nodes could be explored 
relatively quickly.  The BRAINN software was used to explore fits for configurations of 
ten to forty hidden nodes, using three iterations at each setting, in intervals of five hidden 
nodes, using a Gradient Descent with Moment Adaptive Learning Rate because of the 
large number of cases used in fitting.  This approach is suggested by Johnson and Schutte 
in the BRAINN 2.0 manual. [127]  A setting of 30 hidden nodes was found to provide the 
best fit for the data, with an RSq of approximately 93%.  Because of the similarity in the 
data, the sweep of possible ANN configurations was not conducted for the number of red 
targets destroyed.  Rather, the same configuration of 30 hidden nodes was used, with an 
RSq of 91% (Figure 52). 
 
Figure 51 and Figure 52 are each composed of four sub-charts.  The top two sub-charts 
show histograms of the distribution of the Model Fit Error (MFE) and Model 
Representation Error (MRE).  The MFE describes how well the ANN fits the data that 
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was used to train it, while the MRE describe show well the model fits test data that was 
not included in the training process.  In both figures, the errors are centered about 0 with 
a standard deviation of less than 1, which meets the generally accepted criteria for errors 
surrogate model building. [168]  There is some concer  caused by the pattern in the 
Residual by Predicted plot, which displays a pattern on the edges, but given the highly 
conceptual nature of the selection problem, and the wid  range of conditions over which 
the Measures of Effectiveness were considered, this is somewhat expected. 
 
 




Figure 52: BRAINN Fit Results for Red Targets Destroyed 
 
The 91-93% fits found using BRAINN were a few percentage points improvement over 
the JMP neural network tool, and a significant improvement over the polynomial 
response surfaces.  However, because the number of nodes found to be appropriate using 
BRAINN was much larger than the number initially tried in JMP, an attempt was made to 
re-fit a 30 hidden node ANN in JMP.  The results of this trial, and RSq of 91.086% for 
the blue aircraft lost, did not show much of an improvement over the 13 hidden node 
ANN, and still fell short of the performance exhibited in BRAINN.  As a result of these 
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experiments, the ANN created with BRAINN will be used for the rest of the hypothesis 
testing experiments. 
4.4.5.3 Kriging and Radial Basis Functions 
While initially considered for use in this experiment, because of the large number of data 
points included in the design of experiments for the parametric scenario generator, 
kriging surrogates were not built.  Fitting the kriging model would have required 
computational power beyond that available for this dissertation. 
4.4.6 Sub-Hypothesis Discussion 
Based on the fit results from the surrogate model experiments, it is true that surrogate 
models can be fit to metrics across a wide array of possible futures.  These surrogate 
models can be used anywhere in the possible future space defined by the ranges on the 
scenario variables. 
 
The use of the surrogate models for Global Regret Analysis also addresses one of the 
research objectives.  The flexibility and parametric nature of the analysis are important 
because of the trend toward electronic design reviews n the defense acquisition process. 
[156], [13] These electronic design reviews exist to incorporate decision maker feedback 
rapidly into the design process.  Analysts running the codes are usually not qualified to 
establish the values of the elements in the objectiv  function for the candidate evaluation 
(Equation 14).  Any discrepancy between the values assigned to the objective function 
and those held by the decision makers has the potential to discredit the analysis.  
However, if the analysis is done in such a way thatit can be rapidly assessed, such is the 
case when using surrogate models, the values of the weightings in the objective function 
can be changed on-the-fly. 
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The parametric nature of the design review allows credibility to be gained through tuning 
of assumptions to those acceptable by the decision makers; however, the volume of data 
can be overwhelming.  In these cases, sensitivity studies can be carried out beforehand to 
understand which assumptions and design/scenario vaiables actually have a significant 
impact on the results.  By only presenting the dimensions of the problem that have a 
significant impact, the understanding can be gained without overwhelming the decision 
makers.  It is important, however, to keep the fulldata set available to defend any 
questions about the validity of the sensitivity studies. 
4.4.7 Determination of Global Regret 
With surrogate models created for the MOEs for each platform, a number of options exist 
for the evaluation of Global Regret.  Under the formal definition of Global Regret, 
presented in Equation 9, the Global Regret would be calculated in its closed form, by 
integrating the ANN equations over each of the 10 dimensions of the parametric scenario 
generators.  This integration can either be approached analytically, numerically, or 
another approach can be used to evaluate the Global Regret.  
 
The integration over 10 dimensions provides a significant challenge.  Because the 
number of evaluations required for integrating numerically grow exponentially with each 
additional dimension and the “curse of dimensionality” is quickly encountered.  Monte 
Carlo methods exist that can help overcome the necessity of this numerical integration.  
In this experiment, a Monte Carlo simulation will be used, and the statistical distribution 
of the results will be used to understand the trends i  the Global Regret for each of the 
candidates.  While this does not result in the true Global Regret as defined 
mathematically, it provides a significant amount of information and can be used as an 
approximation for the Global Regret. 
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4.4.8 Scenario Probabilities 
Because the scenario framework of interest for thisexperiment is Operation Desert 
Storm, an effort will be made to increase the likelihood of parameters that reflect the 
capabilities of the Iraqi Military in that period.  As was defined earlier, the likelihood a 
particular scenario is the joint probability of all the parameters in the scenario.  These 
parameter probabilities must be set by the decision makers, based on their understanding 
of the likely progression of military technology.  Because of this dependence on expert 
judgment, the results contained herein are meant to be representative of a process only.  
Actual numbers should not be considered. 
 
The likelihood functions for each of the eight adversary scenario variables are shown 
below in Table 15, where the x-axis is the range of the scenario variables, and the y-axis 
is the likelihood of a particular scenario.  In the actual experiment, two weightings were 
used, one with uniform probabilities on the ranges and one reflective of Desert Storm 
parameters.  The stepped distribution represents a probability of four times more for any 
scenario in the higher-probability region than those in the low-probability region.  This 
allows comparison of the robustness of concepts that s ow little knowledge of the 
likelihood of futures a priori with those the robustness of those that only consider a 
smaller set of possible futures.  Because altitude and speed are controlled by mission 
planners, these will be allowed to vary over their full ranges to find the most suitable 









Table 15: Scenario Variable Probabilities 
Scenario 
Variable 





 Step occurs at Pk = 0.5 
SAM Thrust 
 Step occurs at Thrust = 750 lbs 
SAM Max G 




 Step occurs at Power = 45 dBW 
Ground Radar  
Scan Period 








 Step occurs at Range = 200 km 
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4.4.9 Case 1: F-111 versus B-52 
This case explores the set of scenarios that would exist if a conflict circa 1991 were to 
have sea access denied and, consequently, no TLAM presence in theater.  This might be 
the case had operations taken place in Afghanistan duri g the early 1990’s.   
4.4.9.1 Distribution 1 
The first investigation allowed the scenarios to vary with equal likelihood for each 
possible future scenario; each variable was assigned a uniform distribution for 4000 
cases.  Four thousand cases were used because they filled the design space adequately, 
but still provided good responsiveness for the JMP software.  The JMP software tended 
to slow down significantly with more than 5 – 6 thousand cases, as each point is re-drawn 
with any changes to the scatterplots. 
 
Figure 53and Figure 54 show the impact of the various factors on the OEC for the F-111 
and B-52, respectively.  In both cases, the distance the aircraft was able to maintain from 
the SAM site had the greatest impact on the cost weight d likelihood of success of the 
mission.  Aircraft altitude and speed, both parameters hat are controllable by mission 























































































































Figure 54: B-52 OEC Contributing Factors 
 
Interestingly, the performance parameters for the F-111 fell into three groups by order of 
importance: mission planning variables, SAM variables, and finally radar parameters.  
Because the F-111 was traveling at relatively high Mach numbers for a large number of 
the mission cases, the most significant factor in the loss of blue aircraft appears to be 
whether the SAM was able to reach the F-111 in time.  In the case of the B-52, traveling 
at subsonic speeds, the SAM site had the opportunity to launch multiple times, making 
the performance of the SAM less important relative o some of the radar parameters. 
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4.4.9.2 Sub-Hypothesis Testing 
An extremely useful tool in the JMP software allows the visualization of 3-D plots that 
will update in real-time as other variables are changed.  Figure 55 through Figure 58 
show two examples, one for the F-111 and one for the B-52, of the changes that can be 
seen by using the 3-D surface plots and changing other variables.   
 
In Figure 55 and Figure 56, the F-111 OEC is plotted against the ground radar SNR 
threshold, the most significant of the ground radar p rameters, and the SAM probability 
of kill, the second most important SAM parameter.  The difference between the two 
figures is the altitude at which the F-111 is flying, with 30,000 feet occurring in the first 
figure and 40,000 feet in the second.  As can be seen from the shape of the surface in the 
figures, at the lower altitude, the coupling between the radar parameter and SAM 
parameter is not apparent.  In the first figure, th F-111 OEC decreases with an increasing 
SAM probability of kill (the SAM is more likely to destroy the aircraft), and decreases 
slightly with the SNR threshold (the radar is more lik ly to differentiate the aircraft from 
ambient noise at a lower SNR threshold).  However, at 40,000 feet, the relationship is 
slightly more complex.  The overall OEC is lower at 40,000 feet, with a maximum of 
approximately one quarter the magnitude of the aircr ft flying at 30,000 feet.  
Additionally, the SAM probability of kill does not impact the OEC above 0.5 for any 
value of SNR threshold.  However, there is a coupling between the SNR threshold and 
the SAM probability of kill that is visible in the l ft side of the plot.  In this region, the 
aircraft has a higher OEC, which can be explained by the low SAM performance and the 
low radar performance.  In this region the radar does not detect the F-111 until it is 
closer, and has only a limited opportunity to shoot at the aircraft.  If the aircraft is missed 
on the first shot (or the second) it is unlikely that the F-111 will still be within the 
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detection range of the radar.  Above a SAM probability of kill of 0.5, however, only a 






























































































































































Figure 56: F-111 Performance, 40k ft 
 
Figure 57 and Figure 58 show the OEC for the B-52 as a function of the radar 
transmission power and the SAM probability of kill.  The difference between the two 
plots is the distance by which the B-52 is able to av id the SAM site, with the first figure 
showing a 60 km distance and the second showing a 90 km distance.  The surface plot in 
Figure 57 shows that the primary driver on the B-52’s OEC is the SAM probability of 
kill, which, as it improves, lowers the B-52 OEC.  This trend is consistent with the 
expected outcome of a SAM of increasing capability against a fixed platform.  This trend 
is consistent across the range of ground radar transmission powers explored. 
 
At a longer distance from the SAM site, however, the dominant trend is reversed.  The 
OEC magnitude is significantly greater at the longer distance (which is expected because 
of the reduced threat environment), but the primary driver on the OEC is the radar 
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transmission power.  As the transmission power increases, the radar site is able to detect 
the B-52 at longer ranges, and has the opportunity to shoot more SAMs.  There is a slight 
increase in the B-52 OEC with the decrease in SAM probability of kill at lower radar 
powers, but because the SAM site is able to shoot s many times at the higher powers, 





























































































































































Figure 58: B-52 Performance, 90 km keep-out 
 
4.4.9.3 Sub-Hypothesis Conclusions 
These two examples have shown the use of surface plots to explore the behavior of 
systems across many possible scenarios.  Without the use of surrogate models, which 
allow the partial differentials to be understood, the creation of these plots would not be 
possible, and electronic design reviews could not rapidly explore the alternative’s 
effectiveness.  This demonstrates the ability of surrogate models to enable interactive, 
electronic design reviews using possible futures. 
4.4.9.4 Evaluating Regret for Case 1 
Evaluating the regret across the entire scenario space can be accomplished by either 
evaluating the integral form of the Global Regret Equation, shown in Equation 9, or by 
examining the statistical parameters associated with the evaluation of the randomly 
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chosen cases across the scenario space.  Because of the c mplexity of the integral form, 
for this case statistical data will be used to evaluate the Global Regret and decide which 
candidate is more suitable for the missions based on the OEC.  It is important to note that 
the weightings in the OEC would be tuned in an interactive, electronic design review, so 
the results shown here are to demonstrate the method only, not suggest Air Force policy. 
 
Figure 59 shows the statistical data that was created for the regret of the F-111 and B-52 
using the statistical package JMP.  The candidate altern tive with the best performance 
will exhibit zero local regret for a particular scenario, so smaller is better for the statistics.  
This side by side comparison shows that both candidtes have at least 25% of cases 
where they exhibit zero regret.  This implies that there is no “magic bullet solution” 
between the two aircraft.  However, at least 75% of the scenarios showed the F-111 as a 
better candidate based on the OEC.  Also, the mean regret for the F-111 is approximately 
25% of the mean regret for the B-52.  Based on these statistics, the Global Regret for the 
F-111 is lower than the Global Regret of the B-52 and would be the more robust choice 















































































































Figure 59: B-52, F-111 Regret Comparison 
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4.4.9.5 Comparison with Gulf War Operations 
The same types of analyses shown in the sub-hypothesis t sting can be used for the 
second set of distributions on scenario variables.  However, because the trends are the 
primary interest for this dissertation, and the trends are not significantly impacted by the 
probability distributions, the explorations using the surface plots will not be repeated.  
However, the regret associated with two candidates does show a change when the 
probabilities consistent with the Gulf War threat environment are given higher likelihood 
than those in the rest of the scenario space. 
 
Figure 60 shows the statistical data on the distribution of regret for the Gulf War threat 
environment.  One immediate difference between the Gulf War set and the full, equally 
weighted data set is that the maximum regret for both the F-111 and B-52 are lower by 
70% to 80%.  This indicates that the candidates are much closer to each other in terms of 
performance across this region of the scenario space.  However, the distributions of the 
areas of zero regret have also shifted.  The 90th percentile regret for the F-111 is an order 
of magnitude lower than that of the B-52, whereas in the entire scenario space it was on 
the same order of magnitude (smaller by 30%).  This indicates that over the Gulf War 
scenario space, for the mission type simulated, the F-111 was a better choice across the 
vast majority of possible scenarios.  This is echoed in the mean regret for the two 







































































































Figure 60: B-52, F-111 Regret Comparison - Gulf War 
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Having determined through simulation that the F-111 would have been a better choice for 
most missions in Operation Desert Storm than the B-52, it is important to cross check this 
conclusion against data from the conflict.  The General Accounting Office published the 
data in Table 16, which shows the number of total F-111 and B-52 strikes and the 
casualty rate per strike.  Because the casualty rate is a significant factor in the OEC 
calculation, it would be expected that the F-111 would be used in more strikes, have a 
lower casualty rate, or both.  This is in fact the case, with the F-111 flying approximately 
50% more missions than the B-52 and having a casualty rate of approximately one-third 
that of the B-52.  This corroboration of historical events with the simulation data 
strengthens both the model accuracy and the method appropriateness for this type of 
problem. 
 
Table 16: GAO Aircraft Casualty Rates in Operation Desert Storm [97] 
Aircraft Total Casualties Total Strikes Aircraft Casualty 
Rate per Strike 
F-117 0 1,788 0 
F-111F 3 2,802 0.0011 
F-15E 2 2,124 0.0009 
A-6E 8 2,617 0.0031 
O/A-10 20 8,640 0.0023 
F-16 7 11,698 0.0006 
F/A-18 10 4,551 0.0022 
B-52 5 1,706 0.0029 
GR-1 10 1,317 0.0076 
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4.4.10 Case 2: Introduction of TLAM Technology 
This case explores the scenario most representative of the actual Operation Desert Storm.  
Three major systems that were used for the majority of the bombing campaign are 
compared with this set of possible friendly alternatives.  Figure 61 through Figure 63 
show the influence of the various scenario variables on the local regret for each system.  
With the introduction of the TLAM, the tactics are no longer the most important variables 
for determining which system is more appropriate for the mission.  The tactics are both 
important, but radar parameters, and SAM parameters ar  also important.  However, the 
most important factor is still the distance by which the aircraft can evade the SAM site.   
 
The change from the OEC to the local regret as the metric of interest for comparing 
concepts is important with the introduction of the TLAM.  Because the TLAM was build 
on a strictly probabilistic model based on TLAM performance in the Gulf War, the OEC 
for the TLAM is fixed.  This essentially establishe a baseline that shows how well, or 
poorly, the two other alternatives are doing relative o the cruise missile.  Because of this 
status as a baseline, the local regret factors for the TLAM represent the factors that are 
the most significant in driving the TLAM to a regret value above zero.  In that case, the 
tactics variable altitude does play a significant role in the regret.  Following the tactics 
and SAM distance, the two factors that affect how quickly the radar can detect the 
aircraft, transmission power and SNR threshold are most important.  The final factor in 
the group of “heavy hitter” variables is the SAM probability of kill, which relates to how 


















































































































































































Figure 63: TLAM Local Regret Factors 
 
The following figures (Figure 64, Figure 65, and Figure 66) show surface plots of the 
local regret versus the distance the SAM site is avoided by and the ground radar scan 
period.  The ground radar scan period was used becaus  it does not have a significant 
impact of the regret and allows the trends in the distance to be seen more clearly.  In 
these cases, the most desirable state is where regret is zero, so when the surface is flat and 
at zero, that candidate is the “best” for that scenario.  By looking at the values of local 
regret for each candidate as a function of the distance, the regions where each is best can 
be easily identified.  At distances of less that 100 km, the TLAM shows zero regret, while 
the F-111 and B-52 both have positive regret values, indicating that the TLAM would be 
the best choice for this type of mission.  This is consistent with the use of cruise missiles 
against targets in defended areas.  Beyond 100 km, there is a region, which is still within 
striking distance of the most capable SAMs, where the F-111 is the best choice for the 
mission.  Beyond 110 km, however, the B-52 becomes th  most favorable platform.  This 
is consistent with the differences expected between a strategic bomber and a strike 
aircraft, with the strike aircraft being used in riskier situations and the strategic bomber 





























































































































































































































































Figure 66: B-52 Regret vs SAM Distance and Radar Scan Period 
 
Figure 67 shows the statistical data for the local regret for the three systems considered 
for this case.  Looking first at the mean local regret as a measure of the Global Regret, the 
TLAM clearly has a significantly lower mean local reg et than either the F-111 or the B-
52.  The F-111 is still a better choice than the B-52, which is consistent with the 
comparison done in the previous case.  In fact, the TLAM does not show significant 
regret until the 90th percentile, while the F-111 shows significant regret in the 25th 
percentile and the B-52 in the 10th percentile.  These results are consistent with the siz s 























































































































































Figure 67: B-52, F-111, TLAM Regret Comparison 
 
This comparison has shown the ability of the regret analysis approach to include a new 
technology that may be evaluated via a different evaluation criterion than the 
conventional alternatives.  The new technology in this case performed better than the 
conventional alternatives in many possible scenarios, but there were scenarios where each 
of the other alternatives was more successful.  Additionally, the analysis allowed 
understanding of the boundaries of best performance for ach of the alternatives. 
 214 
4.4.10.1 Comparison with Gulf War Operations 
Because this set of alternatives is most representative of the aircraft available during 
Operation Desert Storm, the comparison with historical data has the most potential for 
supporting the use of the Parametric Scenario Generator coupled with Global Regret 
Analysis.  The TLAM, B-52, and F-111 were all used extensively during the conflict. 
 
When the probabilities of the Gulf War-like scenarios were increased, an interesting 
result occurred in the significant factors for the local regret of the aircraft and TLAM.  
The impacts of the various scenario variable factors are shown in Figure 68.  While over 
the entire scenario space the tactics of the blue aircraft were more important than threat 
parameters associated with the radar or SAM, when emphasis is placed on the region of 
the scenario space closer to Iraq’s capabilities, the tactics are least important.  In this 
range of the space, range from the SAM site is still the dominant factor, but a set of three 
radar parameters are the next most important, followed by the SAM probability of kill.  
There is also a shift in the relative importance of the other factors.  While in previous 
experiments, the distance from the SAM site was by far the most significant factor, in this 
case the importance of the following four factors is close to that of the distance.   
 
One slightly counter-intuitive factor is the relationship between speed and regret.  In this 
region of the scenario space, the speed is primarily impacting the accuracy of the 
bombing run, not the ability of the aircraft to leav  the SAM’s reach quickly.  As speed 
increases, the accuracy of the bombing run decreases, decreasing the likelihood of a 
successful mission.  Because this factor is the primary driver in the numerator of the 
OEC, it impacts the regret; as mission effectiveness goes down (due to missed bombing 





























































Figure 68: Local Regret Significant Factors - Gulf War Scenario 
 
The statistics for local regret for the Operation Desert Storm case are shown in Figure 69.  
The trends among the three candidates are similar to those for the entire scenario space, 
but the magnitude of the regret associated with each alternative is significantly smaller.  
However, by weighting the scenarios the difference between the F-111 and B-52 has 
become smaller.  While in the overall scenario space the F-111’s mean local regret was 
59% of the value for the B-52, in this weighting scheme the F-111’s mean local regret is 
67% of the B-52’s.  The change in the mean regret values relative to each other indicates 


























































































































































Figure 69: B-52, F-111, TLAM Regret Comparison – Gulf War Scenario 
 
4.4.11 Case 3: Conventional Arming of B-1B 
This case explores what might have occurred if the B-1B conventional armament 
program had taken place before Operation Desert Stom.  It allows the evaluation of a 
low-RCS candidate in the comparison among alternatives, and also gives some insight 
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into the performance of the F-117, which has intentionally been omitted because many 
details of the F-117’s performance, costs, and role in various conflicts remain classified. 
 
The primary drivers for local regret for the three candidates are shown in Figure 70, 
Figure 71, and Figure 72.    The F-111 and B-52 show similar results to those of earlier 
tests, with some slight re-ordering of the importance of the factors.  This re-ordering 
occurs because while a factor may not have a great impact on the OEC of the particular 
alternative, if it impacts another alternative’s OEC significantly the regret value will 
change.  As a result of this coupling, comparing the influences on the regret provides 
insights into not just the factors that significantly influence the performance of a single 
alternative, but captures the coupling effects of changing parameters on the performance 



















































































































































































Figure 72: B-1B Local Regret Factors - Case 3 
 
The local regret of the B-1B (Figure 72) is the first to have a set of major influences that 
is not topped by the distance from the SAM site.  In fact, the distance is seventh on the 
list of the parameters.  The primary drivers for the B-1B local regret are the three radar 
parameters that affect the detection of the aircraft, the parameter that affects how quickly 
the SAM can reach the aircraft, and how likely the SAM is to down the aircraft.   
 
The importance of these factors makes sense in light of the RCS susceptibility parameter 
that was assigned to the B-1B.  The factor makes th B-1B 100 times harder for the radar 
to detect than the B-52, and 33 times harder to detect than the F-111.  By increasing the 
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difficulty of detection for the radar, the range at which the radar does finally detect the B-
1B will be significantly shorter.  This short detection range means that the two SAM 
parameters relating to how quickly a SAM can engage the target, and how likely that first 
shot (which may be the only opportunity) is to destroy the aircraft are also very 
important.  
 
The partial differentials of each of the variables for the B-1B can be seen in Figure 73.  
The regret for the B-1B increases for slower speeds, in icating that the SAM site is able 
to shoot multiple times.  In situations where there ar  high losses, such as low speeds and 
at extremely close ranges to the SAM site, the regret for the B-1B is actually higher 
because of the very high aircraft cost.  Cost is also the driving factor when the radar SNR 
threshold is very low.  Because the radar can easily detect the aircraft, regardless of its 
susceptibility factor, many aircraft are shot down, making cheaper aircraft more 
desirable.  It is important to note that the plots in Figure 73 are only valid at the settings 
of the scenario variables shown in red.  When a variable changes, the plots update to 
reflect the new partial differential equation of reg t for each of the candidate 
alternatives.    
 
 
Figure 73: Regret Profiles for Case 3 – B-1B Best 
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The multivariate scatterplot for local regret shown is in Figure 74.  In the scatterplot, the 
scenarios have been color coded by which alternative displays the best OEC: B-1B is best 
for gray points, B-52 is best for blue points, and F-111 is best for red points.  This color 
coding allows regions of lowest regret to be identified in the scenario variables for each 
alternative, and also allows the regret for a particular candidate to be observed as a 
function of the candidate which is doing the best.  The existence of the color trends 
identify regions where the parametric scenario generator can be used to gain insight into 
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Figure 74: Regret Coloration Scatterplot 
 
Figure 75 shows one example of three variables that definite trends appearing as color 
gradients.  The trends show trades primarily between th  F-111 (red) and B-1B (gray).  In 
the top left scatterplot, SNR threshold is plotted against the radar transmission power.  In 
the upper left corner of the plot, there are signifcantly more red points, and in the lower 
right there are significantly more gray points.  This trend makes sense as the two 
variables affect the detection of the aircraft, and the F-111 is a significantly cheaper 
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platform.  In the upper left hand corner, it is much easier for the radar to detect and 
engage either aircraft, which results in more aircrft lost.  In that case the cheaper aircraft 
is more attractive.  However, in the lower right section of the plot, the radar is not as 
capable and has a much lower likelihood of detecting he B-1B.  Because of this, even 
though the F-111 is a cheaper platform, because it i  more likely to be shot down, the B-
1B is the more attractive option.  What this analysis basically boils down to is that when 
the radars are so powerful that the susceptibility of the aircraft isn’t a factor, the cheaper 
aircraft is the better option. 
 
An additional trend is visible in the top-right plot f Figure 75, though it is more subtle 
than the trend discussed above.  In this plot, there is a region in the lower right that has 
fewer points where the F-111 is the best option, thoug  it is not as distinct as the region 
in the top-left plot.  This region corresponds to a high SAM probability of kill and a low 
radar transmission power.  The reason that the B-1B is more desirable in this region is 
because the B-1B is more likely to be completely undetected by the radar for very low 
powers.  However, when the SAM probability of kill is also low, the F-111 is likely to 
survive the attack, and therefore, as the cheaper platform, is more desirable. 
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Figure 75: Three Key Variables for Regret 
 
The scatterplot analysis suggests that the Global Regret assessment should identify the B-
1B and the F-111 as the two most viable candidates.  The statistical distributions of local 
regret for each of the three candidates are shown in Figure 76.  Indeed, the mean local 
regret for the B-1B and F-111 are the lowest, with the B-1B having a mean of 
approximately 50% of the F-111 and 33% of the B-52.  The standard deviation for the B-
1B mean local regret is also extremely low, suggesting that for the majority of cases it is 
in fact the best option.  The standard deviation of the B-52 and F-111 are similar, and the 
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maximum local regret value for the two platforms is s milar.  This suggests, that even 
thought the F-111 was a better choice than the B-52, the difference between the two 
platforms is not as great as the difference between th  B-1B and the F-111.  This suggests 
































































































































































Figure 76: B-52, F-111, B-1B Regret Comparison 
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4.4.12 Summary of Experiment Results 
The goal of this experiment was to use three cases to upport the hypothesis that 
robustness could be defined as a function of the regret associated with alternatives.  This 
hypothesis was supported by the experimental results.  Global Regret Analysis 
successfully showed which candidates performed the best over a range of scenarios, the 
essential element of robustness. 
 
Four primary methods were used for the visualization of the regret (and robustness) of 
alternatives: significant factors analysis, multivar ate scatterplot analysis, partial 
differential analysis, and statistical analysis.  The primary metrics identified for judging 
the robustness of a particular candidate are the mean local regret and the standard 
deviation of the local regret.  The goal is to select a candidate with a mean local regret 
close to zero (preferably the lowest) and a low standard deviation.  The low mean local 
regret means that over a large portion of the scenario space, the alternative was the best 
of those considered, with respect to the evaluation function.  The low standard deviation 
indicates that in the regions where the candidate is not the best, it is not dominated by a 
significant margin. 
 
Two cases of probability for scenarios were explored, the first where the regions of the 
scenario space were weighted equally and the second where the region representative of 
Operation Desert Storm was emphasized.  When different egions were explored, 
different factors were the dominant influences on effectiveness and regret.  Additionally, 
while the “best” candidate did not change when the smaller region was emphasized, the 
difference among the candidates shrank.  The change in b havior across different regions 
of the scenario space underlines the need for design xploration beyond a small region of 
scenarios to understand how an alternative might truly perform in different types of 
conditions.  As Lowry states, “the first thing to gafter contact with the enemy is the 
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plan.” [148]  The uncertainty that surrounds warfare is enormous, and it is unlikely that a 
military systems will spend much time in the exact conditions for which it was designed.  
But by exploring the wide variety of possible futures, and exploring behavior within 
regions of those possible futures, better decisions ca  be made at the systems acquisition 
phase and also at the mission planning phase. 
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4.5 Experiment 3 – Filtered Monte Carlo Simulation w/ Possible 
Futures 
4.5.1 Filtered Monte Carlo State-of-the-Art 
Filtered Monte Carlo Simulation (FMCS) is a technique for performing top-down design 
based on a space composed of legitimate, discrete designs created in a bottom-up fashion.  
Thousands of individual designs spanning the design pace are created, along with their 
metrics, and evaluated at each level of the SoS hierarchy.  Each of these thousands of 
points is then a vector that contains a complete description of all the modeled aspects of 
the SoS and its performance metrics.  Then constraits re applied at the top levels of the 
metrics to determine what range of alternatives has t e potential of satisfying those 
constraints.  [197], [78]  This filtering can be done using a multivariate scatterplot, with 
areas allocated to each level of the SoS hierarchy as show in Figure 77. 
 
Surrogate models enable FMCS techniques by allowing the rapid generation of thousands 
of cases for filtering.  If a region of the design space is identified as promising, based on 
top-level filtering, thousands of additional points can be created instantaneously to 
explore trends in that area.  This ability to rapidly “zoom-in” on a particular region of the 
design space is of particular use in interactive design reviews, as it allows the decision 













































































































































































































































































Figure 77: Basic FMCS Scatterplot 
4.5.2 Expansion of Technique 
The current state-of-the-art FMCS technique includes r gions of space devoted to 
subsystem MOPs of performance, and SoS variables and MOEs.  [24], [78] In order to 
incorporate information about possible futures space, additional space in the FMCS 
scatterplot will be allocated for scenario variables and local regret.  The resulting FMCS 
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scatterplot is similar to Figure 78, where the top-left corner of the scatterplot has been 











































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 78: Expanded FMCS Scatterplot Structure 
 
Including scenario variables and local regret in the FMCS scatterplot adds another 
dimension to the information available for decision making in electronic design reviews.  
While before top-level metrics were static, showing results only for the scenario or 
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handful of scenarios for which they were created, now performance and effectiveness can 
be understood across a wide range of possible futures.  In the old paradigm, if a decision 
maker had a problem with an assumption about the scenario used for evaluation of the 
alternative solutions the entire analysis could be considered invalid.  By including “real 
estate” for scenario variables, the decision maker can ask about any scenario of interest 
and get immediate feedback on the results. 
 
By including regret in the multivariate scatterplot, an additional degree of depth is 
obtained.  If filtering occurs first at the system-of-systems effectiveness level, the 
behavior of the remaining systems across many possible futures can be understood.  For 
example, if the effectiveness metric was a success-rate of delivery of supplies through an 
engagement space, a vehicle like the US Army 2.5 ton truck might show promising 
effectiveness for scenarios with low enemy activity, but an armored vehicle might show 
better effectiveness for areas with high enemy activity.  Without including scenario 
variables and regret, it would not be possible to understand where one choice would be 
better than the other. 
4.5.2.1 Limitations 
The major caveat for creating the local regret calcul tion is that the designer must ensure 
that each possible candidate is tested at each scenario or an optimum performance 
baseline is generated for each possible future.  This is because in the formulation that has 
been used to this point, each of the thousands of possible design combinations would 
need to be compared for every point in the possible futures space to obtain a value for 
local regret.  The comparison of such a large number of alternatives would be 
computationally prohibitive.    
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If the number of system and subsystem variables is small, implying few actual 
alternatives under comparison, comparing among the alternatives to calculate local regret 
is feasible.  This is the approach that was taken in the historically-based experiments 
because only a limited number of platforms existed during the Gulf War.  However, in 
using this technique for design, when thousands of alternatives are being compared, it is 
probably more feasible to calculate an “optimum” candidate for each possible future and 
then a simple mathematical difference would create the local regret.  After identifying 
regions of the design space of interest, the regret calculation can be rapidly updated to 
reflect comparison of each of the candidates for eve y point in the future scenario space. 
4.5.3 Demonstration with Parametric Scenario Genera tor Data 
Another application of the multivariate scatterplot views of the parametric scenario 
generator is the identification of regions of possible futures with unacceptable system 
performance.  Figure 79 shows the complete, uncolored possible futures space created by 
the parametric scenario generator.  As an example of exploring areas of unacceptable 
performance, let us consider scenarios which result in a low probability of destroying the 
target, and a high probability of losing the blue aircr ft.  For this example, more than an 
80% chance (20 losses out of 25) of losing the blueomber and less than a 50% chance 
of destroying the target (13 out of 25 unsuccessful bombing runs) will be considered the 
unacceptable region.  This region can be selected by applying filters on the data as shown 
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Figure 79: Complete Random Scenario Space 
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Figure 80: Filtering for a Region of Unacceptable Performance 
 
Once the region of unacceptable performance is selected, all other cases are hidden from 
the views of the multivariate scatterplot.  The remaining points, shown in Figure 81, are 
the possible futures that result in the region of unacceptable performance.  The first result 
that is immediately apparent from the filtering is the reduction in range of the distance 
from which the SAM site was avoided.  This indicates that if the unacceptable 
performance only occurs when the blue aircraft comes within the new range of points in 
the SAM distance row and column.  The second result from the filtering has to do with 
the rest of the points that are left in the other system boxes of the multivariate scatterplot.  
Because these parameters after filtering still display oints over their full range, it means 
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that it is possible to find regions of unacceptable performance for all values of scenario 
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Figure 81: Filtered Results Showing Only Unacceptable Performance 
 
If one additional condition is applied to the multivariate scatterplot, showing only points 
at a medium-range from the air defense site, a trend appears in the radar systems that can 
yield unacceptable system performance.  Figure 82 show  a much denser clustering of 
points in the region of high ground radar transmission power and low signal-to-noise 
ratio threshold than at low ground radar transmission power and high signal-to-noise ratio 
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threshold.  This low density of points indicates that, at medium ranges, aircraft were more 
survivable when the radars with less capability were used by the adversary, regardless of 
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Figure 82: Unacceptable Performance at Medium-Range from SAM Site 
 
If all ranges of aircraft from the SAM site are included in the scatterplot (still under the 
unacceptable performance filtering) and a filter for relatively low-performance radar is 
 236 
included, the result of the filtering is as shown in Figure 83.  This filtering creates trends 
in the missile performance, as shown in Figure 84. The SAM maximum g-loading still 
shows points across nearly the entire region of the space, but there is a region of low 
SAM probability of kill and low SAM thrust that has significantly fewer points than the 
rest of the plot.  The lack of points in the area of low performance indicates that when a 
low-performance SAM is coupled with a low-performance radar, the blue aircraft is more 
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Figure 84: Missile System Parameters for Low-Performance Radar 
 
The identification of these areas can lead to the development of new systems to address 
shortcomings, or at least keep decision makers informed of situations where results will 
fall short of expectations.  In many cases these reults are intuitive, however, intuitive 
results that reflect the expected performance of real-lif  systems builds confidence in the 




4.6 Experimental Summary 
The experiments conducted for this dissertation support the hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter.  FMCS has been shown as an approach th t can be used to explore not 
just a complex design hierarchy space, as Biltgen and Ender showed, but also a scenario 
space.  Using this technique, understanding may be gained as to the performance of 
various system or system-of-systems alternatives across a wide region of possible futures. 
 
In order to populate the FMCS scatterplots and quantify results, surrogate models were 
built on data about candidates’ performance in possible future scenarios.  These surrogate 
models, which had accuracy of around 90 percent, allowed the population of the 
multivariate scatterplots rapidly, and in areas of the scenario space where samples were 
not taken.  Additionally, the surrogate models allowed the definition of a continuous 
function describing the behavior of the candidate’s performance over the scenario space.  
This continuous function was coupled with conventioal regret analysis to create Global 
Regret, a measure of the robustness of the candidates. 
 
To create the data necessary for Global Regret Analysis, a flexible, parametric scenario 
generator was created.  The parametric scenario generator allowed the rapid definition of 
a scenario of interest.  The use of the parametric scenario generator was demonstrated for 
a single point of interest, a set of randomly generated scenarios, and finally a DoE. 
 
The final experiment mentioned in the experimental setup will be left for the conclusions 
of this dissertation.  It will involve the comparison of the Global Regret Analysis 






The proposed method for assessing the robustness of candidates in early design phases 
has the potential to mesh well with any design methodology that incorporates modeling 
and simulation that can be run with a DoE.  For the demonstration of the Global Regret 
Analysis Method in the context of a complete alternatives comparison, one particular 
methodology architecture will be used, but that does not preclude the use of a different 
methodology approach.  The tools used for each step of the general engineering tasks 
discussed in the research formulation must be selected based on their appropriateness for 
the particular application; therefore the methodology itself will change based on the 
problem at hand.   
 
Figure 85 shows a sample matrix of some alternatives for fulfilling each of the general 
tasks for the Pre-Milestone A phase of the defense acquisition process.  Even with this 
fairly limited set, there are 338,688 possible methodologies that could be constructed, if a 
single method were chosen from to complete each task.  However, in most cases the task 
will be completed with a variety of methods, or possibly hybrid methods. 
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Task Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 Alternative 5 Alternative 6 Alternative 7
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Figure 85: Subset of Methodology Alternatives 
 
For the Persistent Precision Strike analysis, a methodology was constructed by selecting 
one, or in some cases two, methods to complete eachtask.  The actual flow of the 
Georgia Tech Revolutionary Hunter-Killer work is shown in Figure 86; however, because 
of the sensitive nature of many of the analyses and the need to maintain focus on the 
Global Regret Analysis demonstration, the methodology in Figure 87 will be presented in 
this dissertation.  The methodology presented herein conveys the important aspects of the 
Persistent Precision Strike analyses, without details that are irrelevant to the Global 
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Figure 87: Simplified RevHK Approach 
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The selection of each of the elements shown in Figure 87 was a joint process between the 
ASDL at Georgia Tech and the AFRL.  Because the ASDL served a support function in 
the analyses for the Pre-MS A JCIDS process, many of the tasks had already been 
addressed by the AFRL or other contractors.  In these cases, the method for completing 
the particular Pre-MS A task had already been selected and was beyond the control of the 
author and researchers at ASDL.  This was the case for the Gap Analysis used for 
completion of Task 1, the QFD used for Task 3, and the DoDAF approach in Task 4.  In 
Task 3, the QFD process undertaken by the AFRL was supplemented with a GOTChA 
analysis conducted at ASDL.  The GOTChA process allowed the understanding of the 
hierarchy of MOEs and MOPs used in later analyses.  The remaining tasks in which the 
ASDL had influence on the method chosen were tasks 2,5,6,7, and 8. 
 
Task 2 was completed using a collaborative scenario and environment definition.  This 
approach was chosen because AFRL had a specified set of cenarios of interest for the 
Rev HK.  Because of the existing set of scenarios, ASDL used a functional/physical 
decomposition approach to describe the scenarios and define the problem. 
 
Morphology was chosen for Task 5, in the form of an Interactive, Reconfigurable Matrix 
of Alternatives, because it possessed several advantages over the other alternatives in the 
matrix of approaches.  While SWARMING, brainstorming, and BOGSAT are all 
accepted approaches when addressing evolutionary concepts or less complex systems, the 
complexity of the Persistent Precision Strike SoS necessitated a more systematic method.  
Because the three methods listed do not necessarily approach the SoS systematically, 
there is great possibility for potential solutions to be overlooked.  However, the 
decomposition and alternatives enumeration procedure in morphology overcomes the 
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challenges associated with the complexity of the SoS and allow combinatorial solutions 
that might be otherwise overlooked to be identified. 
 
Task 6, the actual analysis of SoS alternatives, was conducted using a time-stepped 
simulation and surrogate models.  This approach was selected because of the desire to 
demonstrate the Global Regret Analysis methodology and was conducted independently 
from the analysis work for the Rev HK research.  The discrete time-stepped simulation 
was chosen for similar reasons to the agent-based simulation in the hypothesis testing 
chapter of this dissertation, and the surrogate models were used to create the parametric 
representation of the scenario space.  While it would have been possible to use another 
simulation approach, the surrogate models are a requirement of the Global Regret 
Analysis methodology. 
 
The use of an OEC for Task 7 was chosen based on the requirements for the Global 
Regret Analysis methodology.  TOPSIS or AHP could have also been imbedded within 
the Global Regret Analysis methodology, as they both return a fitness value for each 
concept.  However, the differences between these appro ches are nuanced and the OEC 
has widespread acceptance in the defense acquisition community. 
 
Task 8, the actual decision, was hypothetically select d as an electronic design review to 
showcase the capability of Global Regret Analysis.  However, this step was not actually 
conducted with decision makers because the analysis was conducted in a sanitized 
manner free from sensitive or dimensional data.  
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5.1 Selection of an Application 
The USAF Persistent Precision Strike was selected for this research based on the interest 
in the military community in UAVs and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), 
the enduring low-intensity conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the existence of 
research projects at the ASDL  
5.2 Persistent Precision Strike Background 
5.2.1 Military Interest 
The 1996 Scientific Advisory Board recommended thatUAVs and UCAVs be used for 
missions that are “now, for survivability or other r asons, difficult for manned aircraft.” 
[61]  All four branches of the US Military have incorporated unmanned systems into their 
near and far-term plans for military operations.  The US Army incorporates a number of 
sensor and weaponized UAVs and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) in their Future 
Combat System.  The USMC and USAF both have strategic visions that call for the use 
of weaponized UAVs and sensor UAVs.  In the case of the Marine Corps, these vehicles 
are indigenous at the platoon or squad level, with eaponized versions being available at 
the battalion level.  [89], [237]  The US Navy’s Sea Power, Sea Base, and Sea Shield 
visions all call for remotely operated and autonomous aerial and undersea vehicles. 
5.2.2 Brief UAV History 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been used by the US military since the USAF 
deployed the “Lightening Bug” during the Vietnam War. [237]  However, it was not until 
2002 that armed versions of these remotely piloted craft were employed in US operations.  
On February 7th of that year, a MQ-9A Predator fired hellfire missile  into a convoy of 
Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) belonging to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, killing a 
senior Al-Qaeda member.  This event represented the first time in history that an air 
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strike was carried out by a remotely piloted surveillance vehicle, with almost no risk to 
members of the US Military. 
 
In the past 5 years since the 2002 Predator air strike, the state of the art in UAVs has 
advanced dramatically.  An armed successor to the Predator, the MQ-9B Reaper has the 
ability to carry significantly more payload and stay loft longer.  The Israeli Harpy 
system can be launched from a truck and will autonomously hunt and kill air defense 
systems.  The Global Hawk reconnaissance platform is truly remarkable; with an 
endurance of over 35 hours, the ability to fly unrefueled half way around the world, under 
either remote or autonomous control [238], this platform effectively replaces the 
dangerous U-2 capability of the Cold War.  According to Larry Dickerson, in many 
countries the UAV is viewed as a cheaper alternative to satellite surveillance systems, 
with the ability to duplicate many of their capabilities. [93] 
 
The advantages of using unmanned systems in military operations are numerous.  The 
following table (Table 17) summarized the advantages and disadvantages of UAVs 
outlined in the US Air Force’s Strategic Vision for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) 



















Table 17: UAV Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Operation for longer than human endurance 
allows 
Integration into existing airspace difficult 
Operation in chemically, biologically, or 
radioactively contaminated environments 
Data bandwidth limitations 
Reduced ground crew operational tempo 
because of endurance 
Weight limitations similar to manned 
systems 
Reduced wear and tear because of fewer 
takeoff/landing cycles per flight hour 
Weather limitations 
Crews do not necessarily have to deploy 
forward to operate vehicles 
Reliability issues 
Reduced operational logistics, support, and 
cost footprints 
Susceptibility to Jamming 
Off-loading mundane tasks through 
machine autonomy 
Organizational issues, acceptance in “pilot-
centric” culture 
Expansion of traditional flight and altitude 
envelope 
Data fusion abilities (Elliot) 




5.2.3 Historical Persistent Strike 
5.2.3.1 Tacit-Rainbow 
Tacit-Rainbow was a program during the 1980s designd at developing a Persistent Anti-
Radiation Missile (PARM) for the SEAD mission.  The goal of the Tacit-Rainbow 
program was to create a platform that would be launched in large numbers in advance of 
a bombing raid.  The platforms would loiter in the area, and autonomously attack any 
radiation emitting devices within a certain frequency band (radar sites).  The primary 
advantage of the loitering PARM was that if a radar site attempted to protect itself by 
shutting down, the PARM would simply wait for it to turn back on again. [171] 
 
Tacit-Rainbow was unique in that once, launched it id not need targeting instructions 
from the airman who launched it.  Rather it would autonomously loiter in a 
preprogrammed area and wait for a target that met a certain set of criteria, 
preprogrammed into the system. 
5.3.2.2 Harpy 
The Israeli Israel Aircraft Industries Harpy system is similar in purpose to the Tacit-
Rainbow.  The Harpy is launched from a modified truck chassis, moves to a loiter area, 
and begins searching for radar emitters.  If a radar emitter is detected, and determined to 
be a target by the Harpy’s logic system, the aircraft will attack the emitter.  While not 
officially designated as such, this fits the definition of PARM.  The Harpy is a “fire-and-
forget” weapons system [124], which means that once it has been launched, it will behave 
autonomously until it either runs out of fuel, or destroys itself attacking a target. 
 
Both Tacit-Rainbow and the Harpy are autonomous system  that use preprogrammed 
logic to decide whether to attack a detected target.  However, the level of intelligence 
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required for these vehicles is limited because of their high level of specialization and the 
relatively unique nature of their targets.  Radar systems are used for a wide variety of 
applications from range finding and speed detection to aircraft tracking.  However, the 
bandwidth and power associated with military radar systems makes them fairly unique.  
Only commercial aircraft control systems  
5.2.4 Current USAF Fleet 
Very few US military systems have the ability to maint in station over an area, find a 
target in that area, and then deliver a weapon to the target.  Killbox Interdiction 
techniques [138] achieve a similar capability by employing multiple aircraft or 
combinations of aircraft and ground systems.  In a killbox mission, strike aircraft loiter in 
an area of interest, and are assigned targets by an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, or possibly by troops n the ground.  This approach is 
reminiscent of using infantry to scout for artillery, then having the infantry radio 
coordinates and adjustments to the battery.  However, th  separation of the ISR and strike 
responsibilities increases the exposure of units and coordination required. 
 
The USAF currently operates the following manned ISR platforms. 
• E-3C Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
• E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) 
• EP-3 (Aries II) Navy 
• RC-12 (Guardrail) Army 
• RC-135 (Rivet Joint) 
• U-2 (Dragon Lady) 
 
Additionally, the USAF operates three unmanned ISR platforms, the Predator, Reaper 
(Figure 88), and Global Hawk (Figure 89 US Museum of the Air Force).  The operating 
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costs of these aircraft vary widely relative to themanned ISR assets.  A 2005 assessment 
by the Naval Research Advisory Committee also found that operating costs for the 
Global Hawk were higher than for any existing or proposed Navy surveillance aircraft.  
The advisory committee, a group of independent civilian scientists who advise the Office 
of Naval Research, determined the cost of operating the Global Hawk at $26,500 per 
flight hour. The group also reported operating costs for the Predator at $5,000 per flight 
hour.  In comparison, the group set the Navy's costfor operating its E-2C Hawkeye, a 
manned airborne warning and control aircraft, at $18,700 per flight hour. [22] 
 
 





Figure 89: Global Hawk [238] 
5.2.4.1 Strike 
The USAF currently has 8 strike aircraft available in its inventory (Figure 90). [241]  
Because of the precision nature of the persistent strike mission, the payload capacity of 
the strike platform is not considered a driving factor.  However, the endurance and 
operation cost for aircraft that will spend the majority of their time loitering while waiting 




B1-B Lancer B-2 Spirit B-52 Stratofortress
F-117 Nighthawk F-15 Eagle F-15E Strike Eagle
F-16 Falcon F-22 Raptor
 
Figure 90: USAF Attack Aircraft 
 
Endurance is a critical constraint on the strike comp nent of the killbox interdiction 
mission.  While aerial refueling can extend the endurance of a loitering strike platform, it 
does not address all problems with manned strike systems.  First, when refueling the 
strike platform must either depart the killbox, or at the very least leave station to 
rendezvous with the tanker aircraft.  This creates gaps in the strike coverage that must be 
filled by another aircraft or considered mission downtime.  Secondly, even with refueling 
the manned system is limited by pilot endurance.  While concrete numbers on pilot 
endurance are hard to find, a typical value for a single seat fighter is probably around 8 
hours.   
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The cost per hour of loitering a strike aircraft is s gnificant.  The F-16 is favored by the 
Air National Guard because it has a relatively low perating cost of somewhere around 
$4000 per hour. [98]  Platforms such as the B-52 have operating costs (largely driven by 
maintenance) which are significantly higher. The endurance limits, high cost, and dull-
nature of the killbox mission make UAVs a good candidate for filling the role of manned 
strike platforms. 
 
The USAF has a wide variety of ground attack munitio s at its disposal for use on an 
unmanned aircraft as shown in Figure 91.  Additionally, the US Army has demonstrated 
that its Hellfire missile can be successfully employed on UAVs.  The Predator B 
















5.3.1 M&S Environment 
A number of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) environments were considered for use in 
the analysis of candidate Revolutionary Hunter-Killer alternatives.  Because the problem 
under consideration is similar to the assessment of candidates in the hypothesis testing 
section of this dissertation, a time-stepped enviroment will be sought for the same 
reasons outlined for the other assessment.  The following modeling environments were 
considered. 
 
• FLAMES by Ternion 
• SEAS by DoD 
• NetLogo by Center for Connected Learning at Northwester University 
• ATMAS by Diana Talley at Georgia Tech’s ASDL 
• MATLAB by MathWorks 
5.3.1.1 Selection Criteria 
Each of the five M&S environments listed above have benefits and drawbacks.  In order 
to objectively compare them, the following criteria were used.  They are discussed in 
order of importance, with the first criterion being most important. 
5.3.1.1.1 Availability of Code 
The most important criterion for selecting an M&S environment was the availability of 
the code to the researcher.  Many commercial M&S enviro ments have high costs 
associated with licenses, so it was important to ensure that the code was free, low-cost, or 
already licensed for use by the researcher.  In the cas  of each of the M&S environments 
listed, it was possible to use the codes in the laboratory setting, though in the case of 
FLAMES, required using a specialized terminal for model development.  MATLAB, 
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ATMAS, and SEAS all existed in the laboratory environment and could be loaded onto a 
personal terminal.  Finally, NetLogo was available as freeware and could be downloaded 
to laboratory or personal computers.   
 
Because its freeware status, NetLogo was considered the best in terms of availability; it 
was followed by MATLAB, ATMAS, and SEAS, which were considered equally 
desirable.  The FLAMES package was considered least de irable because of the 
requirement to use the special terminal for model development. 
5.3.1.1.2 Suitability for Modeling SoS 
The investigation of the concepts for the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer will include 
interactions between systems working together to achieve a capability.  In order to 
successfully assess the robustness of the various candidates, the M&S environment must 
possess the ability to model those interactions.  All of the M&S environments have some 
ability to model the interactions of SoSs.  ATMAS was built in, and executes in, 
MATLAB, demonstrating this capability.  However, because of the procedural nature of 
the MATLAB programming language, dealing with SoS is more difficult that with a 
more object-oriented approach.  FLAMES, SEAS and NetLogo all use a more object-
oriented approach than MATLAB, and were considered more desirable for that reason. 
5.3.1.1.3 Existing Knowledge or Shallow Learning Curve 
The desire to complete the modeling tasks relatively quickly drove the search for a code 
that either had a wide base of existing knowledge that could be leveraged, or a relatively 
shallow learning curve.  In the engineering community, MATLAB is perhaps one of the 
best well known programming languages and environments.  The author has used 
MATLAB extensively in the past, and therefore it was  very desirable choice from the 
standpoint of existing knowledge.  FLAMES, SEAS, and ATMAS each have been used 
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in research projects with which the author was affili ted, though not extensively by the 
author.  The existence of the knowledge within the laboratory community was a positive 
mark for each of these environments. 
 
Unfortunately, the FLAMES package has a steep learning curve which requires 
significant time before productive models can be crated.  The work earlier in this 
dissertation leveraged existing models in many places, but that was not possible for the 
Revolutionary Hunter-Killer study.  The steep learning curve associated with the 
FLAMES package detracted from its attractiveness as an M&S environment for the 
Revolutionary Hunter-Killer study.  SEAS and ATMAS both were unfamiliar to the 
author, but possessed moderate learning curves, especially relative to FLAMES.  This 
made them more attractive than FLAMES, but less so than MATLAB.  Finally, NetLogo 
possessed an extremely shallow learning curve, a few days to develop fairly advanced 
simulations.  The extreme simplicity of the language made NetLogo the most desirable 
M&S environment other than MATLAB. 
5.3.1.2 Selection 
Based on the evaluation criteria discussed above, the author selected NetLogo as the best 
compromise solution for the M&S environment.  While the coding language was not 
already known, the appropriateness of the environment for SoS problems, the ability to 
install the program on any computer and the shallow earning curve made it the best 
choice overall. 
5.4 Application of Methodology 
Methodology application required working through each of the eight general tasks for the 
Pre-Milestone A phase of the defense acquisition process.  In some cases, because the 
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task would be completed by parties other than the analyst, existing results from the public 
domain were used. 
5.4.1 Establish the need 
The US Air Force has already established persistent, precision strike (engagement) as one 
of their priorities in the future vision (Figure). [24]  During Operation Allied Force, the 
minimum time it took to coordinate high altitude ISR assets with a strike platform was 12 
minutes [226].  However, the USAF has a goal of a single-digit minutes for the kill chain. 
[116].  This goal provides the general framework for the development of the 




Figure 92: Air Force Vision [24] 
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The body of work that truly established the need for the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer 
included two gap analyses, and was conducted within the USAF. [198], [199]  According 
to Bowman, the capabilities are being pursued through the program are the surveillance 
of an area-of-interest for time-sensitive targets, and the prosecution of those targets. [30]  
These capabilities were used as a baseline for the Next Generation Morphing Aircraft 
Structures program, which combined with the gap analyses were the predecessors of the 
Revolutionary Hunter-Killer. [30], [31] 
 
Because the need for the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer had been established by the Air 
Force prior to the start of this work, additional justification for the need will not be 
pursued. 
5.4.2 Define the problem 
The analysis of Revolutionary Hunter-Killer alternatives should allow the researchers to 
guide further research with a more clear understanding of trades at the SoS level.  
Because the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer is still in the pre-conceptual design phases, 
before the solidification of the Initial Capabilities Document, the SoS level trades could 
also be described as an Analysis of Approaches.  The approaches mean high level trades 
among large classes of systems, as opposed to limited system level trades. 
 
Of particular interest for this work is understanding the impact of a single, very capable 
(and presumably expensive) vehicle, versus a team of oderately capable vehicles, 
versus a swarm of low-capability vehicles.  Understanding the capability of a single 
vehicle falls very much in line with traditional vehicle analysis, but the team and swarm 
concepts both rely on emergent behavior of the group f r capability.  This emergent 
behavior is not immediately apparent from the specificat ons of the individual vehicles, 
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which is often the focus of the AoA in the post-ICD analysis.  Therefore, understanding 
these trades upfront in the pre-ICD phase is important to guide the more vehicle-centric 
AoA. 
5.4.3 Establish MOPs and MOEs 
The MOEs for this problem should quantify how well the different alternatives are able to 
complete the mission and how much is costs to complete.  At the highest level, this can 
be described for the kill-box mission in the following questions. 
 
• What percentage of the available targets did the SoS find and kill? 
• How quickly were the available targets found and killed? 
• How many times did the aircraft have to resupply in the process? 
• What was the cost of operating those systems? 
 
The MOPs at this stage of analysis are not as important as the overall capabilities of the 
aircraft.  However, two items are of interest and fall naturally out of the capability 
considerations: fuel capacity and weapons capacity. 
 
Because an excess of either fuel or weapons will have an adverse effect on vehicle weight 
and, consequently, cost it is important that the aircr ft have an appropriate amount of fuel 
and number of weapons.  The appropriateness of the fuel and weapons payloads will be 
monitored by recording the reason for each resupply.  By using this metric of 
performance, the driving factor can be identified whether it is fuel or weapons. 
5.4.4 Generate architectures 
Because the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer will be designed to fill a kill-box interdiction 
role, the basic architecture of the current unmanned vehicle that fills this role, the Reaper, 
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will be used.  This basic architecture includes a vehicle or vehicles, under the control of a 
ground station, working to find and then deliver a missile against a target.  A 
representation of the architecture and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is shown in 




Figure 93: CONOPS [81] 
 
The level of autonomy assigned to the unmanned vehicles in the kill-box interdiction 
mission has the potential to impact the architecture of the SoS.  If vehicles are allowed to 
operate completely independently, there is no need for a remote pilot ground station, 
wide bandwidth communication or pilot training.  However, this level of autonomy 
increases the requirement for on-board computation and machine intelligence.  At the 
 260 
other end of the spectrum, a completely remotely piloted aircraft requires a large amount 
of bandwidth for pilot awareness, extensive ground control stations, and provisions for 
handling lost communications with the aircraft. 
 
Because the architecture is somewhat dependent on choices for the alternatives, the basic 
architecture will be assumed, but only the elements operating in the kill-box will be 
modeled.  Other elements, such as aerial refueling and ground station response times, will 
be modeled by through parametric times for communication responses and re-supply.  
This assumption allows the impact of various architectures to be considered on the in-
kill-box capability, but still allows the analysis to remain in the scope of this dissertation. 
 
5.4.5 Generate alternatives 
5.4.5.1 Approach 
Morphological analysis was selected as the method fr identifying the possible 
alternatives for fulfilling the kill-box interdiction mission in a systematic way. These 
methods have gained popularity in the aerospace industry in recent years as a way to deal 
with the massive size of the possible design space.   Morphological analysis provides a 
“method for identifying and investigating the total set of possible relationships or 
‘configurations’ contained in a given problem complex.” [193]  Because this method was 
developed in the middle part of the 20th century, the computational resources were not 
available to provide significant numerical analysis for problems of the scale seen in 
conceptual design space.  Therefore the focus is to reduce the initial set of alternatives to 
a manageable set by applying filters to the conceptual design space. 
 
The morphological analysis creates an n-dimensional m trix where each dimension 
corresponds to a particular physical or functional feature of the system or system of 
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systems.  In this construct, each member of the space of alternatives would correspond to 
a cell in the hypercube defined by the n-dimensional matrix.  Morphological analysis then 
removes incompatible combinations in this matrix and then applies constraints to the 
various dimensions of the problem in an effort to reduce the number of alternatives to a 
manageable set that can be evaluated with quantitative methods.  In recent years, effort 
has been made to incorporate limited quantitative analysis in the framework of a 
morphological analysis. [80] 
 
In any conceptual design problem, there exits the possibility of trillions of design 
alternatives that have the potential to satisfy the requirements of the problem to varying 
degrees.  In order to systematically assess these alternatives, the ASDL at Georgia Tech 
has created a tool called the Interactive, Reconfigurable Matrix of Alternatives (IRMA).  
The IRMA allows experts from various disciplines and system designers to evaluate the 
design alternatives by filtering concepts based on Technology Readiness Level (TRL), 
cost, performance, etc.  These filters, coupled with expert engineering judgment allow the 
reduction of the design space from trillions of alternatives to a manageable subset that 
can be further evaluated for concept selection. 
 
The rows of an IRMA represent a physical or functional breakdown of the system of 
interest, depending on knowledge of the system architecture.  In each column, 
alternatives are listed that could satisfy the functional or physical characteristic of the 
row.  The alternative space is then defined as all fe sible combinations of systems which 
are created by selecting an item from each row.  This combinatorial space is the set of 
alternatives that must be evaluated in the AoA. 
 
Once populated based on background research and expert opinion, a typical Matrix of 
Alternatives will represent well over a trillion combinations of concepts which must be 
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systematically evaluated to find the best overall concept.  (To put this in perspective, one 
trillion cases evaluated at one case per second would take 31,710 years to evaluate.)  One 
important characteristic of the IRMA is the identification of incompatibilities between 
characteristic alternatives prior to the evaluation of concepts.  Additionally, a Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL) is assigned to each alternative in the matrix, and concepts can be 
filtered such that only concepts meeting the minimum TRL will be displayed.  This 
ensures that if a particular option is selected, all other incompatible alternatives are 
eliminated from the matrix. 
 
In order to begin reducing the design space to a manageable set that can be evaluated 
using reasonable computational effort, a collaborative meeting is held to begin reducing 
the options in the IRMA.  Initially, a minimum TRL for the project is established based 
on the resources available and the desired date of system deployment, which then filters 
alternatives in the matrix that do not meet the mini um TRL.  Then the customer and 
engineers assess each row of the matrix and identify concept alternatives that should be 
eliminated from consideration due to a major defect with respect to an important measure 
of goodness.  As each row is evaluated, the IRMA updates to reflect the remaining 
compatible combinations that must be considered.  The set of compatible alternatives that 
remain after filtering are those that must be compared to identify the best system concept. 
5.4.5.2 Revolutionary Hunter-Killer Alternative Exp loration 
The IRMA used for identifying Revolutionary Hunter-Killer alternatives is shown in 
Figure 94.  The first column of the matrix shows the categories for which alternatives 
were defined, organized by the SoS hierarchy.  At the top level are SoS variables, 
primarily concerned with the mix of hunter, killer, and hunter-killer.  The aircraft level 
contains mission profile characteristics for the aircr ft, as well as the presence of 
survivability enhancing characteristics.  The weapon level contains the number and type 
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of weapons that the hunter-killer or killer vehicle carries.  Options for the primary and 
secondary sensor systems and the communication equipment are included in the sensor 
level category of the matrix. 
 
SOS Level Selection
Configuration Options H&K H&K H/K H & K & H/K
Number of H/K 1 0 1 4 10 25 50 100
Number of H 0 0 1 4 10 25 50 100
Number of K 0 0 1 4 10 25 50 100
Aerial Refueling No No Yes
System Level 
Number of Operators 1 1 2 3 4
Modularity Low Low Medium High
Autonomy Remote Manned Remote Autonomous
Aircraft Level (Common)
Fly (Hunter Mode)
Operating Altitude (ft) 40000 30000 40000 50000 60000 80000
Range (nm) 1000 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Cruise Speed (Mach #) 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9
Dash Speed (Mach #) 1.4 0.8 1 1.4 2 2.5
Endurance (hr) 10 5 10 20 30 40
Fly (Killer Mode)
Operating Altitude (ft) 20000 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
Range (nm) 50 50 100 200 300 400 500
Cruise Speed (Mach #) 300 125 200 250 300 350
Dash Speed (Mach #) 350 125 200 250 300 350
Endurance (hr) 4 2 4 6 8 10
Survive
Avoid Detection Some stealth tech No stealth tech Some stealth tech Lots of stealth tech
Avoid Hit (counter measures) No No Yes
Survive Hit (redundant systems) No No Yes
Weapon Level
Primary Weapon 
Weapon 1  Payload (Internal) External Internal External
Weapon 1 Type SDB I SDB I SDB II Subsonic Missile High Speed Weapon Hyperso nic GBU-28 None
Number of Weapons 1 1 2 4 6 8
Secondary Weapon
Weapon 2  Payload (Internal) Internal Internal External
Weapon 2 Type Subsonic Missile SDB I SDB II Subsonic Missile High Speed Weapon Hyperso nic GBU-28 None
Number of Weapons 1 1 2 4 6 8
Sensor Level
Primary Sensor 
Sensor Type RF EO/IR RF
Sensor Payload Location Internal Internal External
Number of Sensors 1 0 1 2 3 4
Coverage Med Very Low Low Med High Very High
Range (nm) 10 1 10 25 50 100
Resolution (m) 1 0.1 0.5 1 2 3
Secondary Sensor 
Sensor Type EO/IR EO/IR RF
Sensor Payload Location Internal Internal External
Number of Sensors 1 0 1 2 3 4
Coverage Med Very Low Low Med High Very High
Range (nm) 10 1 10 25 50 100
Resolution (m) 1 0.1 0.5 1 2 3
COMM
COMM Type LoS LoS SatCom
COMM Payload (Internal) Internal Internal External
COMM Range (nm) [Derived] 100 50 100 150 200 250
COMM Frequency (MHz)[Derived] 1000 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
OPTIONS
 
Figure 94: Hunter-Killer IRMA 
 
The rows of the IRMA for the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer were populated based on a 
literature search conducted by the research team.  The literature search included current 
and proposed systems, and was directed toward creating realistic bounds for the elements 
of the IRMA.  Because the effort was primarily aimed at understanding the difference 
between a single hunter-killer aircraft and a system of separate hunters and killers, details 
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of the aircraft design beyond the mission profile wre not considered.  Sensor technology 
was considered to be very important, as was using an off-the-shelf missile technology. 
 
5.4.5.3 Identification of an Analysis Sub-set 
Because of the scope of this dissertation, identification of a small subset of potential 
alternatives for analysis was important.  Naturally, a representative single-aircraft 
revolutionary hunter-killer should be compared to a two-vehicle system, as understanding 
the difference is one of the goals of the research.  Additionally, understanding how the 
number of each type of aircraft impacts capability s desirable so that the relative costs 
can be understood.  These high-level fleet sizing ad ircraft type questions drove the 
selection of each of the candidate SoS shown in Table 18.  These were selected so as to 
represent very different approaches and provide insight for recommendations for the 
initial capabilities study. 
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Table 18: Revolutionary Hunter-Killer SoS Options 
























1 NA 5 NA 2 
Number of 
Hunters 
NA 10 NA 15 4 
Number of 
Killers 
NA 1 NA 8 NA 
HK Fuel 6785  NA 5999 NA 6399 
Hunter Fuel NA 5450 NA 3917 5580 
Killer Fuel NA C-130 NA 3532 NA 
HK 
Weapons 
4 NA 2 NA 4 
Killer 
Weapons 
NA 100 NA 2 NA 
Sensor Size 20x20 7x7 10x10 5x5 10x10 
 
5.4.6 Analyze alternatives 
Two primary steps were used for the analysis of the five hunter-killer concepts.  The first 
step involved the sizing and synthesis of the particular aircraft that make up the SoS.  
This step included a cost calculation in addition t energy-based and empirical sizing 
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equations.  The “Aircraft Sizing and Synthesis Module” contains the calculations for this 
step and was created in Microsoft Excel ® with additional Visual Basic scripts run to 
converge the designs.  The second step was the evaluation of the sized alternatives in the 
parametric scenario generator.  Two modules were combined to complete the second 
step.  The  MATLAB based “Terrain and Urban LOS Module” calculates the ability of 
the aircraft to see an area of interest based on urban building and street layout and the 
mountainousness of the area.  The output of this module was fed into the “Mission 
Analysis Module,” where the effectiveness of the particular concept was evaluated.  This 
module was built in the NetLogo environment.  The flow of information among the 

















Figure 95: Information Flow Among Modules 
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5.4.6.1 Aircraft Sizing and Synthesis Module 
The aircraft sizing and synthesis module is currently a combination of energy-based 
constraint analysis, historical engine performance, and historical weight estimation based 
on a ratio of fuel volume to empty weight. There arseven sheet colored in yellow. Each 
is described below. 
 
Aircraft Sheet – There are three primary input areas on this sheet, corresponding to 
aircraft mission parameters, environmental parameters, and aircraft design parameters.  
There are three primary output areas of the sheet that display the graphical mission 
profile, the aircraft weight data for the current iput settings, and finally a comparison 
plot of the thrust-to-weight and wing loading of the aircraft relative to three other data 
points: the F-35 Lightning II, the Reaper UAS, and the Global Hawk. 
 
Aircraft mission parameters are linked from the main MOA page, but can be manually 
adjusted on the Aircraft sheet.  The parameters associated with the attack mission 
segment are not part of the MOA, and consequently are controlled only from this page.  
The plot of the aircraft mission is a two-axis plot that simultaneously displays the altitude 
profile for the mission as a function of mission time and the Mach number of the aircraft 
as a function of mission time.  This plot allows rapid communication of the flight 




































Figure 96: Sample Mission 
 
Environmental parameters allow the selection of the type of atmosphere used for the 
sizing analysis.  Options include Standard, Cold, Hot, and Tropic days, though only the 
Cold, Hot, and Tropic days are currently available for selection.  The selection among 
these days affects the density conditions calculated for each aircraft mission segment.  
The selection of atmosphere affects all mission segments; it is not currently possible to 
assign a different atmosphere to each mission segment. 
 
The aircraft design parameters include the type of ngine under consideration and the 
payload required.  The payload value is imported to the sizing module based on the 
results of the sensor sizing modules and the weapon selection.  There are four options for 
the engine on the Rev HK: reciprocating engine with a propeller, a turboprop, a turbofan, 
and a turbojet, though data for a reciprocating engine and propeller is not currently 
incorporated into the sizing tool. 
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The Rev HK results section is calculated when either  large button above the results 
section is clicked, or when the “Size Aircraft” button on the main MOA sheet is clicked.  
The sizing code uses Excel’s Solver Function, a numerical optimization function, to 
converge weights for the aircraft.  The Takeoff Gross Weight (TOGW), Fuel Weight, 
Engine Thrust Required, and Wing Area Required are all calculated and values are 
returned to the Rev HK results section, and also to the main MOA sheet. 
 
Mission Characteristics Sheet – This sheet is a collection point for values from other 
places in the code for debug purposes only.  The values on this sheet should not be 
changed. 
 
Segments Sheet –This sheet calculates atmospheric, mission, and other parameters for 
each segment of the RevHK mission.  The segments coidered for the mission are warm 
up, takeoff, climb, cruise, loiter, attack (descend), climb, loiter, cruise, descend, land.  
Warm up, takeoff, cruise, loiter, descend, and land re calculated as a single mission 
segment with constant atmospheric, aerodynamic, and engine performance parameters.  
The two climbing segments and the attack segment ar discretized into six sub-segments 
to account for the variation in atmospheric, aerodynamic, and engine performance 
parameters associated with the change in altitude.  The final descent is considered as a 
single segment because there is not a speed constraint on the approach to landing, while 
there is in the attack. 
 
The main areas of calculation for the sheet are Flight Conditions, Air Properties, Installed 
Thrust Lapse, Drag Polar Components, and Weight Fraction.  The values for the 
aerodynamic K1 and Cdo are currently assumed, but could eventually be linked to a more 
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rigorous aerodynamic module. Weight fractions for the warm up, takeoff, decent, and 
landing are based on recommendation from Raymer’s Ai craft Sizing. [189] 
 
Physics Sheet – This sheet calculates constraints in terms of thrus -to-weight and wing 
loading.  This calculation is based on Equation 16, which is derived from basic force 
balances of thrust, weight, lift, and drag associated with an aircraft in a steady state.  
Because of the conceptual nature of this exploration, and the resulting lack of a detailed 
aircraft geometry for aerodynamic calculations, the entire K2 term for drag in Equation 
16 is ignored.  Additionally, no drag penalty is considered based on the carriage of stores 






























































For each of the mission segments where more than one sub-segment was considered, it 
was necessary to calculate the constraint line for ach of the sub-segments.  However, for 
simplicity on the thrust-to-weight versus wing loading plot, a composite constraint was 
constructed by using the highest value of thrust-to-weight for each wing loading. 
 
Once all the constraints have been constructed, the “best” aircraft design is that which 
minimizes the thrust-to-weight ratio for a reasonable wing loading, which was set to have 
a minimum possible value at 20 lbs/ft^2.  In the sizing routine, an optimizer varies the 
wing loading to obtain a minimum thrust-to-weight ra io, while meeting all of the design 
constraints.  This design point (thrust-to-weight and wing loading) is then used to in 
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conjunction with the weight calculation to determine the required thrust and wing area of 
the aircraft.  A sample constraint analysis is included as Figure 97; in the plot, the 





















Figure 97: Sample Constraint Plot 
 
Weights Sheet – The weights sheet uses an approach based on Raymer’s Aircraft Design 
to calculate the TOGW of the vehicle (Equation 17) [189] 
βα emptyTO WW =  
Equation 17 
 
The mission fuel fractions from the mission segments sheet are multiplied to obtain the 
overall mission weight fraction.  The values for the mission fuel fraction are calculated 
based on the Breguet Range and Endurance Equation, or for segments discussed in the 
mission segments sheet section, using values suggested by Raymer.  The mission weight 
fraction, when multiplied by a TOGW guess and combined with the payload weight can 
be used to obtain the empty weight of the aircraft.  Using the historically based 
coefficients A and C, a value of TOGW is then calculated.  An iterative procedure is then 
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used to reduce the difference between the guessed TOGW and the calculated TOGW.  
Once the iteration has converged, the TOGW is return d to the main page, along with the 
fuel weight (based on the mission weight fraction). 
 
Initially, a small database of UAVs was compiled and then regressed to obtain values for 
the coefficients in Equation 17.  However, when attempts were made to re-create a 
Global Hawk like and Reaper like aircraft, the values of TOGW were much too large.  
This error was likely because of the small size andfuel capacity of the majority of the 
UAVs in the database.  Because of the errors, the database was replaced with an 
estimated empty weight fraction based on the Global Hawk and Reaper empty weight 
fractions.  This value is 0.35. 
 
Engine Data Sheet – This sheet calculates the engine thrust lapse (alpha) and TSFC 
based on Mattingley’s historical relationships.  The values are representative of engines 
in each class, but are not tuned for any particular engine.  This sheet can be replaced with 
more accurate engine data when a set of candidate engines are identified.  The 
relationship provided by Mattingley is included as Equation 18.   C1 and C2 are empirical 






















































































Air (Table) Sheet – This sheet contains the atmospheric data used in the sizing tool.  
5.4.6.2 Economic Analysis Module 
The costing calculations for a fleet of UAVs are a difficult task.  According to Roskam 
[194], the total life cycle cost is composed of theplanning and conceptual design costs, 
the preliminary design and systems integration costs, the detail design and development 
costs, the manufacturing and acquisition costs, the op rations and support costs, and, 
finally, the disposal cost of the aircraft.  Roskam breaks the costs down into four areas for 
estimation: RDT&E costs (CRDT&E), acquisition costs (CACQ), operating costs (COPS), and 
disposal cost (CDISP).  Roskam suggests the estimation of these costs largely on a weight-
basis, using historical empirical data to establish the relationships.  While this approach 
has worked well for estimating costs of conventional aircraft, for advanced UAVs such as 
the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer, very few historical data points exist, making actual cost 
estimation with this approach impossible. 
 
Given the lack of data for costing purposes, the approach for this conceptual study will 
use cost data for existing UAVs as a baseline, and then modify those baseline costs based 
on sensor, communication, and weapons characteristics.  While this approach will not 
allow accurate estimates of the hunter-killer costs, applied in a systematic way it will 
allow the aircraft to be compared.  If a higher fidel ty study of the aircraft costs is needed, 
it will be easy to replace the cost estimation module used in this study for one of higher 
fidelity, and immediately see the impact propagate through to the study results. 
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5.4.6.3 Sizing and Economic Analysis Results 
The system costing environment was constructed in Microsoft Excel ®, and linked to the 
sizing sheet presented earlier.  A baseline mission w th 8 hours of loiter time and two 500 
nm cruise segments was assumed.  For each aircraft concept, the baseline loiter time was 
adjusted based on the loiter capability of each aircr ft in the concept.  This meant 
increasing the loiter time for the Concept 2 killer v hicle by 400 percent, and decreasing 
the concept 4 loiter times for the hunter and killer aircraft by 20 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively.  The speeds for the baseline mission were not changed among concepts. 
 
Once the mission parameters were adjusted for each concept, the payload weights for the 
aircraft were specified.  The weapon for the sizing was selected based on the AGM-114 
HELLFIRE missile [86], with a weight of 100 lbs.  The sensor payload was assumed to 
weigh 20 lbs per unit of coverage.  While this assumption is not based on a particular 
system, it results in sensor weights in the range expected for UAV’s performing a search 
mission.  Because sensor technology is difficult to obtain information on and often 
classified, this assumption removes concern about sensitive data usage.  The cost per 
pound of the aircraft was based on the cost per pound f the Global Hawk.  [238]  The 
sizing and cost results are summarized in Figure 98, where each cost is per aircraft.  Fleet 
costs can be obtained by multiplying the average cost by the number of aircraft included 
in the concept. 
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Concept 1 Concept 2 Concept 3 Concept 4 Concept 5
Num HK 1 NA 5 NA 2
Num Hunters NA 10 NA 15 4
Num Killers NA 1 NA 8 NA
HK Ws 400 NA 200 NA 200
HK Ww 400 NA 200 NA 400
HK Loiter Factor 1 NA 1 NA 1
Hunter Ws NA 140 NA 100 200
Hunter Loiter Factor NA 1 NA 0.8 1
Killer Ws NA 20 NA 20 NA
Killer Ww NA 10000 NA 200 NA
Killer Loiter Factor NA 5 NA 0.7 NA
HK TOGW 18831 NA 16647 NA 17759
HK Fuel Weight 6785 NA 5999 NA 6399
HK Thrust 11342 NA 10027 NA 10697
Hunter TOGW NA 15124 NA 12053 15484
Hunter Fuel Weight NA 5450 NA 3917 5580
Hunter Thrust NA 9109 NA 7260 9326
Killer TOGW NA 164000 NA 11519 NA
Killer Fuel Weight NA C-130 NA 3532 NA
Killer Thrust NA C-130 NA 6938 NA
HK Cost ($M) 46.36 NA 42.25 NA 44.36
Hunter Cost ($M) NA 39.30 NA 33.13 40.01
Killer Cost ($M) NA 62.44 NA 32.02 NA
Avg Cost ($M) 46.36 41.41 42.25 32.74 41.46  
Figure 98: Sizing and Costing Results 
5.4.6.4 Terrain and Urban Visibility Modules 
5.4.6.4.1 Terrain LOS Calculation 
The interference of terrain with sensor line-of-sight is calculated in a MATLAB script.  
The script currently functions by taking in a 2-dimensional set of terrain values, the 
altitude of the aircraft, and the width of ½ of the sensor swath.  The 2-dimensional terrain 
values can be easily generated by using the ridgemak r function, or taken as a cross 
section of the current 3-dimensional terrain over which the aircraft is flying. 
 
The percentage of terrain observable by the aircraft is calculated by discretizing the 2-
dimensional ridge into line segments.  These line segements are then checked to see if 
another line segment lies between them and the sensor (masked by a hill), or if they slope 
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away too greatly for the sensor to see their face ( canyon face).  An illustration of this is 
included as Figure 99 where green segments can be seen and red cannot.  The area of the 






Figure 99: Terrain Masking Geometry 
 
The discretizations are then used to calculate a percentage of terrain visible as a function 
of the mountainousness, jaggedness, and altitude of the aircraft.  The MATLAB script for 
the ridgemaker and terrain masking calculations are included in Appendix B. 
5.4.6.4.2 Urban LOS Calculation 
The calculation for the percentage of the streets in an urban area under the aircraft’s 
sensor that can actually be seen by the sensor is calculated as a function of the average 
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block size, the average building height, the averag street width, and the altitude of the 
aircraft.  The code assumes that all buildings and blocks are uniform, which is an 
acceptable assumption since only an average percentage obscured is sought.  
Additionally, the code assumes that the aircraft is stationed over the center of a building 
in the center of the block, which is a worst case assumption in terms of visibility. 
 
The urban area is discretized into concentric squares for calculation of the percentage 
visibility, as shown in Figure 100.  The details of the calculation will follow, but as can 
be seen from the figure, where yellow represents buildings and blue represents streets, the 
standard grid pattern of a city is not entirely represented by this calculation.  The indigo 
areas of Figure 101 still need to be calculated.  As an estimate, these areas are assumed to 
have the same coverage as the ring before.  The aircraft is located at the ‘x’ in Figure 101. 
 
 





Figure 101: Additional Areas for Estimation in Urban Coverage 
 
Figure 102 shows a 2 dimensional cross section of the sensor coverage, which is assumed 
to be a square.  The aircraft is located over the center of a block, and can “see” the 
sections of the street that are not blocked by a building.  The size of these sections is 
determined by the height of the buildings, the size of the block, the size of the street, and 
the altitude of the aircraft.  In the figure, the gr en areas are portions of the street that can 
be seen, and the red sections are those that are obscured.  The size of the red and green 
sections can be determined from simple trigonometric ratios; right triangles are created 
by the location of the aircraft, the corners of thebuildings and either the top of the 
building below the aircraft or the ground directly below the aircraft. 
 
The code functions by an iterative procedure from the street nearest the aircraft to the 
edge of the sensor coverage area (denoted in the figure by the solid cone coming from the 
aircraft and the blue section at the bottom).  In each iteration, the two dimensional areas 
of the street are then integrated around the blue section in Figure 100.  As the integration 
progresses around the blue section, the distance from the aircraft to the edge of the 
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building grows and shrinks, which is accounted for in the code.  Each of the indigo areas 
in Figure 101 is then estimated based on the percentag  available in the closest iteration. 
 
The code then can return several values: the percentag  of streets visible, the percentage 
of the entire swath that is visible street, and the percentage of the swath that is street (both 
visible and not-visible).  The MATLAB script for the urban LOS calculation is included 
in Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 102: Urban Sensor Coverage Geometry 
 
5.4.6.5 Mission Analysis Module 
The mission analysis module operates in a time-stepped fashion, with each agent in the 
simulation evaluating its location and status at each time step.  There are two primary 
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types of agents in the Netlogo environment: patches and turtles.  Patches make up the 
environment in which turtles interact.  In general, patches do not move; turtles do.  
Therefore the environment for the mission analysis module is modeled with patches, 
while friendly systems, threats, and targets are modeled as turtles.  In order to avoid 
issues with availability of data about hunter-killer concepts, the mission analysis module 
functions with non-dimensional units that have only properties of length or mass for 
example, not feet or kilograms.  To use the mission analysis module for an actual 
decision exercise, the appropriate units would be specified and the parametric concepts 
given appropriate values. 
 
The analysis used a low-intensity search and destroy mission for evaluating hunter-killer 
concepts.  In this mission, time critical targets, fixed facilities, and threats are all present, 
in a situation analogous to present day operations in Afghanistan.  In this situation, long 
periods are spent searching a relatively large areafor targets that do not appear very 
often.  This mission type assumes that little intellig nce exists for the direction of the 
search beyond the general area of interest.  The terrain is mixed with small urban pockets 
that require target masking to be considered. The mission analysis module interface is 
shown in Figure 103.  In the scenario shown in the figure, hunter-killer aircraft are being 
aided by hunter aircraft, both of which appear in blue.  The fixed targets are shown in red, 
while 1 hiding target (truck) appears in gray.  The gr en and gray patches on the 
background represent areas of rural or urban terrain, espectively. 
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Figure 103: Mission Analysis Module 
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5.4.6.5.1 Hunter-Killer, Hunter, and Killer Logic 
The system-of-systems alternatives were made up of three individual vehicles that were 
simulated using logic, some of which was shared among the three vehicles and some that 
was unique to each class.  At a high level, the hunter-killer searches for targets in the 
mission simulation and when it finds one will fire a missile to destroy it.  Hunter vehicles 
search for targets in the simulation, and when theyfind one they will call for the nearest 
hunter or hunter-killer to engage the target.  Killer vehicles loiter in the area of interest 
until they are called by a hunter vehicle; when called they fly towards the target and fire a 
missile at it. 
 
The hunter-killer search pattern is created such that in a cycle through the area of interest, 
the entire space will be covered by the sensor once.  The search path flies the aircraft in 
the North-South direction as shown in Figure 104.  When the aircraft reaches the end of 
the area of interest, the aircraft moves by the sensor width in the East-West direction, and 
then flies in the opposite direction of the last sweep.  When the aircraft reaches a “corner” 
of the area of interest, it returns to the start point by the shortest path and starts the search 
again.  The sensor width and length, as well as the aircraft speed, are defined by the user.  








Figure 104: Search Pattern for Hunter-Killer and Hunter Aircraft 
 
At each time step the hunter-killer logic checks the distance to all turtle-targets that are 
not hiding.  If any of the non-hiding targets are within the sensor radius, the aircraft will 
begin the process of firing on the target.  The “deci r?” parameter determines whether 
the hunter-killer is completely autonomous or must ask for permission before firing.  If 
the “decider?” variable is TRUE, the hunter-killer will immediately fire on the target.  If 
the variable is FALSE, the aircraft will wait for the “base decision time,” set by the user, 
plus the discernability factor, which is discussed in the Target Logic section.  Once that 
time has past, the hunter-killer will fire on the target.  During the time between the 
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detection of the target and firing, the hunter-killer does not move.  This simulates 
loitering in the area with sensors tracking the target.  Once the hunter-killer has fired and 
successfully destroyed the target, or if the target oes back into hiding before that 
happens, the hunter-killer will continue with its search pattern. 
 
When the hunter-killer’s fuel is reduced to zero (simulating “bingo fuel,” when a return 
to base is required) or has fired all of its weapons, it enters a “resupply” mode.  In this 
mode, the hunter-killer flies directly to the origin of the search pattern and then is 
“hidden” for a user-specified amount of time.  This t me simulates either an aerial 
refueling/rearming, or returning to base for fuel and weapons.  Once the resupply time 
has elapsed, the aircraft flies back to its last search point and resumes searching for 
targets. 
 
Hunter aircraft follow an identical set of logic tohe hunter-killer aircraft, except for 
when a target is detected.  Rather than firing a missile at the target, the hunter calls on a 
hunter-killer or killer aircraft to destroy the target.  The hunter logic compares the 
distance to the nearest hunter-killer or killer aircraft to a user-specified communication 
range.  If the communication range is greater than the distance, the objective of the 
hunter-killer or killer aircraft is set to that of the hunter which called them.  That 
aircraft’s logic will then direct it to fire on the target, or vector to the target if the distance 
is too great for an immediate shot. 
 
Killer aircraft follow an identical set of logic to the hunter-killer aircraft, except for their 
movement.  Killer aircraft loiter randomly throughout the area of interest rather than 
searching for a target.  They can only be assigned a target by a hunter aircraft.  The 
random loiter is accomplished by assigning a random heading change between 0 and 15 
degrees, and then moving in the forward direction. 
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5.4.6.5.2 Target Logic 
The targets in the mission analysis module are subsets of the turtle class.  Three general 
types of targets are modeled in the NetLogo simulation: trucks, facilities, and threats.  
The three targets are distinguished by the “variety” parameter of each turtle-target.  Each 
target has the same set of parameters, but the valus of those parameters distinguish the 
target’s parameters. 
 
The simplest form of the turtle-target is the facility variety.  Facilities can not hide, have a 
constant location, and can not defend themselves.  The number of facilities is specified in 
the user interface (or through the batch processing file), and then placed randomly in the 
environment.  The facilities are considered soft, based on the interest in terracotta and 
dried mud huts for this type of scenario. [254] 
 
The truck variety of turtle-targets operates on a slightly more advanced logic than the 
facilities.  Trucks have four additional parameters that govern their behavior and make it 
more complex than the facilities.  Trucks can hide, and “pop-up” with a frequency 
specified by a parameter in the user interface, and then will loiter in the “unhidden” mode 
for a user-specified amount of time.  During the time that they are not in hiding, the 
trucks will move with a user-specified speed in a random fashion.  Additionally, trucks 
have a discernability factor, which is user-specifid, and allows a delay to be added 
before firing to simulate target identification and obtaining clearance to fire in low-
intensity conflict. 
 
Threats constitute the final variety of turtle-targets.  Threats have “pop-up” and 
discernability behavior identical to the truck variety of targets, but specified with 
independent parameters.  When not in hiding, threats do not move, and consequently do 
 286 
not have a speed parameter.  Threats can, however, fire missiles at hunter-killers, hunters, 
or killers that come within range when they are nothiding.  The detection range and 
weapon range for the turtle-threats are specified by the user in the interface. 
5.4.6.5.3 Missile Logic 
Missiles are a turtle-type that is not present when the scenario is first set up.  Rather, 
threats, hunter-killers, and killers “hatch” missile  when they engage another turtle on the 
adversary’s side.  The newly-hatched missiles then b come agents within the scenario 
that follow their own set of logic. 
 
Missiles are assigned the objective of the turtle that fires them.  They first check a range 
to the objective, set by the user, which is the missile’s kill radius.  If the distance is less 
than the kill radius, both the missile and the objectiv  turtle are issued the “die” 
command.  If the distance is more than the kill radius, the missile faces the target and 
advances based on the missile speed.  If the missile “overshoots” the objective in the 
move, the “die” command is issued to both the objectiv  and the missile as if the missile 
was within the kill radius. 
5.4.6.5.4 Environment Logic 
Two types of patches were created for the simulation and are arranged in a grid that is 
201 by 201 patches in size.  The patch can be defined as either urban or rural.  Depending 
on the type of terrain, a probability is assigned to the sensor detection for the hunter and 
hunter-killer vehicles.  This sensor detection is taken from the urban and terrain LOS 
calculations.  If the patch that the target inhabits is urban, the urban LOS calculation is 
used, while if the patch is rural, the terrain LOS calculation is used.  The ratio of urban to 
rural terrain is set by a user-defined parameter on the main scenario interface, or in the 
batch mode input file. 
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5.4.6.6 Analysis Execution 
Before attempting to evaluate the five concepts in the parametric scenario generator, a 
screening test was conducted to determine the significa t factors for the analysis.  A 
Taguchi screening array was used for this test, and 30 cases were executed for each 
setting to account for the random number generator used in the scenario.  The average 
value of the results was then calculated based on the 30 trials at each setting in the 
Taguchi array.  Based on the results of the screening, eight variables were identified as 
important for the Global Regret Analysis. 
 
• Number of trucks (time-critical-targets) 
• Probability of truck pop-up 
• Loiter time of trucks 
• Number of facilities (non-time-critical-targets) 
• Presence of threats 
• Terrain visibility factor 
• Urban visibility factor 
• Resupply time 
 
For each concept, a DoE was constructed of 12800 cases.  The DoE was a combination of 
a face-centered-central composite design to ensure capture of the corners of the design 
space and a random sampling of equal size to the central composite design.  The two 
types of the design accounted for 512 cases, which were resampled 25 times each to 
account for the random number usage in the parametric scenario generator.  The ranges 




Table 19: Scenario Generator Variable Ranges 
Design Variable Low Value High Value 
Number of trucks 1 4 
Probability of pop up 1 5 
Loiter time of trucks 15 150 
Number of facilities 0 4 
Presence of threats 0 1 
Terrain visibility factor 70 100 
Urban visibility factor 70 100 
Resupply time 10 500 
 
ANN regressions were used to create surrogate models f the data using the same process 
as described in the previous chapter.  All the fits were in the range acceptable for 
conceptual design; however, the fits for the mission success parameter were typically 
better than those of the expected friendly attrition rate.  The coefficients of determination 





Table 20: NetLogo ANN Regression Fit Data 
















5.4.7 Compare results 
5.4.7.1 Scenario Space Trends 
Trends in the scenario space were initially explored using two UTEs, one for each 
concept’s regret and one for each concept’s OEC.  The two UTEs are shown in Figure 
105 and Figure 106, for regret and OEC, respectively.  The use of both environments 
allows the user to explore trends that may be masked by the normalization and 
comparison that occurs in Global Regret Analysis.  However, by using the regret UTE in 
addition to the OEC UTE, the relative merits of theconcepts can be understood in the 
context of the other systems.  The trends shown in the UTEs were created by the 




Figure 105: Regret UTE 
 
 
Figure 106: OEC UTE 
 
The following five figures (Figure 107, Figure 108, Figure 109, Figure 110, and Figure 
111) show the relative importance and the direction of impact for the eight design 
variables on the regret associated with each of the five concepts.  The most dominant 
factors change for each of the five candidates.  In Figure 107, the first four factors, the 
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number of trucks, SAMs, facilities, and the truck loiter, all result in an increase in regret 
as the variable increases.  This indicates the direction in which the single hunter-killer 
performance degrades relative to the other concepts.  Degradation of performance against 
an increasing number of targets makes sense for a single aircraft, especially when 





DV - Truck Loiter
DV - Truck Popup
DV - Terrain Visibility
DV - Resupply Time








































Figure 107: Concept 1 Regret Factors 
 
The significant factors for the second concept (many hunters and a C-130 type missileer), 
include the number of facilities and trucks, as well as the truck loiter and popup 
parameters.  The decrease in regret associated with the increase of these factors can be 
attributable to two trends in the OECs.  The “best” concept can be decreasing in fitness or 
the concept under consideration can be increasing in fitness.  In the figure the number of 
SAMs has almost no effect on the regret of the concept.  This is likely because of the 
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Figure 108: Concept 2 Regret Factors 
 
The number of facilities, trucks, and the presence of threats dominate the variability of 
the concept with 5 moderately capable hunter-killers similarly to the single hunter-killer.  
The direction is reversed, however, indicating that an increase in the number of targets 
reduces the regret for the distributed concept.  This is likely a result of the distributed 
number of vehicles having a combined sensor footprint that is much larger than that of 
the single hunter-killer.  Additionally, the five vehicle concept would not have to rearm 
as frequently as the single hunter-killer.  However, the operating cost for 5 vehicles is 
significantly more than that of a single vehicle, which is why the regret is decreasing 
(indicating the dominance of the single vehicle concept).  Concepts 3, 4, and 5 all show 
similar behavior in their dominant factors, supporting the theory that numerous vehicles 
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Figure 111: Concept 5 Regret Factors 
 
Figure 112 through Figure 116 give a slightly different perspective on the OEC fore each 
of the five concepts by including the effect of varying importance of mission success and 
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the two cost factors (coupled with the friendly attrition rate for each concept).  In each 
case, the two most dominant factors are the weight that decision makers give to operation 
cost and performance.  Acquisition cost importance falls into a number of different places 
in the ranking of factor importance, depending on the concept.  Acquisition cost is near 
the least important for Concept 1(Figure 112) or is the least important for Concept 3 
(Figure 114).  For the other three concepts it is one f the middle parameters.  The 
importance of the acquisition cost is more likely linked to the attrition rate of aircraft in 
the various system concepts as opposed to the actual system cost.  The system costs were 
similar across the concepts, but the ones with higher acquisition costs do not necessarily 
have a higher influence for the importance.  Therefore, the most likely candidate is the 
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Figure 116: Concept 5 OEC Factors 
 
Figure 117 provides a good example of the visualization of the regret space that is 
possible with the JMP software.  The figure shows the Concept 1’s regret as a function of 
the number of time critical targets in the scenario and the presence of threats in the 
environment.  In places where the surface is flat and equal to zero, the concept is the 
‘best’ choice for the scenario.  For the particular settings of the other variables that were 
used, this area occurs in areas where there are no threats and a relatively low number of 
targets.  However, when more than 3 targets and threats are present, a rapid increase in 
the regret can be observed. 
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Figure 117: Concept 1 Regret vs. Threats and Trucks 
 
Because there is a rapid increase in regret in one scenario space region of Figure 117, this 
indicates that a different concept must be the “best” choice for that particular region of 
the space.  Figure 118 shows regret as a function of the same two variables for the other 
four concepts, but the axes have been flipped so they are unobscured by the surface.  As 
can be seen from the surfaces in the figure, all four c ncepts display similar responses in 
regret as a function of the threats and number of time critical targets.  However, Concept 
3 is the only concept to attain zero regret in the region of high number of time critical 
targets with threats present.  This indicates that Concept 3 is the concept that has 
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overtaken Concept 1 in terms of its OEC.  The similarit es in the behavior are likely 
because of the inherent similarities in the concept with respect to using multiple aircraft 




Figure 118: Concepts 2-5 Regret vs. Threats and Trucks 
 
Figure 119 shows a more complex regret response for Concept 1 as a function of the time 
the time critical targets remain on the field and the ime it takes the vehicle to rearm or 
refuel.  The behavior shows the dynamic nature of the scenario space, because while 
Concept 1 was clearly dominant for the setting of the space shown in Figure 117, there 
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are large regions of Figure 119 where Concept 1 show  regret.  There are, however, two 
regions where Concept 1 is dominant.  For long target loiters and long resupply times, 
and also in one region of resupply time around 200 and loiter around 50.  These two areas 
are mirrored by rises in regret in the other four concepts, shown in Figure 120 and Figure 
121. 
 
Figure 119: Concept 1 Regret vs. Truck Loiter and Resupply Time 
 
Figure 120 shows the regret for Concept 3 as a function of the time the time critical 
targets remain on the field and the time it takes the vehicle to rearm or refuel.  For the 
majority of the region of the scenario space shown in the figure, Concept 3 is the 
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dominant solution, showing zero regret.  However, fo  high loiter times, a rise in regret is 
seen as Concept 1 becomes dominant.  The regret for the ther three concepts is shown in 
Figure 121. 
 
Figure 120: Concept 3 Regret vs. Truck Loiter and Resupply Time 
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Figure 121: Concepts 2, 4, 5 Regret vs. Truck Loiter and Resupply Time 
 
Another aspect of the regret for Concept 1 is shown in Figure 122.  This figure compares 
regret to the number of fixed targets and the resupply time required.  Concept 1 is clearly 
dominant, except in when there are a large number of facilities and a relatively high 
resupply time.  In this region Concept 3 dominates, as can be seen by the flat region for a 
large number of facilities in Figure 123.  It is interesting to not that there is a region with 
a large number of facilities where both Concepts 1 and 3 appear to have zero regret.  
However, close examination of Figure 123 reveals a very slight increase in regret for high 
numbers of targets but low resupply time.  In this region the concepts are very close in 
terms of their OEC, but Concept 1 has a slight edge.  The regret as a function of this 
aspect of the scenario space for the other three concepts appears in Figure 124. 
 302 
 
Figure 122: Concept 1 Regret vs. Resupply Time and Facilities 
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Figure 123: Concept 3 Regret vs. Resupply Time and Facilities 
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Figure 124: Concepts 2, 4, 5 Regret vs. Resupply Time and Facilities 
 
The ANN regressions used to create the figures shown above were also used to populate 
a multivariate scatterplot containing the eight design variables, three decision maker 
factors, and five regret responses.  Figure 125 show  the 5000 point multivariate 
scatterplot.  In the scatterplot, the regret respones for the five concepts are shown in the 
first five rows and columns, the decision maker factors are shown in rows and columns 
six through eight, and the remaining rows and columns are dedicated to the design 
variables.  Continuous design variables appear as boxes that are “full” of points, while 
discrete design variables appear with lines of points.  There are very few distinguishable 
 305 
trends in the initial population of the design space; however, the addition of color does 
provide some insight into general trends. 
 
In Figure 125, two regions of the design space have been assigned different colors.  Blue 
points indicate the region of the design space where threats are present and black points 
indicate non-threatening environments.  This color c ding allows decision makers to 
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Figure 125: Filtered MCS - Full Scenario Space 
 
Figure 127 shows only the responses and decision maker f ctors from the full scenario 
space, using the same color scheme as used above.  S me interesting trends emerge in the 
responses as a function of the decision maker factors.  In the first row, sixth and seventh 
columns, the relation between Concept 1’s regret and the acquisition and operation cost 
importance can be seen.  There is a fairly distinct trend where as acquisition cost 
importance increases, Concept 1’s regret increases, and as operation cost importance 
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increases, Concept 1’s regret decreases.  This result is fairly intuitive as the cost of a 
single, more capable platform will be higher than a cheaper platform, but the operating 
cost will be lower than for multiple, cheaper platforms. 
 
Another, very strong trend can be observed for Concept 4’s regret with respect to 
operating cost.  As the operating cost importance goes to zero, the regret associated with 
Concept 4 decreases rapidly, though never quite obtaining a zero regret status.  This is 
because Concept 4 had the highest operating cost of any of the concepts, but included the 
largest number of vehicles.  As the impact of the op rating cost decreases, the swarm-
effect advantages increase in impact, making the concept more desirable.  This trend 
appears to be more pronounced in the scenarios where t reats are present.  Because of the 
distributed nature of Concept 4, threats are less able to destroy the capability of the SoS, 




















Figure 126: Orthogonality of Local Regret 
 
Figure 126 shows the local regret for three of the concepts considered in the Global 
Regret Analysis.  The top, rightmost and bottom, leftmost plots in the multivariate 
scatterplot show a relationship among the values of local regret that identifies Concepts 1 
and 3 as the dominant solutions for the scenario space.  Because the space was populated 
with a large number of points (5,000), and there are only 26 that are not equal to zero in 
the horizontal or vertical direction, this means that only 26 points exist where Concepts 1 
or 3 are not the minimum-regret solution.  The distribution of points in the local regret 
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scatterplot of the two dominant concepts is starkly different than that of the other plots in 
the multivariate scatterplot.  This discovery allows the engineer to quickly identify if a 
single or pair of concepts dominates the scenario space. 
 
Because so few points lie in the orthogonal set in Figure 126, they can be quickly 
investigated.  The dynamic nature of JMP allows the id ntification of the scenario 
variables that led to the other concepts high performance.  Once the scenario variables 
have been identified, the size of the space in which the different concepts dominate can 
be identified by running a small scenario DoE around the points.  The information gained 
from this type of investigation can be useful for mission planning and understanding the 
benefits of different approaches in specific regions f the scenario space. 
 
An additional observation may be made about the nature of the points where concepts 
other than Concept 1 or Concept 3 are “best.”  In nearly all of these cases, the points are 
blue, indicating that the scenario environment includes threats.  The correlation between 
other concepts being dominant and the presence of threats in the environment is not 
surprising, however, because the other concepts have an increased number of aircraft.  
The increased numbers of aircraft, which are networked, allow the mission to be 
completed even in the event of several nodes being lost.  This is not the case with the 
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Figure 127: Filtered MCS - Weighting Effects 
 
In Figure 128, an additional filter has been added to the scenario space to simulate the 
increased time-criticality of the targets.  To reduce the space, the bounds of target loiter 
time were reduced by half (with targets now remaining on the field for half as long) and 
the likelihood of targets emerging was also reduced.  The coloring in the figure indicates 
the presence of threats in the simulation, with red points indicating threats are present.  
With this filtering and coloring scheme, Concept 1 clearly has more points with higher 
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regret when threats are present in the environment.  This result is likely because of the 
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Figure 128: Filtered MCS - Increased Time Criticality 
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5.4.7.2 Regret Statistics 
Ten thousand data points were used to create two sets of statistics for the five concepts.  
These statistical distributions were created for varying importance of decision maker 
factors, and constant, equally weighted importance of decision maker factors.  Figure 129 
shows the distribution data for varying importance factors while Figure 130 contains the 
results for constant importance factors.   
 
When importance factors are allowed to vary, it is possible for the decision makers to 
choose a scenario where any concept could be the “best” choice.  This can be seen in 
Figure 129 by the lower bound of each of the five concepts equaling zero.  However, 
Concept 2 and Concept 4 have histograms that indicate the majority of scenarios yield 
relatively high regrets.  This is mirrored in the fact that the 0.5 percent quartile has a 
positive regret value of greater than 40 percent for b th concepts.  Concept 5 falls 
somewhere in between Concepts 2 and 4 and the best two concepts.  Its regret histogram 
shows greatest frequency at a much lower value of rgret than Concept 2 and Concept 4, 
indicating that it is a better choice than those candidates.  Concepts 1 and 3 are clearly the 
best candidates, with their histograms showing the highest frequency with a regret of 
zero.  However, Concept 3 does have a slight advantage over Concept 1, with a mean 
regret that is 0.004 less than that of Concept 1.  This indicates, for the varying factors 
case, that approximately a half a percent difference between the concepts exists in the 














































































































































































































































































Figure 129: Regret Statistics - Varying Importance of Factors 
 
Figure 130 presents a slightly different picture than the varying importance factors case.  
When all of the decision maker factors are given equal weighting, Concepts 2, 4, and 5 
retain essentially the same characteristics as in the varying importance factors case.  
There is one exception to this, however, in that none f these concepts now have a zero 
regret case.  The minimum regrets are 6 percent for Concept 5, 53 percent for Concept 2, 
and 73 percent for Concept 4.  The most interesting observation is that by locking down 
the decision maker importance factors, Concept 1 show  a lower mean local regret than 






























































































































































































































































5.4.8 Make a decision 
Based on the data presented in the “Compare Results” tep of the methodology, the two 
primary candidates for consideration, based on Global Regret Analysis, are Concept 1 
and Concept 3.  Regardless of the probabilities associated with time-critical-targets or the 
threat environment of the scenario, these two concepts were consistently the best 
alternatives, and the only ones to obtain a local regret score of 0.  Based on this analysis, 
the three concepts that employed dedicated hunter vehicles can be discarded. 
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Because the Global Regret Analysis changes based on the decision maker weighting 
factors, it is necessary to carry forward both Concept 1 and Concept 3 to the decision 
making electronic design review. 
 
5.5 Persistent Strike Evaluation Conclusions 
The Global Regret Analysis statistics presented in the previous section provide additional 
support for the need for exploration of a wide variety of scenarios for comparing 
alternatives.  If any of the 26 cases where Concept 1 or Concept 3 was not the dominant 
solution was selected as the scenario for comparing alternatives, a choice that is 
dominated over the vast majority of the scenario space would have been erroneously 
labeled “best.”  However, by employing the scenario space exploration using Global 
Regret Analysis, the dominance of Concept 1 and Concept 3 was clear. 
 
The case explored here also addresses the use of Global Regret Analysis on a true 
system-of-systems problem.  Each of the areas from the Hypothesis Testing section of the 
dissertation was revisited in the context of this exploration, and no problems arose with 
the usage of the methodology.  The system-of-systems concepts explored in this chapter 
represented a wide variety of approaches to the problem: single, highly capable vehicles, 
dispersed roles concepts, swarms of smaller aircraft, and sensor augmentation of aircraft.  
In the previous pre-conceptual design paradigm, where few scenarios were considered, it 
was difficult to understand the trades between concepts, especially when concepts 
performed well under different circumstances.  Globa  Regret Analysis overcomes this 
challenge by allowing the understanding of the merits and detractors of concepts over the 
entire scenario space, and then provides a means to weight that scenario space and 
determine the proper overall judgment.  
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5.6 Summary 
The demonstration of the Global Regret Analysis methodology was conducted using an 
example problem from the current defense acquisition paradigm.  The USAF Persistent, 
Precision Strike mission provided an excellent opportunity for a relevant, Pre-MS A 
acquisition program where many SoS alternative exist.  All branches of the US military 
have expressed great interest in UAVs, and the technology provides the possibility to 
provide significantly increased capability over thecurrent state-of-the-art.  The particular 
program of interest was the Revolutionary Hunter-Killer, and the work for this 
dissertation was conducted in parallel with efforts a  the ASDL at Georgia Tech to 
support the USAF program. 
 
The general tasks conducted for the evaluation of the alternatives were: 
1. Establish the need 
2. Define the problem 
3. Establish MOPs and MOEs 
4. Generate architectures 
5. Generate alternatives 
6. Analyze alternatives 
7. Compare results 
8. Make a decision 
 
The majority of the independent work for this dissertation took place surrounding the 
implementation of the Global Regret Analysis Methodol gy to the Persistent, Precision 
Strike mission.  Five alternatives were selected from the IRMA for comparison.  These 
concepts represented a wide range of SoS approaches, including single-vehicle 
approaches, teams of similar vehicles, teams of different vehicles, and swarm concepts. 
 
 317 
The Parametric Scenario Generation M&S environment was constructed in MATLAB 
and NETLOGO, and linked using ModelCenter.  MATLAB was used to construct terrain 
generation, urban visibility, and terrain visibility models.  NETLOGO was used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the different concepts in a time-critical target prosecution 
mission.  The simulation included the ability to manipulate target characteristics, threat 
characteristics, and terrain.  All of the simulation software was written by the author of 
this dissertation. 
 
The effectiveness results of the Parametric Scenario Generation M&S were evaluated in 
the JMP statistical discovery environment.  Regret analysis showed interesting trends in 
the scenario space and identified two concepts that dominated the vast majority of the 
scenario space.  However, cases could be found where each of the concepts would be 
dominant, underscoring the need for robustness evaluation when considering alternatives 








6.1 Final Experiment 
This dissertation was undertaken with the hope of improving the ability of the early 
defense acquisition process to understand and account f r robustness in the design of 
military systems and systems-of-systems.  The question then becomes, because defense 
systems can only truly be evaluated after their servic  life has ended [183], and because 
defense systems are too expensive to provide control and experimental alternatives, how 
does one determine if the new way is better than the old. 
 
While modeling and simulation approaches have shown that using Global Regret 
Analysis can identify systems that perform “better” across many possible manifestations 
of friendly tactics, environmental conditions, and enemy tactics and technologies, the 
performance of the system in the “real world” is much more complex.  In all likelihood, 
the system under consideration will only have to perform in a few conflicts; the billions 
of possible futures will only manifest to a handful.  In reality, we can never know if the 
current predictions of what the face of war will look like in the mid-to-long-term will 
come true, or if a completely different and unexpected paradigm of warfare will emerge.  
Therefore, the only way to understand the impact of this dissertation is to document the 
decisions that “would have been” during the electronic design reviews and, many years in 
the future, assess how the decisions that were madecompare. 
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Because of this inability to validate through experim ntation the strength of the 
methodology presented in this dissertation, a more qualitative approach must be taken if 
any near-term understanding is to be obtained.  In the earliest phases of the literature 
search, a qualitative comparison was made among the curr nt methods for assessing 
robustness in design.  This search was based on the results of a thought-experiment, an 
exercise in logic, which identified an improvement in robustness as desirable for military 
systems.  Because we strive to understand how the curr nt paradigm compares to the 
work of this dissertation, the same qualitative comparison exercise will be used to try and 
understand how the new method compares with the stat -of-the-art. 
 
Figure 131 shows the initial assessment that was used to base-line the existing robustness 
evaluation techniques (repeated from Chapter 1).  The criteria in the left-most column of 
the figure will now be used to provide an assessment of the new method.  The importance 
of the various criteria will then be manipulated, and using the Technique for Ordered 
Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (See Appendix A), the robustness of the 
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Figure 131: State-of-the-art Robustness Evaluation Techniques 
 
6.1.1 Mathematical Definition of Robustness 
The Global Regret Analysis approach does provide a concise, mathematical definition of 
robustness.  This mathematical definition is the int gral, over the entire possible futures 
space, of the probability weighted local regret values. 
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This definition, however, does not come without challenges.  In order to successfully 
evaluate the Global Regret, the designer must be abl to integrate the probability 
weighted local regret function over all the dimensio  of the possible future space.  This 
integration is not a trivial task, and can require significant computational power.  The 
Global Regret can be approximated, however, by considering the mean local regret of a 
large sampling of the possible futures space, and the distribution of the local regret in the 
possible futures space. 
 
An additional challenge associated with the mathematical definition of robustness as 
Global Regret arises from the discrete nature of traditional regret analysis.  To evaluate 
the Global Regret, a continuous function must be crated for the response data.  
However, the use of highly accurate surrogate models has been shown to overcome this 
challenge. 
6.1.2 Applicability in Conceptual Design 
The Global Regret Analysis approach can be used in conceptual design, assuming 
quantifiable data on the measures of merit of interest can be created.  Additionally, the 
designer must be able to identify the scenarios over which the system or SoS will be 
expected to be used.   An additional, useful piece of information would be an estimation 
of the likelihood of the different scenarios. 
 
In a modern systems and SoS design environment, the conceptual design phase 
incorporates physics-based modeling, historical and empirical relationships, and 
capability analysis.  These models are created and integrated in such a fashion as to return 
quantification of the different concepts with respect to the measures-of-merit for the 
program.  However, these models may not be valid over the entire scenario space.  As a 
result, if the designer wishes to gain understanding of the robustness of particular 
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concepts relative to the other design alternatives by using Global Regret Analysis, 
particular attention must be paid to the suitability of models over the entire scenario 
space. 
 
6.1.3 Applicability in Pre-Conceptual Design 
Applicability of Global Regret Analysis in the pre-conceptual design phase is dependent 
on the availability of data quantifying the measure of merit for different approach 
alternatives.  In the pre-conceptual design phase, decisions are often made on the basis of 
heuristics, expert surveys, and back-of-the-envelope calculations.  These approaches are 
intended to weed-out a subset of the design space th t is likely to be dominated by other 
approaches.  Much of this process is accomplished, effectively, through good systems 
engineering such as the IPPD process [202] and Morphological Analyses. [80] 
 
Once a manageable subset of approach alternatives has been established, however, some 
form of ranking for those alternatives is usually required while still in the pre-conceptual 
design phase.  In the case of the JCIDS process, the ICD requires a ranked list of 
approaches prior to the AoA.  Because of the complexity of the multiple objectives and 
attributes associated with the system approaches being ranked, in all likelihood some sort 
of quantification of measures of effectiveness will have been completed.  If a relation 
between these quantifications and different scenarios can be completed, Global Regret 
Analysis can be used in pre-conceptual design.  Based on the timeline of typical JCIDs 
studies, which is between six months and a year, this exploration is not considered 
unreasonable. 
 
Because Global Regret Analysis only is applicable once certain conditions are met in pre-
conceptual design, the method will be considered moerately applicable. 
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6.1.4 Robustness Evaluation at the Capability Level  
Global Regret Analysis does a good job of capturing the difference in robustness among 
candidate alternatives at the capability level.  Byleveraging the work of Biltgen [24] and 
Ender [78], [152]  for the construction of the analysis framework, the focus for design at 
all levels of the SoS hierarchy is the military capability.  The methodology presented in 
this dissertation encourages the definition of the local regret fitness metric in terms of the 
military capability and costs of each SoS alternative.  In this way the Global Regret for 
each SoS alternative is a function of the probability weighted military capability across 
all scenarios.  By casting Global Regret in those terms, the capability level remains most 
important in the design process. 
6.1.5 Applicable to Systems-of-Systems 
The applicability of Global Regret Analysis to SoS problems was tackled by considering 
a SoS problem for the application of the method.  The primary differences between the 
handling of a SoS and a systems problem arise in the modeling and simulation aspects of 
the design.  In particular, the modeling approach chosen for a SoS will tend to favor 
techniques that focus on the interaction among system  in the hopes of identifying 
emergent behavior.  These models tend to involve the specification of environmental 
parameters, which can naturally be used as the foundation of the scenario space.  In either 
case, however, because Global Regret Analysis can use measures of merit from any level 
of the SoS hierarchy, it is applicable to SoS, system , and subsystems. 
6.1.6 Applicable to Multi-Objective Problems 
There are two approaches in the current state-of-the-art for multi-objective problems.  
The first approach uses some form of overall evaluation criterion (OEC), which combines 
the different objective of the problem into a single score.  The challenge associated with 
creating a valid and effective OEC is assigning appro riate weighting factors to the 
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different dimensions of the problem.  The second approach is the use of Pareto Frontiers.  
Pareto Frontiers carry forward a family of solutions i stead of a single “best” solution.  
These solutions define the hyper-space boundaries of performance with respect to the 
competing objectives of the design problem [179].  A three-dimensional example of a 
Pareto Frontier is shown in Figure 132.  In the example, each of the three attributes 
improves by increasing.  The family of solutions that represents the boundary of the 
performance with respect to the three attributes is shown by the convex red surface in the 
figure. 
 
Figure 132: 3-D Pareto Frontier 
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Global Regret Analysis requires the use of an OEC because of the need to create a single 
value for comparison with other solutions for a particular scenario.  Because only one of 
the two state-of-the-art approaches to multi-objectiv  problems can be handled in the 
current formulation, the method will be considered to be mostly applicable to multi-
objective problems. 
6.1.7 Optimizable 
The ability of Global Regret Analysis to be coupled with an optimizer depends on the 
behavior of the Global and Local Regret functions with changing scenario parameters.  
As a general rule, the capability of the alternatives under consideration was observed to 
be non-linear with local minima, and discrete jumps in some regions of the scenario 
space.  This behavior was what drove the use of Artificial Neural Network-based 
surrogate models.  However, because Global Regret Analysis does lead to a single-value 
measure for each candidate alternative, the analysis can be written in a standard 
optimization form. [243] 
 
Because of the non-linear behavior of the Global Regret Function, a stochastic optimizer 
would be the preferred choice, as opposed to a puregradient-based or path-building 
method.  Both genetic-algorithm [243] and simulated-annealing [75] approaches could be 
applied to this type of problem, especially given the rapid-response of the surrogate 
models. 
 
Because fairly advanced stochastic optimization techniques are required for use with 
most Global Regret Analysis applications, the method will be considered to have mostly 
met the optimization criteria. 
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6.1.8 Automated 
The applications used in the testing of the hypotheses for this dissertation, and for the 
complete methodology demonstration have both been conducted in an automated fashion.  
While there was considerable time required for the construction of the parametric 
scenario generator for each case, once the environment was built and the alternatives 
modeled, the DoE was run through an automated process using Model Center.  The 
computational time for the hypothesis demonstration was approximately one week on a 
desktop computer, which would have been significantly more if the cases had been run 
manually. 
 
In a sense, Global Regret Analysis requires an automated approach to modeling and 
simulation because of the large number of scenarios that must be explored to create the 
scenario surrogate models for each alternative.  The degree of automation will impact the 
time required to complete the analyses, but nothing about the method inhibits automation.  
There is no human-in-the-loop requirement once the cases have been programmed. The 
determination of an appropriate objective function does require the interaction with 
decision makers, and often iteration among interestd parties.  Therefore, Global Regret 
Analysis will be considered to be a moderately automated approach. 
6.1.9 Applicable to Revolutionary Concepts 
Global Regret Analysis is applicable to revolutionary concepts to the degree that they can 
be captured by the modeling and simulation environme t chosen by the designers.  
Revolutionary concepts imply that simple empirical relationships that have been 
traditionally used for aircraft conceptual and pre-conceptual design will no longer be 
applicable.  In this case, the designer must rely on physics-based analysis for 
understanding the capability of the revolutionary concept. 
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The example used for hypothesis testing in this dissertation used a physics-based 
modeling and simulation approach.  The agents in the environment were modeled based 
on physical equations derived from basic physical principles such as the Newton’s 
Second Law for calculating aircraft flight performance.  Because these relationships do 
not change for revolutionary concepts, the revolutinary concepts can be integrated easily 
into the type of modeling and simulation used with Global Regret Analysis. 
 
6.1.10 Robustness Evaluation based on Full Life Cyc le 
Because of the scope of this dissertation effort, the applicability of Global Regret 
Analysis to the full life cycle of a System of Systems was not considered in either the 
example used for hypothesis testing nor the example used for demonstration of the entire 
method.  The lack of an example to cite for determining the applicability of Global 
Regret Analysis to the full life cycle means that the determination must be made on the 
basis of logic, and could be disproved in the future. 
 
There are two primary requirements for a designer to use Global Regret Analysis: a 
single OEC that exists at the capability level (and potentially other levels if requirements 
dictate) and the ability to consider the impact of different possible scenarios on that OEC.  
Therefore, if other aspects of the SoS’s life cycle, such as maintenance, logistics, training, 
disposal, etc, can be modeled so that competing altern tives receive a numerical score in 
each area, and that score can change according to different possible scenarios, Global 
Regret Analysis will be applicable for assessing the robustness of the entire life cycle of 
the SoS.  However, if models of those life cycle processes can not return a score for each 
alternative, or the models are not able to incorporate scenario parameters into that score, 
Global Regret Analysis would not be suited for asses ing the robustness of that particular 
aspect of the SoS life cycle. 
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Because of the varying level of maturity of models for the entire SoS life cycle, Global 
Regret Analysis will be considered to have a low-to-m derate ability to capture the 
robustness of these activities.  Additionally, the planning processes for post-acquisition 
activities of the SoS life cycle are typically not handled until after the Milestone A review 
in the defense acquisition process. However, as models for the entire SoS life cycle 
mature and are integrated more readily into conceptual and pre-conceptual design, Global 
Regret Analysis will be able to incorporate those models without modification to the 
method. 
6.2 Comparison of Global Regret Analysis to Existing Methods 
Having discussed the merits of Global Regret Analysis with respect to each of the metrics 
used for qualitative assessment of robustness methods, Global Regret Analysis was 
assigned “poor”, “moderate”, or “good” score for each.  These scores are summarized in 
the final column of Figure 133.  As can be seen in the figure, for some metrics, such as 
“Robustness Evaluation at Capability Level,” Global Regret Analysis is clearly the 
superior option.  With respect to some other metrics, such as “Robustness Based on Full 
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Figure 133: Comparison of Robustness Methods 
 
In order to gain more insight into the “goodness” of Global Regret Analysis, the 
Technique for Ordered Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
methodology was used.  TOPSIS is discussed in detail in Appendix A.  Two approaches 
were used to quantifying the data in Figure 133.  The first approach assigned a value of 1 
to poor performance, 2 to moderate performance, and 3 to good performance.  This type 
of scoring is referred to as a linear scale, and can be useful for its simplicity.  The second 
approach used a ratio scale, where a value of 1 was assigned to poor performance, 3 to 
moderate performance, and 9 to good performance.  This type of scale allows approaches 
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with strengths in a particular area to be easily distinguishable from those with low 
performance. 
 
Because it is impossible to know which of the metrics used to judge robustness 
methodologies will be most important to analysts, a large number of weighting schemes 
were developed using a MCS approach, and the statistics for the TOPSIS “best” solution 
recorded.  The results of the MCS, for which 10,000 cases were run, are shown in Figure 
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Figure 135: Best Approach, Ratio Scale 
 
As can be seen in the figures, the number of times a particular approach appears as the 
dominant approach changes depending on the weighting scheme.  For example, method 3 
does ever appear as a best solution with the ratio scale, though it does with the linear 
scale.  Additionally, the rankings of approaches one through five changes depending on 
the scale used.  What does not change between the scales, however, is the dominance of 
weightings for which approach 6, Global Regret Analysis, is the “best” approach.  While 
it is clearly not a silver bullet for addressing robustness, the method shows a great 




This section contains a summary of the major contribu ions of this dissertation to the 
aerospace engineering and defense acquisition fields. 
• Survey of the current state-of-the-art with respect to robustness evaluation in 
defense acquisition 
• Identification of gaps in the current defense acquisition process related to 
robustness evaluation 
• Proposal of a method that defines robustness in terms of capability level metrics 
• Quantitative definition of robustness that incorporates system and scenario 
variables 
• Supported the individual elements of the method through hypothesis testing 
o Parametric Scenario Generator M&S 
o Surrogate Models for Scenario Space Modeling 
o Mathematical Definition of Global Regret 
o Filtered Monte Carlo Simulation for Visualization 
• Demonstrated the use of Global Regret Analysis for the USAF’s Persistent 
Precision Strike application 
o Discovered visualization for single and dual dominance of concepts in 
local regret visualization 
o Provided a method for visualizing the useful scenario space for different 
concepts and discussed the implications for mission pla ning 
• Compared Global Regret Analysis to current, state-of-the-art robustness 
evaluation methods and discussed advantages 
6.3.1 INCOSE SoS Challenges 
The INCOSE identifies 7 challenges related to the engineering of SoS in the INCOSE 
Systems Engineering Handbook [123].  These challenges are listed as being above and 
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beyond the challenges associated with engineering conventional systems.  Biltgen 
summarizes the challenges and discusses their contribution to the unique nature of SoS 
[24]. 
 
1. System Elements Operate Independently 
2. Systems Elements Have Different Life Cycles 
3. The Initial Requirement are Likely to be Ambiguous 
4. Complexity is a Major Issue 
5. Management Can Overshadow Engineering 
6. Fuzzy Boundaries Cause Confusion 
7. SoS Engineering is Never Finished 
 
Because the defense acquisition process was the starting point for the development of the 
ideas of this dissertation, these 7 challenges werenot included in the initial development 
of Global Regret Analysis.  However, Global Regret Analysis does partially address two 
of the challenges identified by the INCOSE: ambiguity of initial requirements and 
management overshadowing engineering. 
 
Ambiguity in the initial set of requirements can be partially addressed by Global Regret 
Analysis by structuring the Parametric Scenario Generator and M&S so that the 
requirements with ambiguity are included as scenario variables.  For example, if the radar 
signature requirements for an aircraft were ambiguous early in the design phase, they 
could be incorporated into the Global Regret calcultion in one of two ways.  The first 
way would be the construction of the local fitness function in such a fashion as to impose 
a penalty when the signature constraint was violated.  This constraint could then be 
varied and the robustness of the concepts would include the moving requirement.  A 
second approach would be to re-size the set of concepts each time a vehicle requirement 
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changed.  This approach would allow the comparison of the robustness of approaches, 
not just individual concepts.  Unfortunately, this approach would be much more 
computationally intensive than the modified fitness function. 
 
The second challenge that Global Regret Analysis partially addresses is the challenge of 
management overshadowing engineering.  As was shown in the demonstration of the 
methodology on the Persistent Precision Strike example, for each of the five concepts a 
combination of OEC weighting factors and scenario variables could be found to make 
any concept dominant.  The implication of this discovery is that if program management 
had a concept that was preferred for reasons beyond those stated for the analysis, a case 
could be made for that concept being the “best.”  However, by using the Global Regret 
Analysis approach in assessing robustness, those few cases could quickly be shown as 
outliers, while the dominant concepts were “best” over the majority of the scenario space.  
While Global Regret Analysis does address the issue of management being able to dial in 
scenarios for a favored candidate, it does not helpwith another aspect of the management 
issue.  Because SoS are so complex, the program management necessary to coordinate 
among the different vendors, designers, users, and funders can be overwhelming. 
 
6.4 Final Thoughts 
Finding robust solutions to problems requires much more effort than finding an optimal 
solution.  The optimal solution makes the designer only think of one scenario, one 
(sometimes composite) objective function, and a set of constraints.  The robust solution, 
on the other hand, needs to consider the objective function, the set of constraints, and 
how those change over many possible scenarios.  But, given the rapid pace at which the 
world is changing and the lives that are on the linwhen considering military systems, we 
must strive to overcome these difficulties and make the best possible decisions. 
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6.4.1 Future Work 
The majority of the work in this dissertation focused on the comparison of a few, materiel 
solutions to a capability need.  However, the process of parsing through the billions of 
morphological combinations that exist in the design space, especially when non-materiel 
solutions are including, has not been well documented in the defense acquisition process.  
A formalization of the morphological analysis methods for the early defense acquisition 
process could greatly clarify the process of reducing the design space in a logical and 
systematic way. 
 
There is the potential to greatly improve the effectiveness of a system-of-systems through 
the tactical manner in which it is employed.  US Special Forces use essentially the same 
equipment as the enemies they engage, yet are so tactically superior they nearly always 
prevail.  The tactics for using a system are typically left to they operational phase of the 
system’s life cycle.  Beyond a brief CONOPS, the soldiers must train and learn to employ 
the system after its design.  If tactics could be accounted for easily in the early modeling 
and simulation efforts of conceptual design, those tactics could in turn be accounted for 
in the design itself, possibly reducing cost on increasing expected performance. 
 
The Global Regret Analysis methodology could be expanded and tested in a number of 
ways that would contribute to its usefulness.  The first area for additional research is the 
implementation of the fitness function for the evaluation of the local regret.  While OECs 
have wide acceptance in the aerospace and defense acquisition communities, they are not 
without critics.  Exploration of the use of other tchniques such as AHP, TOPSIS, or 
Pareto Optimality would enhance the ability of Global Regret Analysis to overcome 
criticisms of OECs. 
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The second area of additional research for the Global Regret Analysis methodology 
would be improvements in the definition for the local likelihood function for the scenario 
space.  In the formulation presented for the local like ihoods, all of the scenario variables 
are treated as independent variables.  In reality, however, there would most likely be 
correlations among the various scenario variables.  In many cases these correlations could 
be linked to other metrics, such as levels of funding in the adversary’s research and 
development, level of hostility, and environmental characteristics of the adversary’s 
country.  Accounting for these correlations would allow for a more accurate vision of the 
likelihood of plausible futures, and consequently, a better assessment of the Global 
Regret for each competing alternative. 
 
6.4.2 Support for Global Regret Analysis 
Throughout this dissertation, the author has strove t  address the creation of the Global 
Regret Analysis method in a scientifically sound, repeatable way.  However, especially 
with regard to the experiments in logic that led to the selection of the particular tools 
used, the human mind was the laboratory for the experiment.  In these cases, other 
scientists and engineers might reach different conclusions.  Therefore, for consensus to be 
reached, scientific dialog on the topic is required.  Especially when the hypotheses of the 
work deal with subjects that can not be explicitly proven, the merits and weaknesses of 
the method must be explored. 
 
This dissertation provided two example problems that provided support to the overall 
hypothesis that Global Regret Analysis has strength for addressing robustness early in the 
defense acquisition process.  The examples were selected to hopefully allow readers to 
extrapolate the metrics, systems, and environments con idered to problems relevant to 
their own work.  However, because the degree pursued by the author is in aerospace 
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engineering, it was necessary to keep the example applic tions in that arena.  The work 
contained here has provided two successful applications of Global Regret Analysis; 
however, the bounds of its applicability still need to be tested. The bound of Global 
Regret Analysis’s applicability have been suggested based on logic throughout the 
development of the method.  However, these bounds will only become clear as the 
method is used. 
6.4.3 Exploring the Bounds of SoS Performance 
A wide variety of factors beyond simply the SoS’s capability and cost drive defense 
acquisitions.  The military industrial complex invol es lobbyists, politicians, military 
planner, and budget controllers. [68] In most cases, elected officials must show how the 
work they have done has benefited their home district, adding another degree of 
complexity to the SoS acquisition problem.  While Global Regret Analysis does a good 
job of allowing decision making based on the capability and cost concerns of the SoS, 
M&S does not exist for all of the political factors of the military industrial complex. 
 
Regardless of these complexities, Global Regret Analysis provides one major benefit for 
decision makers, even if decisions are not truly based on the capability and cost of the 
SoS.  The ability to understand the bounds of performance for a system relative to its 
alternatives would be very valuable for a military campaign.  If mission planners 
understood the topology of the scenario space and were able to explore that space rapidly, 
situations that posed challenges could be addressed before lives were lost.  If after the 
acquisition process was complete, it became apparent that the SoS would be used in an 
area of degraded performance as identified by Global Regret Analysis, training or tactics 
could be altered to improve the system performance, or the mission might be cancelled.  
This understanding would also help politicians prepa  for potential backlash by 






A.1 Functional Decomposition 
A functional decomposition, just as the name suggests, breaks down the system design 
based on the functions it will accomplish.  Rather than looking at the physical system 
parts, the functional decomposition could be accomplished by asking “what must the 
system do?”  An example functional decomposition for an aircraft might include 
“generate lift”, “store payload”, and “generate thrust.”  Functional decompositions are 
useful for organizing conceptual design alternatives when the requirements do not dictate 
a specific type of physical system.  They encourage engineers to “think outside the box” 
when deciding how to accomplish the tasks required of the system-of-systems. 
 
A.2 DoE Methods 
Design of Experiments is a collection of mathematical approaches to structuring 
experiments in such a way as to gain as much information from each experimental run as 
possible.  According to Breyfogle, “DoE Techniques offer a structured approach to 
change many factor settings within a process at once a d observe the data collectively for 
improvements/degradations.” [36]  There are many types of DoEs that are specialized for 
certain applications, so some knowledge of the nature of the system being explored is 
helpful.  When little knowledge of the system is available, a set of screening DoEs can be 
used to gain insight with little effort.  DoEs are most helpful when individual 
experimental runs are expensive, either computationlly, in terms of labor, or dollars. 
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Reductionism is often coupled with DoE techniques.  In SoS problems especially, the 
number of independent variables available for manipulation is large.  Screening DoEs, 
coupled with Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), can help reduce the number of variables 
that are considered in early design phases. [250]  In most SoS problems, only a handful of 
variables have significant influence on the variabil ty of the metrics of interest over the 
ranges relevant to the problem.  By using ANOVA, those variables may be identified and 
the rest defaulted with little impact on the accuray surrogate models. 
A.3 TOPSIS 
The Technique for Ordered Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
provides a simple procedure for obtaining a definitive set of ranked alternatives.  TOPSIS 
involves the selection of important design criteria, the assignment of weights to those 
criteria (often from the QFD) and then the evaluation of alternatives based on the distance 
of those alternatives’ design criteria from an ideal.  For this procedure a positive and 
negative “ideal” case are created, and the alternative that is closest to the positive ideal 
and farthest from the negative ideal is ranked the highest.  Geometrically this is shown in 
Figure 136.  The Pareto Curve is a curve defined by the limit of cases that minimize 
attributes 1 and 2.  The Pareto Curve can be thought of as an isovalue contour of the 
maximum fitness for the feasible design space based on the overall evaluation function 
that is used to evaluate concepts. The best case would be that case which minimized 













Figure 136: Graphical Representation of TOPSIS 
 
TOPSIS involves first creating a decision matrix ofalternatives as rows and 
responses/characteristics as columns.  These columns are then populated for each 
alternative based either on simulation results, empirical data, or qualitative assessment.  If 
a qualitative assessment is used, the values must be converted to a numerical scale.  The 
dimensional values in this matrix are then normalized on a scale of -1 to 1 by dividing 
each entry by the square-root of the sum-of-squares of it  column and then multiplied by 
the weighting factor associated with the response or characteristic.  Each response is then 
characterized as a cost or a benefit, for example payload and endurance are benefits and 
are maximized while carbon dioxide emissions and laing field length are costs and are 
minimized.  The responses considered for this impleentation follow a weighting 
structure that is adjustable depending on the judgment of the evaluating engineers. 
 
In order to establish a basis for comparison for each lternative a positive and negative 
ideal are selected based on the weighted values of the responses.  The positive ideal is the 
set that includes the maximum value in the matrix for each of the benefits and the 
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minimum value for each of the costs.  Then negative ideal possesses the maximum value 
for each of the costs and the minimum value for each of the benefits.  The separation of 
each alternative from the positive and negative ideal is calculated based on the square-
root of the sum-of-squares of the differences betwen the alternative and the positive 
ideal, and then again for the alternative and the negative ideal. 
 
The relative closeness of each alternative to the ideal solution is then calculated based on 
the separation from the negative solution divided by the sum of the positive and negative 
separations.  This ranking system results in a value for each alterative between 0 and 1, 
where 0 corresponds to the worst alternative and 1 to the best.  A flow chart of the 




Figure 137: TOPSIS Flowchart 
 
 
When the fitness of each concept with respect to the system metrics used for concept 
evaluation are plotted on each of the axes of a radr plot, the best system from the 
TOPSIS methodology will correspond roughly to that which has the most area in the 
radar plot.  Because of the dependence of the overall evaluation criterion on the weights 
assigned to each system evaluation metric, it is important to have consensus on the 
weights from the evaluating engineers, or create a probabilistic assessment by varying the 
weights over a large number of cases and observing tre ds in the resulting rankings.  This 
type of analysis can be used to show the sensitivity of system ranking to requirement 
weights and allows the further study of significant requirements.  An example 
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B.1 MATLAB Terrain Generators 
B.1.1 Ridgemaker 
%Ridge Generator - Fractal 
%Benjamin Poole 
  
function [terrain45] = ridgemaker(mountainousness,roughness,max_elev) 
  
% mountainousness = 1; 
% roughness = .3; 
  
InitialLine = [0,0;1,0]; 
Line = InitialLine; 
n=1; 
randomrange = mountainousness; 
while n <= 7 
    segments = size(Line); 
    segments = segments(1)-1; 
    segcounter = 1; 
    while segcounter <= segments 
        distance = (Line(segcounter+1,1) - Line(segcounter,1)); 
        midpoint = 0.5*(Line(segcounter+1,1) - Line(s gcounter,1))+ Line(segcounter,1); 
        slope = (Line(segcounter+1,2) - Line(segcounter,2))/distance; 
        mid_elev = slope*(midpoint-Line(segcounter,1))+ Line(segcounter,2); 
        displacement = rand*randomrange; 
        direction = 1; 
        if rand<0.5 
            direction = -1; 
        end 
        newpoints(segcounter,:) = [midpoint, direction*displacement+mid_elev]; 
        segcounter = segcounter + 1; 
    end 
    Line = [Line;newpoints]; 
    Line = sortrows(Line); 
    randomrange = randomrange*roughness; 
    n = n+1; 
end 
% plot(Line(:,1),Line(:,2)) 
% AXIS([InitialLine(1,1) InitialLine(2,1) -1 1]) 
terrain1 = Line(:,2); 
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terrain2 = max_elev*terrain1; 














%mountainousness = 1; 
%roughness = 0.5; 




Terrain = Initial_Square; 
randomrange = mountainousness; 
number_squares = 1; 
%iterations =5; 
 
%Uncomment if you want the same terrain repeatedly 
%rand('state',0) 
 
iteration_counter = 0; 
while iteration_counter<iterations 
    %Square Step 
    n = 0; 
    while n<number_squares 
        %Find the cornerpoints of the square for this sub-iteration 
        gridsize = (number_squares^.5);%*(Initial_Square(3,1)-Initial_Square(1,1)) 
        Square1 = [mod(n,gridsize)/gridsize*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),(floor(n/gridsize))/gridsize*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
        Square1 = Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Square1(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Square1(2)),:); 
        Square2 = [Square1(1)+1/gridsize,Square1(2)]; 
        Square2 = Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Square2(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Square2(2)),:); 
        Square3 = [Square1(1),Square1(2)+1/gridsize]; 
        Square3 = Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Square3(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Square3(2)),:); 
        Square4 = [Square1(1)+1/gridsize,Square1(2)+ /gridsize]; 
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        Square4 = Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Square4(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Square4(2)),:); 
        Square = [Square1;Square2;Square3;Square4]; 
 
        %Find the Midpoint Height 
        average_elev = (Square(1,3)+Square(2,3)+Square(3,3)+Square(4,3))/4; 
        displacement = rand*randomrange; 
        direction = 1; 
        if rand<downpercent 
            direction = -1; 
        end 
        midpoint1 = (Square(2,1)-Square(1,1))*0.5+Square(1,1); 
        midpoint2 = (Square(3,2)-Square(2,2))*0.5+Square(1,2); 
        midpoint3 = direction*displacement+average_el v; 
        midpoint = [midpoint1,midpoint2,midpoint3]; 
        midpoints(n+1,:) = [midpoint]; 
        %Update the Terrain 
        Terrain = [Terrain;midpoint]; 
        n=n+1; 
    end 
    %diamond step 
    m=0; 
    while m<number_squares 
        d=0; 
       while d<4 
            %find corner points of the diamond for this sub-iteration 
            if d==0 
                Diamond1 = [midpoints(m+1,1),midpoints(m+1,2)-
(1/gridsize)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond2 = [midpoints(m+1,1)-(1/grids ze/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)-(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond3 = [midpoints(m+1,1), midpoints(m+1,2)]; 
                Diamond4 = [midpoints(m+1,1)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)-(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
            end 
            if d==1 
                Diamond1 = [midpoints(m+1,1)-(1/grids ze/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)-(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond2 = [midpoints(m+1,1)-(1/grids ze)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)];          
                Diamond3 = [midpoints(m+1,1)-(1/grids ze/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond4 = [midpoints(m+1,1), midpoints(m+1,2)]; 
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            end 
            if d==2 
                Diamond1 = [midpoints(m+1,1), midpoints(m+1,2)]; 
                Diamond2 = [midpoints(m+1,1)-(1/grids ze/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond3 = 
[midpoints(m+1,1),midpoints(m+1,2)+(1/gridsize)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond4 = [midpoints(m+1,1)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
            end 
            if d==3 
                Diamond1 = [midpoints(m+1,1)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)-(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond2 = [midpoints(m+1,1), midpoints(m+1,2)];             
                Diamond3 = [midpoints(m+1,1)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)+(1/gridsize/2)*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))]; 
                Diamond4 = [midpoints(m+1,1)+(1/gridsize)*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1)),midpoints(m+1,2)];         
            end 
            %does this diamond already exist? (check to see if midpoint is in 
            %terrain) 
            midpoint_d = Diamond1+(Diamond3-Diamond1)/2; 
            exist_test = find(Terrain(:,1)==midpoint_d(1)&Terrain(:,2)==midpoint_d(2)); 
            if isempty(exist_test) 
               Diamond1 = 
Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Diamond1(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Diamond1(2)),:); 
               Diamond2 = 
Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Diamond2(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Diamond2(2)),:); 
               Diamond3 = 
Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Diamond3(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Diamond3(2)),:); 
               Diamond4 = 
Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==Diamond4(1)&Terrain(:,2)==Diamond4(2)),:); 
               Diamond = [Diamond1;Diamond2;Diamond3;Diamond4]; 
               direction = 1; 
               if rand<downpercent 
                   direction = -1; 
               end 
               displacement = rand*randomrange; 
               midpoint_d = [midpoint_d,direction*displacement+mean(Diamond(:,3))]; 
               Terrain = [Terrain;midpoint_d]; 
            end 
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            d = d+1; 
       end 
       m=m+1; 
    end 
    number_squares = number_squares*4; 
    iteration_counter = iteration_counter+1; 





x_counter = 0; 
x=[]; 
while x_counter<=(2*gridsize) 
    x = [x;Initial_Square(1,1)+x_counter*(Initial_Square(3,1)-
Initial_Square(1,1))/(2*gridsize)]; 
    x_counter = x_counter+1; 
end 
y_counter = 0; 
y=[]; 
while y_counter<=(2*gridsize) 
    y = [y;Initial_Square(1,2)+y_counter*(Initial_Square(2,2)-
Initial_Square(1,2))/(2*gridsize)]; 
    y_counter = y_counter+1; 
end 
Z = []; 
for j=1:(2*gridsize+1) 
    for i=1:(2*gridsize+1) 
        Z(i,j) = Terrain(find(Terrain(:,1)==x(j)&Terrain(:,2)==y(i)),3); 
    end 
end 
 surf(x,y,Z)  
 hold; 
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B.2 MATLAB LOS Calculators 
B.2.1 Urban LOS 



















%worst case viewing (over center of the block) 
v=a/2; 
 








    x=v+b; 
    s=b*x-1/2*v*c/(h-c)*x*(1+x^2/v^2)^(1/2)-1/2*v*c/(h-
c)*log(1/v^2*x/(1/v^2)^(1/2)+(1+x^2/v^2)^(1/2))/(1/v^2)^(1/2); 
    s=s*4; 
    x=v; 
    s1=b*x-1/2*v*c/(h-c)*x*(1+x^2/v^2)^(1/2)-1/2*v*c/(h-
c)*log(1/v^2*x/(1/v^2)^(1/2)+(1+x^2/v^2)^(1/2))/(1/v^2)^(1/2); 
    s1=s1*4; 
    if s<0 
        s=0; 
        if s1<0 
            s1=0; 
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        end 
    end 
    avgdepth=s1/4/v; 
    slightly_optomistic_sections=(counter)*8*avgdepth*a; 
    covered_area = covered_area+s+s1+slightly_optomis ic_sections; 
    v=v+a+b; 






covered_of_available = covered_area/(((1-(a/(a+b))^2) *w^2) 
covered_of_available_percent = covered_of_available*100 
 
 
B.2.2 Terrain LOS 
%terrain coverage 2-D 
%Benjamin Poole 
%inputs are h (height of aircraft), halfswath (length of half of the swath 
% and terrain, a vector of the terrain heights 
 
function [visibility_amount] = linear_terraincoverage(h,halfswath,terrain) 
 
%h is height agl 
% h = 100; 
% halfswath = 100; 
% terrain = [3,4,50,12,13,14,10,1,2,3,4]; 
 





h1 = terrain(x1+1); 
h2 = terrain(x2+1); 
 
angle2 = atan(x2*d/(h-h2)); 
angle1 = atan(x1*d/(h-h1)); 
theta = angle2 - angle1; 
 
hmax = [h2,d]; 
 
if h1 > h2 & theta < 0 
    visibility(x2) = 0; 
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else 







 while x2 <= halfswath/d 
     h1 = terrain(x1+1); 
     h2 = terrain(x2+1); 
     visibility(x2)=1; 
      
     if h1 < hmax | h2 < hmax 
       angle_max = atan(hmax(2)/(h-hmax(1))); 
       angle2 = atan(x2*d/(h-h2)); 
       angle1 = atan(x1*d/(h-h1)); 
       theta1 = angle1-angle_max; 
       theta2 = angle2-angle_max; 
       if theta1 < 0 | theta2 <0 
           visibility(x2)=0; 
       end 
     end 
      
     if visibility(x2)==1 
         angle2 = atan(x2*d/(h-h2)); 
         angle1 = atan(x1*d/(h-h1)); 
         theta = angle2 - angle1; 
         if h1 > h2 & theta < 0 
             visibility(x2) = 0; 
         end 
     end 
      
     if h2>hmax(1) 
         hmax = [h2,x2*d]; 
     end 
     x1=x2; 
     x2=x1+1; 
 end 
 visibility; 
 visibility_amount = sum(visibility)/(length(visibility)); 
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B.3 NetLogo Model 
;Hunter-Killer Model 
;By Benjamin Poole 






breed [HKs HK] 
breed [hunters hunter] 
breed [killers killer] 
breed [missiles missile] 









































































































  ca 
  random-seed seed 
  make-HKs 
  make-hunters 
  make-killers 
  make-targets 
  make-patches 
  set missile-speed 15 
  set detonation-radius 1 
  set-default-shape missiles "missile" 
  set remember-percentage 0 
  set base-decision-time 1 
  set max-missile-flight 100 
  set refueling-counter 0 
  set rearming-counter 0 
  set blue-missiles-counter 0 




  missile-flight 
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  defenses 
  huntkill 
  target-move 
  unhide 
  tick 
  if (count HKs + count killers) = 0 or count targets with [variety != "SAM"] = 0 or ticks 
>= 5000 [ 
  finish 








  set-default-shape HKs "hk" 
  create-HKs nHKs [ 
  set size 10 
  set color blue - 2 
  set heading 0 
  set speed 3 
  set decider? autonomous? 
  set objective nobody 
  set permission? false 
  set missile-inbound? false 
  set hiding? false 
  set weapons max-hk-weapons 
  set fuel max-hk-fuel 
  set resupply-timer 0  
  setxy  (who * 200) / count HKs - 100 + sensor-width / 2 (who * 200) / count HKs - 100 
+ sensor-width / 2 
  set last-x xcor 
  set last-y ycor 
  set last-heading heading 
  set weapon-range BWRange 
  set resupplying? false 
  set returning? false 




  set-default-shape hunters "rq-4a" 
  create-hunters nHunters [ 
  set size 10 
  set color blue - 2 
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  set heading 0 
  set speed 3 
  set decider? autonomous? 
  set objective nobody 
  set permission? false 
  set missile-inbound? false 
  set hiding? false 
  set weapons 0 
  set fuel max-hunter-fuel 
  set resupply-timer 0  
  setxy random-xcor random-ycor 
  set last-x xcor 
  set last-y ycor 
  set last-heading heading 
  set resupplying? false 




  set-default-shape killers "killer" 
  create-killers nKillers [ 
  set size 4 
  set color blue - 2 
  set heading 0 
  set speed 3 
  set decider? autonomous? 
  set objective nobody 
  set permission? false 
  set missile-inbound? false 
  set hiding? false 
  set weapons max-killer-weapons 
  set fuel max-killer-fuel 
  set resupply-timer 0  
  setxy random-xcor random-ycor 
  set last-x xcor 
  set last-y ycor 
  set last-heading heading 
  set weapon-range BWrange 




  create-targets ntrucks [ 
    set variety "truck" 
    set shape "truck" 
    set hiding-counter 0 
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    set size 5 
    set hiding? true 
    set color gray 
    set missile-inbound? false 
    set discernability Dtruck 
    set popup-percent Ptruck 
    set loiter-time Ltruck 
    set can-hide? true 
    set objective nobody 
    set permission? false 
    set speed 1 
    setxy random-xcor random-ycor] 
  create-targets nfacilities [ 
    set variety "facility" 
    set shape "facility" 
    set hiding-counter 0 
    set size 5 
    set hiding? false 
    set color red 
    set missile-inbound? false 
    set discernability 0 
    set popup-percent 3 
    set loiter-time 15 
    set can-hide? false 
    set objective nobody 
    set permission? false 
    setxy random-xcor random-ycor] 
  create-targets nSAMs [ 
    set variety "SAM" 
    set shape "sa-6 sam" 
    set hiding-counter 0 
    set size 5 
    set hiding? true 
    set color gray 
    set missile-inbound? false 
    set discernability DSAM 
    set popup-percent PSAM 
    set loiter-time LSAM 
    set can-hide? true 
    set armed "SAMissile" 
    set sensor-range RSSAM 
    set objective nobody 
    set permission? false 
    set weapon-range RWSAM 





  ask patches [ 
    ifelse random 100 < urban-percent [ 
      set urban? true 
      set pcolor 5 ] 
      [ 
      set urban? false 







;need to work out a way for the permission not to reset if the objective doesn't hide 
 
to huntkill 
  ask HKs [ 
    ifelse weapons = 0 or fuel <= 0 or resupplying? [ 
      if not resupplying? [ 
        set last-x xcor 
        set last-y ycor 
        set last-heading heading]       
      resupply] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and decider? [ 
      fire] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and permission? [ 
       
      fire] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and not decider? [ 
      get-permission] [ 
    ifelse fly-back? [ 
      fly-back] [ 
    hunt] 
    ]]]] 
    if fuel > 0 [ 
    set fuel fuel - 1]] 
     
  ask hunters [ 
    ifelse fuel <= 0 or resupplying? [ 
      if not resupplying? [ 
        set last-x xcor 
        set last-y ycor 
        set last-heading heading] 
      resupply] [ 
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    ifelse objective != nobody and decider? [ 
      call-in] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and permission? [ 
      call-in] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and not decider? [ 
      get-permission] [ 
    hunt] 
  ]]] 
  if fuel > 0 [ 
    set fuel fuel - 1]] 
   
  ask killers [ 
    ifelse weapons = 0 or fuel <= 0 or resupplying? [ 
      if not resupplying? [ 
        set last-x xcor 
        set last-y ycor 
        set last-heading heading] 
      resupply] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and decider? [ 
      fire] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and permission? [ 
      fire] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody and not decider? [ 
      get-permission] [ 
    loiter]]]] 
    if fuel > 0 [ 




    target-available 
    ifelse objective != nobody [] [  ; if i have a t rget, do nothing, else move the aircraft in 
one of the ways below 
    ifelse returning? [return] [ 
    ifelse heading = 0 and max-pycor - ycor < speed an  max-pxcor - xcor < sensor-width 
[ 
      return] [ 
    ifelse heading = 180 and ycor = min-pycor and xcor = max-pxcor [ 
        return] [ 
    move-aircraft] 




  ifelse ycor < min-pycor + max list speed sensor-width and xcor < min-pxcor + max list 
speed sensor-width [ 
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    set heading 0 
    setxy min-pxcor + sensor-width / 2  min-pycor + sensor-width / 2 
    set returning? false][ 
    set returning? true 
    facexy min-pxcor min-pycor 
    forward speed] 
end 
        
to move-aircraft  ; moves aircraft in the search pattern 
    if heading != 180 and heading != 0 [ 
      set heading last-heading] 
    ifelse heading = 0 and max-pycor - ycor >= speed [ 
      forward speed] [ifelse heading = 0 and max-pycor - ycor < speed  [ 
        set heading 90 
        forward sensor-width 
        set heading 180] [ifelse heading = 180 and min-pycor - ycor <= -1 * speed [ 
            forward speed] [ifelse heading = 180 and min-pycor - ycor > -1 * speed [ 
            set heading 90 
            forward sensor-width 
            set heading 0][set heading 0] 
            ]]]    
end 
 
to target-available ; checks if there is a target within range, if not, sets objective to 
nobody 
  ifelse any? targets with [not hiding? and not memb r? self turtle-set (list [objective] of 
hunters)] [ 
    compute-dist-to-nearest 
    let terrain-of-target find-terrain 
    ifelse terrain-of-target = true [ 
      if nearest < sqrt (sensor-width ^ 2 + sensor-length ^ 2) and random 100 < urban-
visibility and random 100 < terrain-visibility [ 
        set objective min-one-of targets with [not hiding? and not member? self turtle-set 
(list [objective] of hunters)] [distance myself]]] [ 
      if nearest < sqrt (sensor-width ^ 2 + sensor-length ^ 2) and random 100 < terrain-
visibility  [ 
        set objective min-one-of targets with [not hiding? and not member? self turtle-set 
(list [objective] of hunters)] [distance myself]]]][ 




  let terrain-of-target [urban?] of patch-set [patch-here] of min-one-of targets with [not 
hiding? and not member? self turtle-set (list [objective] of hunters)] [distance myself] 





  let target-of-interest min-one-of targets with [not hiding? and not member? self turtle-set 
(list [objective] of hunters)] [distance myself] 
  if target-of-interest != nobody [ set nearest disance target-of-interest ] 
end 
 
to fire ; if my distance to objective is greater than my weapon range, move toward 
objective, else fire (remove, set objective and perm) 
  ifelse distance objective > weapon-range [ 
    ifelse breed != targets [set last-heading heading 
    face objective 
    forward speed] [ 
    ]][ 
  if not [missile-inbound?] of objective [ 
    ifelse color = red [ 
      set red-missiles-counter red-missiles-counter + 1][ 
      set blue-missiles-counter blue-missiles-counter + 1] 
    hatch-missiles 1 [ 
      set heading towards objective 
      set speed missile-speed 
      set size 4 
      forward speed 
      ] 
      ask objective [ 
        set missile-inbound? true]] 
  if is-HK? self or is-hunter? self [set weapons weapons - 1] 
  set objective nobody 
  if is-HK? self [set fly-back? true] 




  ifelse [discernability] of objective + base-decision-time <= discernability-timer [ 
  set permission? true 
  set discernability-timer 0][ 




  set resupplying? true 
  ifelse xcor > min-pxcor + 1 and ycor > min-pycor + 1 and ((member? self killers and 
(weapons = 0 or fuel <= 0)) or (member? self HKs and (weapons = 0 or fuel <= 0)) or 
(member? self hunters and fuel <= 0))[ 
    facexy min-pxcor min-pycor 
    forward min ( list speed distancexy min-pxcor min-pycor )] [ 
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    ifelse resupply-timer < resupply-time [ 
      if resupply-timer = 0 and fuel = 0 [ 
        set refueling-counter refueling-counter + 1] 
      if resupply-timer = 0 and weapons = 0 and (not member? self hunters) [ 
        set rearming-counter rearming-counter + 1]   
      set color black 
      set resupply-timer resupply-timer + 1] [ 
    ifelse return-last? and distancexy last-x last-y > 0.1 [ 
      set color blue - 2 
      ifelse is-hk? self [set weapons max-hk-weapons 
      set fuel max-hk-fuel] [ 
        ifelse is-killer? self [set weapons max-killer-weapons 
          set fuel max-killer-fuel] [ 
          set fuel max-hunter-fuel]] 
      facexy last-x last-y 
      forward min (list speed (distancexy last-x last-y))][ 
    ifelse return-last? [ 
      set color blue - 2 
      set resupply-timer 0  
      set heading last-heading 
      set resupplying? false] [ 
    set color blue - 2 
    ifelse is-hk? self [set weapons max-hk-weapons 
      set fuel max-hk-fuel] [ 
      ifelse is-killer? self [set weapons max-killer-weapons 
        set fuel max-killer-fuel] [ 
        set fuel max-hunter-fuel]] 
    set resupply-timer 0  
    setxy min-pxcor + sensor-width / 2 min-pycor 
    set heading 0 
    set resupplying? false 




  if any? (turtle-set (list killers hks)) with [weapons != 0 and objective = nobody] and not 
[missile-inbound?] of objective and not any? ((turtle-set (list killers hks)) with [objective 
= ([objective] of myself)])[ 
  compute-nearest-support 
  if nearest-support-dist < comm-length [ 
    ask nearest-support [ 
    set last-heading-fb heading 
    set last-x xcor 
    set last-y ycor 
    set objective [objective] of myself] 
    set objective nobody 
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  set nearest-support-dist distance min-one-of (turtle-set (list killers HKs)) with [weapons 
!= 0 and objective = nobody] [distance myself] 
  set nearest-support min-one-of (turtle-set (list killers HKs)) with [weapons != 0 and 




  ifelse random 100 < 50   [ 
    set heading heading + random 35] [ 
    set heading heading - random 35] 




  set fly-back? true 
  ifelse distancexy last-x last-y > 0.1 [ 
      facexy last-x last-y 
      forward min (list speed (distancexy last-x last-y))][ 
      set heading last-heading-fb 
      set fly-back? false] 






  ask targets with [armed != 0 and not hiding?] [ 
    ifelse objective != nobody [ 
    fire ][ 
    if (count HKs != 0 or count hunters != 0 or count killers != 0) and distance min-one-of 
turtles with [breed != targets and breed != missiles] [distance myself] < sensor-range [ 
    set objective min-one-of turtles with [breed != targets and breed != missiles] [distance 
myself]] 
    ]]  
end     








  ask missiles [ 
    ifelse flight-time >= max-missile-flight [die] [ 
    ifelse [hiding?] of objective and random 100 > remember-percentage [ 
    ask objective [set missile-inbound? false] 
    die] [ 
    ifelse distance objective < detonation-radius [ 
    kill] [ 
    ifelse abs (subtract-headings heading towards objective - 180) < 5 [ 
    kill] [ 
    set heading towards objective 
    forward min ( list speed (distance objective) ) 
    set flight-time flight-time + 1 




  ask objective [die] 
  die 
end  
     
;================================================== =========== 
;Target codes 
;================================================== ===========   
to target-move 
  ask targets with [speed != 0 and not hiding?] [ 
    set heading heading + random 15 
    forward speed] 
end 
to unhide 
  ask targets with [hiding?] [ 
    if random 100 < popup-percent [ 
      set hiding? false 
      set color red]] 
  ask targets with [not hiding? and can-hide?] [ 
    if hiding-counter > loiter-time [ 
      set hiding? true 
      set hiding-counter 0 
      set color gray]] 
  ask targets with [hiding? = false] [ 
    set hiding-counter hiding-counter + 1] 
end 
       
;================================================== =========== 
;Data summarizing for output 
;================================================== ===========  
to finish 
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  file-open "test.txt" 
    ;file-write "Threats ="  
    file-write count targets with [variety = "SAM"] 
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Facilities ="  
    file-write count targets with [variety = "facility"] 
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Trucks ="  
    file-write count targets with [variety = "truck"] 
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "HKs ="  
    file-write count hks    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Hunters ="  
    file-write count hunters    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Killers ="  
    file-write count killers    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Rearming ="  
    file-write rearming-counter    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Refueling ="  
    file-write refueling-counter    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Blue_Missiles ="  
    file-write blue-missiles-counter    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Red_Missile ="  
    file-write red-missiles-counter    
    ;file-write "," 
    ;file-write "Ticks = " 
    file-write ticks 
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